Chapter III.—Justin narrates the manner of his conversion.

“And while I was thus disposed, when I wished at one period to be filled with great quietness, and to shun the path of men, I used to go into a certain field not far from the sea. And when I was near that spot one day, which having reached I purposed to be by myself, a certain old man, by no means contemptible in appearance, exhibiting meek and venerable manners, followed me at a little distance. And when I turned round to him, having halted, I fixed my eyes rather keenly on him.

“And he said, ‘Do you know me?’

“I replied in the negative.

“ ‘Why, then,’ said he to me, ‘do you so look at me?’

“ ‘I am astonished,’ I said, ‘because you have chanced to be in my company in the same place; for I had not expected to see any man here.’

“And he says to me, ‘I am concerned about some of my household. These are gone away from me; and therefore have I come to make personal search for them, if, perhaps, they shall make their appearance somewhere. But why are you here?’ said he to me.

“ ‘I delight,’ said I, ‘in such walks, where my attention is not distracted, for converse with myself is uninterrupted; and such places are most fit for philology.’13    Philology, used here to denote the exercise of reason.

“ ‘Are you, then, a philologian,’14    Philology, used here to denote the exercise of speech. The two-fold use of λόγος— oratio and ratio—ought to be kept in view. The old man uses it in the former, Justin in the latter, sense. said he, ‘but no lover of deeds or of truth? and do you not aim at being a practical man so much as being a sophist?’

“ ‘What greater work,’ said I, ‘could one accomplish than this, to show the reason which governs all, and having laid hold of it, and being mounted upon it, to look down on the errors of others, and their pursuits? But without philosophy and right reason, prudence would not be present to any man. Wherefore it is necessary for every man to philosophize, and to esteem this the greatest and most honourable work; but other things only of second-rate or third-rate importance, though, indeed, if they be made to depend on philosophy, they are of moderate value, and worthy of acceptance; but deprived of it, and not accompanying it, they are vulgar and coarse to those who pursue them.’

“ ‘Does philosophy, then, make happiness?’ said he, interrupting.

“ ‘Assuredly,’ I said, ‘and it alone.’

“ ‘What, then, is philosophy?’ he says; ‘and what is happiness? Pray tell me, unless something hinders you from saying.’

“ ‘Philosophy, then,’ said I, ‘is the knowledge of that which really exists, and a clear perception of the truth; and happiness is the reward of such knowledge and wisdom.’

“ ‘But what do you call God?’ said he.

“ ‘That which always maintains the same nature, and in the same manner, and is the cause of all other things —that, indeed, is God.’ So I answered him; and he listened to me with pleasure, and thus again interrogated me:—

“ ‘Is not knowledge a term common to different matters? For in arts of all kinds, he who knows any one of them is called a skilful man in the art of generalship, or of ruling, or of healing equally. But in divine and human affairs it is not so. Is there a knowledge which affords understanding of human and divine things, and then a thorough acquaintance with the divinity and the righteousness of them?’

“ ‘Assuredly,’ I replied.

“ ‘What, then? Is it in the same way we know man and God, as we know music, and arithmetic, and astronomy, or any other similar branch?’

“ ‘By no means,’ I replied.

“ ‘You have not answered me correctly, then,’ he said; ‘for some [branches of knowledge] come to us by learning, or by some employment, while of others we have knowledge by sight. Now, if one were to tell you that there exists in India an animal with a nature unlike all others, but of such and such a kind, multiform and various, you would not know it before you saw it; but neither would you be competent to give any account of it, unless you should hear from one who had seen it.’

“ ‘Certainly not,’ I said.

“ ‘How then,’ he said, ‘should the philosophers judge correctly about God, or speak any truth, when they have no knowledge of Him, having neither seen Him at any time, nor heard Him?’

“ ‘But, father,’ said I, ‘the Deity cannot be seen merely by the eyes, as other living beings can, but is discernible to the mind alone, as Plato says; and I believe him.’

