Chapter II.—Justin describes his studies in philosophy.

“I will tell you,” said I, “what seems to me; for philosophy is, in fact, the greatest possession, and most honourable before God,8    ὧ some omit, and put θεῷ of prev. cl. in this cl., reading so: “Philosophy is the greatest possession, and most honourable, and introduces us to God,” etc. to whom it leads us and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed attention on philosophy. What philosophy is, however, and the reason why it has been sent down to men, have escaped the observation of most; for there would be neither Platonists, nor Stoics, nor Peripatetics, nor Theoretics,9    Maranus thinks that those who are different from the masters of practical philosophy are called Theoretics. I do not know whether they may be better designated Sceptics or Pyrrhonists.—Otto. nor Pythagoreans, this knowledge being one.10    Julian, Orat., vi., says: “Let no one divide our philosophy into many parts, or cut it into many parts, and especially let him not make many out of one: for as truth is one, so also is philosophy.” I wish to tell you why it has become many-headed. It has happened that those who first handled it [i.e., philosophy], and who were therefore esteemed illustrious men, were succeeded by those who made no investigations concerning truth, but only admired the perseverance and self-discipline of the former, as well as the novelty of the doctrines; and each thought that to be true which he learned from his teacher: then, moreover, those latter persons handed down to their successors such things, and others similar to them; and this system was called by the name of him who was styled the father of the doctrine. Being at first desirous of personally conversing with one of these men, I surrendered myself to a certain Stoic; and having spent a considerable time with him, when I had not acquired any further knowledge of God (for he did not know himself, and said such instruction was unnecessary), I left him and betook myself to another, who was called a Peripatetic, and as he fancied, shrewd. And this man, after having entertained me for the first few days, requested me to settle the fee, in order that our intercourse might not be unprofitable. Him, too, for this reason I abandoned, believing him to be no philosopher at all. But when my soul was eagerly desirous to hear the peculiar and choice philosophy, I came to a Pythagorean, very celebrated—a man who thought much of his own wisdom. And then, when I had an interview with him, willing to become his hearer and disciple, he said, ‘What then? Are you acquainted with music, astronomy, and geometry? Do you expect to perceive any of those things which conduce to a happy life, if you have not been first informed on those points which wean the soul from sensible objects, and render it fitted for objects which appertain to the mind, so that it can contemplate that which is honourable in its essence and that which is good in its essence?’ Having commended many of these branches of learning, and telling me that they were necessary, he dismissed me when I confessed to him my ignorance. Accordingly I took it rather impatiently, as was to be expected when I failed in my hope, the more so because I deemed the man had some knowledge; but reflecting again on the space of time during which I would have to linger over those branches of learning, I was not able to endure longer procrastination. In my helpless condition it occurred to me to have a meeting with the Platonists, for their fame was great. I thereupon spent as much of my time as possible with one who had lately settled in our city,11    Either Flavia Neapolis is indicated, or Ephesus.—Otto. —a sagacious man, holding a high position among the Platonists,—and I progressed, and made the greatest improvements daily. And the perception of immaterial things quite overpowered me, and the contemplation of ideas furnished my mind with wings,12    Narrating his progress in the study of Platonic philosophy, he elegantly employs this trite phrase of Plato’s.—Otto. so that in a little while I supposed that I had become wise; and such was my stupidity, I expected forthwith to look upon God, for this is the end of Plato’s philosophy.

