Chapter 20.—Against Eunomius, Saying that the Son of God is the Son, Not of His Nature, But of His Will. Epilogue to What Has Been Said Already.

38. Wherefore the logic of Eunomius, from whom the Eunomian heretics sprang, is ridiculous. For when he could not understand, and would not believe, that the only-begotten Word of God, by which all things were made is the Son of God by nature,—i.e. born of the substance of the Father,—he alleged that He was not the Son of His own nature or substance or essence, but the Son of the will of God; so as to mean to assert that the will by which he begot the Son was something accidental [and optional] to God,—to wit, in that way that we ourselves sometimes will something which before we did not will, as though it was not for these very things that our nature is perceived to be changeable,—a thing which far be it from us to believe of God. For it is written, “Many are the thoughts in the heart of man, but the counsel of the Lord abideth for ever,”1028    Prov. xix. 21 for no other reason except that we may understand or believe that as God is eternal, so is His counsel for eternity, and therefore unchangeable, as He himself is. And what is said of thoughts can most truly be said also of the will: there are many wills in the heart of man, but the will of the Lord abideth for ever. Some, again, to escape saying that the only-begotten Word is the Son of the counsel or will of God, have affirmed the same Word to be the counsel or will itself of the Father. But it is better in my judgment to say counsel of counsel, and will of will, as substance of substance, wisdom of wisdom, that we may not be led into that absurdity, which we have refuted already, and say that the Son makes the Father wise or willing, if the Father has not in His own substance either counsel or will. It was certainly a sharp answer that somebody gave to the heretic, who most subtly asked him whether God begat the Son willingly or unwillingly, in order that if he said unwillingly, it would follow most absurdly that God was miserable; but if willingly, he would forthwith infer, as though by an invincible reason, that at which he was aiming, viz. that He was the Son, not of His nature, but of His will. But that other, with great wakefulness, demanded of him in turn, whether God the Father was God willingly or unwillingly; in order that if he answered unwillingly, that misery would follow, which to believe of God is sheer madness; and if he said willingly, it would be replied to him, Then He is God too by His own will, not by His nature. What remained, then, except that he should hold his peace, and discern that he was himself bound by his own question in an insoluble bond? But if any person in the Trinity is also to be specially called the will of God, this name, like love, is better suited to the Holy Spirit; for what else is love, except will?

39. I see that my argument in this book respecting the Holy Spirit, according to the Holy Scripture, is quite enough for faithful men who know already that the Holy Spirit is God, and not of another substance, nor less than the Father and the Son,—as we have shown to be true in the former books, according to the same Scriptures. We have reasoned also from the creature which God made, and, as far as we could, have warned those who demand a reason on such subjects to behold and understand His invisible things, so far as they could, by those things which are made1029    Rom. i. 20 and especially by the rational or intellectual creature which is made after the image of God; through which glass, so to say, they might discern as far as they could, if they could, the Trinity which is God, in our own memory, understanding, will. Which three things, if any one intelligently regards as by nature divinely appointed in his own mind, and remembers by memory, contemplates by understanding, embraces by love, how great a thing that is in the mind, whereby even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recollected, beheld, desired, doubtless that man finds an image of that highest Trinity. And he ought to refer the whole of his life to the remembering, seeing, loving that highest Trinity, in order that he may recollect, contemplate, be delighted by it. But I have warned him, so far as seemed sufficient, that he must not so compare this image thus wrought by that Trinity, and by his own fault changed for the worse, to that same Trinity as to think it in all points like to it, but rather that he should discern in that likeness, of whatever sort it be, a great unlikeness also.

CAPUT XX.

38. Contra Eunomium dicentem Filium Dei non naturae, sed voluntatis esse Filium. Epilogus supradictorum. Quocirca ridenda est dialectica Eunomii, a quo Eunomiani haeretici exorti sunt: qui cum non potuisset intelligere, nec credere voluisset, unigenitum Dei Verbum, per quod facta sunt omnia (Joan. I, 3), Filium Dei esse natura, hoc est, de substantia Patris genitum; non naturae vel substantiae suae sive essentiae dixit esse Filium, sed filium voluntatis Dei, accidentem scilicet Deo volens asserere voluntatem qua gigneret Filium: videlicet ideo quia nos aliquid aliquando volumus, quod antea non volebamus; quasi non propter ista mutabilis intelligatur nostra natura, quod absit ut in Deo esse credamus. Neque enim ob aliud scriptum est, Multae cogitationes in corde viri; consilium autem Domini manet in aeternum (Prov. XIX, 21); nisi ut intelligamus sive credamus, sicut aeternum Deum, ita in aeternum ejus esse consilium, ac per hoc immutabile, sicut ipse est. Quod autem de cogitationibus, hoc etiam de voluntatibus verissime dici potest: Multae voluntates in corde viri; voluntas autem Domini manet in aeternum. Quidam ne filium consilii vel voluntatis Dei dicerent unigenitum Verbum, ipsum consilium seu voluntatem Patris idem Verbum esse dixerunt. Sed melius, quantum existimo, dicitur consilium de consilio, et voluntas de voluntate, sicut substantia de substantia, sapientia de sapientia: ne absurditate illa quam jam refellimus, Filius dicatur Patrem facere sapientem vel volentem, si non habet Pater in substantia sua consilium vel voluntatem. Acute sane quidam respondit haeretico versutissime interroganti, utrum Deus Filium volens an nolens genuerit: ut si diceret, Nolens, absurdissima Dei miseria sequeretur; si autem, Volens, continuo quod intendebat velut invicta ratione concluderet, non naturae esse Filium, sed voluntatis. At ille vigilantissime vicissim quaesivit ab eo, utrum Deus Pater volens an nolens sit Deus: ut si responderet, Nolens, sequeretur illa miseria quam de Deo credere magna insania est; si autem diceret, Volens, responderetur ei, Ergo et ipse Deus est sua voluntate, non natura. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut obmutesceret, et sua interrogatione obligatum insolubili vinculo se videret? Sed voluntas Dei si et proprie dicenda est aliqua in Trinitate persona, magis hoc nomen Spiritui sancto competit, sicut charitas. Nam quid est aliud charitas, quam voluntas?

1088 39. Video me de Spiritu sancto in isto libro secundum Scripturas sanctas hoc disputasse, quod fidelibus sufficit scientibus jam Deum esse Spiritum sanctum, nec alterius substantiae, nec minorem quam est Pater et Filius, quod in superioribus libris secundum easdem Scripturas verum esse docuimus. De creatura etiam quam fecit Deus, quantum valuimus, admonuimus eos qui rationem de rebus talibus poscunt, ut invisibilia ejus, per ea quae facta sunt, sicut possent, intellecta conspicerent (Rom. I, 20), et maxime per rationalem vel intellectualem creaturam, quae facta est ad imaginem Dei; per quod velut speculum, quantum possent, si possent, cernerent Trinitatem Deum, in nostra memoria, intelligentia, voluntate. Quae tria in sua mente naturaliter divinitus instituta quisquis vivaciter perspicit, et quam magnum sit in ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici , concupisci, reminiscitur per memoriam, intuetur per intelligentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem, profecto reperit illius summae Trinitatis imaginem. Ad quam summam Trinitatem reminiscendam, videndam, diligendam, ut eam recordetur, eam contempletur, ea delectetur, totum debet referre quod vivit. Verum ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam, et suo vitio in deterius commutatam, ita eidem comparet Trinitati, ut omni modo existimet similem; sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat, quantum esse satis videbatur, admonui.