[3] Καί μου οὕτως διακειμένου ἐπεὶ ἔδοξέ ποτε πολλῆς ἠρεμίας ἐμφορηθῆναι καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλεεῖναι πάτον, ἐπορευόμην εἴς τι χωρίον οὐ μακρὰν θαλάσσης. πλησίον δέ μου γενομένου ἐκείνου τοῦ τόπου, ἔνθα ἔμελλον ἀφικόμενος πρὸς ἐμαυτῷ ἔσεσθαι, παλαιός τις πρεσβύτης, ἰδέσθαι οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος, πρᾶον καὶ σεμνὸν ἦθος ἐμφαίνων, ὀλίγον ἀποδέων μου παρείπετο. ὡς δὲ ἐπεστράφην εἰς αὐτόν, ὑποστὰς ἐνητένισα δριμύτερον αὐτῷ. Καὶ ὅς: Γνωρίζεις με; ἔφη. Ἠρνησάμην ἐγώ. Τί οὖν, μοι ἔφη, οὕτως με κατανοεῖς; Θαυμάζω, ἔφην, ὅτι ἔτυχες ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μοι γενέσθαι: οὐ γὰρ προσεδόκησα ὄψεσθαί τινα ἀνδρῶν ἐνθάδε. Ὁ δέ: Οἰκείων τινῶν, φησί μοι, πεφρόντικα. οὗτοι δέ μοί εἰσιν ἀπόδημοι: ἔρχομαι οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς σκοπήσων τὰ περὶ αὐτούς, εἰ ἄρα φανήσονταί ποθεν. σὺ δὲ τί ἐνθάδε; ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖνος. Χαίρω, ἔφην, ταῖς τοιαύταις διατριβαῖς: ἀνεμπόδιστος γάρ μοι ὁ διάλογος πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν γίνεται, [μὴ ἐναντία δρώσαις ὡσανεί,] φιλολογίᾳ τε ἀνυτικώτατά ἐστι τὰ τοιάδε χωρία. Φιλόλογος οὖν τις εἶ σύ, ἔφη, φιλεργὸς δὲ οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲ φιλαλήθης, οὐδὲ πειρᾷ πρακτικὸς εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ σοφιστής; Τί δ' ἄν, ἔφην ἐγώ, τούτου μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἄν τις ἐργάσαιτο, τοῦ δεῖξαι μὲν τὸν λόγον ἡγεμονεύοντα πάντων, συλλαβόντα δὲ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὀχούμενον καθορᾶν τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πλάνην καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύματα, ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς δρῶσιν οὐδὲ θεῷ φίλον; ἄνευ δὲ φιλοσοφίας καὶ ὀρθοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἄν τῳ παρείη φρόνησις. διὸ χρὴ πάντα ἄνθρωπον φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοῦτο μέγιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον ἔργον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα, καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὲν ἀπηρτημένα μέτρια καὶ ἀποδοχῆς ἄξια, στερηθέντα δὲ ταύτης καὶ μὴ παρεπομένης τοῖς μεταχειριζομένοις αὐτὰ φορτικὰ καὶ βάναυσα. Ἦ οὖν φιλοσοφία εὐδαιμονίαν ποιεῖ; ἔφη ὑποτυχὼν ἐκεῖνος. Καὶ μάλιστα, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ μόνη. Τί γάρ ἐστι φιλοσοφία, φησί, καὶ τίς ἡ εὐδαιμονία αὐτῆς, εἰ μή τι κωλύει φράζειν, φράσον. Φιλοσοφία μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐπίγνωσις, εὐδαιμονία δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς σοφίας γέρας. Θεὸν δὲ σὺ τί καλεῖς; ἔφη. Τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ ἔχον καὶ τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον, τοῦτο δή ἐστιν ὁ θεός. οὕτως ἐγὼ ἀπεκρινάμην αὐτῷ: καὶ ἐτέρπετο ἐκεῖνος ἀκούων μου, οὕτως τέ με ἤρετο πάλιν. Ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι κοινὸν ὄνομα διαφόρων πραγμάτων; ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς τέχναις ἁπάσαις ὁ ἐπιστάμενος τούτων τινὰ ἐπιστήμων καλεῖται, ἔν τε στρατηγικῇ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ καὶ ἰατρικῇ ὁμοίως. ἔν τε τοῖς θείοις καὶ ἀνθρωπείοις οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστιν ἡ παρέχουσα αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν θείων γνῶσιν, ἔπειτα τῆς τούτων θειότητος καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐπίγνωσιν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφην. Τί οὖν; ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπον εἰδέναι καὶ θεόν, ὡς μουσικὴν καὶ ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφην. Οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄρα ἀπεκρίθης ἐμοί, ἔφη ἐκεῖνος: αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ μαθήσεως προσγίνονται ἡμῖν ἢ διατριβῆς τινος, αἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδέσθαι παρέχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην. εἴ γέ σοι λέγοι τις ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν Ἰνδίᾳ ζῶον φυὴν οὐχ ὅμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, πολυειδὲς καὶ ποικίλον, οὐκ ἂν πρότερον εἰδείης ἢ ἴδοις αὐτό, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λόγον ἂν ἔχοις εἰπεῖν αὐτοῦ τινα εἰ μὴ ἀκούσαις τοῦ ἑωρακότος. Οὐ γάρ, φημί. Πῶς οὖν ἄν, ἔφη, περὶ θεοῦ ὀρθῶς φρονοῖεν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἢ λέγοιέν τι ἀληθές, ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ μὴ ἔχοντες, μηδὲ ἰδόντες ποτὲ ἢ ἀκούσαντες; Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῖς, πάτερ, ὁρατὸν τὸ θεῖον ὡς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ νῷ καταληπτόν, ὥς φησι Πλάτων, καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι αὐτῷ.