[2] Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ ὅ γέ μοι καταφαίνεται. ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγιστον κτῆμα καὶ τιμιώτατον θεῷ, ᾧ τε προσάγει καὶ συνίστησιν ἡμᾶς μόνη, καὶ ὅσιοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκότες. τί ποτε δέ ἐστι φιλοσοφία καὶ οὗ χάριν κατεπέμφθη εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς πολλοὺς λέληθεν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν Πλατωνικοὶ ἦσαν οὐδὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὐδὲ Περιπατητικοὶ οὐδὲ Θεωρητικοὶ οὐδὲ Πυθαγορικοί, μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης ἐπιστήμης. οὗ δὲ χάριν πολύκρανος ἐγενήθη, θέλω εἰπεῖν. συνέβη τοῖς πρώτοις ἁψαμένοις αὐτῆς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδόξοις γενομένοις ἀκολουθῆσαι τοὺς ἔπειτα μηδὲν ἐξετάσαντας ἀληθείας πέρι, καταπλαγέντας δὲ μόνον τὴν καρτερίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν καὶ τὸ ξένον τῶν λόγων ταῦτα ἀληθῆ νομίσαι ἃ παρὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου ἕκαστος ἔμαθεν, εἶτα καὶ αὐτούς, τοῖς ἔπειτα παραδόντας τοιαῦτα ἄττα καὶ ἄλλα τούτοις προσεοικότα, τοῦτο κληθῆναι τοὔνομα, ὅπερ ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου. ἐγώ τε κατ' ἀρχὰς οὕτω ποθῶν καὶ αὐτὸς συμβαλεῖν τούτων ἑνί, ἐπέδωκα ἐμαυτὸν Στωϊκῷ τινι: καὶ διατρίψας ἱκανὸν μετ' αὐτοῦ χρόνον, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν πλέον ἐγίνετό μοι περὶ θεοῦ (οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἠπίστατο, οὐδὲ ἀναγκαίαν ἔλεγε ταύτην εἶναι τὴν μάθησιν), τούτου μὲν ἀπηλλάγην, ἐπ' ἄλλον δὲ ἧκα, Περιπατητικὸν καλούμενον, δριμύν, ὡς ᾤετο. καί μου ἀνασχόμενος οὗτος τὰς πρώτας ἡμέρας ἠξίου με ἔπειτα μισθὸν ὁρίσαι, ὡς μὴ ἀνωφελὴς ἡ συνουσία γίνοιτο ἡμῖν. καὶ αὐτὸν ἐγὼ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν κατέλιπον, μηδὲ φιλόσοφον οἰηθεὶς ὅλως. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔτι μου σπαργώσης ἀκοῦσαι τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἐξαίρετον τῆς φιλοσοφίας, προσῆλθον εὐδοκιμοῦντι μάλιστα Πυθαγορείῳ, ἀνδρὶ πολὺ ἐπὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ φρονοῦντι. κἄπειτα ὡς διελέχθην αὐτῷ, βουλόμενος ἀκροατὴς αὐτοῦ καὶ συνουσιαστὴς γενέσθαι: Τί δαί; ὡμίλησας, ἔφη, μουσικῇ καὶ ἀστρονομίᾳ καὶ γεωμετρίᾳ; ἢ δοκεῖς κατόψεσθαί τι τῶν εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελούντων, εἰ μὴ ταῦτα πρῶτον διδαχθείης, ἃ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν περισπάσει καὶ τοῖς νοητοῖς αὐτὴν παρασκευάσει χρησίμην, ὥστε αὐτὸ κατιδεῖν τὸ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; πολλά τε ἐπαινέσας ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα καὶ ἀναγκαῖα εἰπὼν ἀπέπεμπέ με, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ὡμολόγησα μὴ εἰδέναι. ἐδυσφόρουν οὖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἀποτυχὼν τῆς ἐλπίδος, καὶ μᾶλλον ᾗ ἐπίστασθαί τι αὐτὸν ᾠόμην: πάλιν τε τὸν χρόνον σκοπῶν, ὃν ἔμελλον ἐκτρίβειν περὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ μαθήματα, οὐκ ἠνειχόμην εἰς μακρὰν ἀποτιθέμενος. ἐν ἀμηχανίᾳ δέ μου ὄντος ἔδοξέ μοι καὶ τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς ἐντυχεῖν: πολὺ γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἦν κλέος. καὶ δὴ νεωστὶ ἐπιδημήσαντι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει συνετῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ προὔχοντι ἐν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς συνδιέτριβον ὡς τὰ μάλιστα, καὶ προέκοπτον καὶ πλεῖστον ὅσον ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἐπεδίδουν. καί με ᾕρει σφόδρα ἡ τῶν ἀσωμάτων νόησις, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀνεπτέρου μοι τὴν φρόνησιν, ὀλίγου τε ἐντὸς χρόνου ᾤμην σοφὸς γεγονέναι, καὶ ὑπὸ βλακείας ἤλπιζον αὐτίκα κατόψεσθαι τὸν θεόν: τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας.