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all things flow in that are poured in through hearing? who are the recorders of the words introduced into it? and what are the receptacles for the thoughts placed in the hearing? and how, when many and various things are laid upon one another, does confusion and error not arise from the overlapping position of what is stored inside? And one might wonder at the same thing in the case of the activity of sight. For similarly through these too the mind grasps things outside the body, and draws to itself the images of things that appear, recording in itself the characters of visible things.

And just as if there were some spacious city receiving those who flock to it through various entrances, with not everyone running to the same place in the city, but some to the marketplace, others to houses, others to the assemblies, or the broad streets, or the narrow alleys, or the theaters, each one moving according to his own preference; so I see a certain city of the mind, established within us, which the various entrances through the senses fill up; and the mind, judging and examining each of the things that enter, stores them away in the appropriate places of knowledge. And just as in the example of the city, it is often possible for those who are of the same tribe and kin not even to be inside the same gate, one having run in through one entrance and another through another as it happened, but nonetheless having come within the circuit of the wall, they are again with each other, 153 being on familiar terms with one another; and it is possible to find the opposite happening; for those who are strangers and unknown to each other often use one entrance to the city, but their commonality at the entrance does not join them to one another; for even having entered, they can be separated toward their own kind; I see something like this also in the case of the spaciousness of the mind. For often a single knowledge is gathered for us from different sense-organs, when the same object is divided in many ways for the senses. And again, on the other hand, it is possible from one of the senses to learn many and various things, which have nothing in common with one another in nature; for example (for it is better to clarify the argument with an example), let some inquiry be proposed concerning the property of juices, what is pleasant to the sense, and what is to be avoided by those who taste. Thus through experience was discovered both the bitterness of gall and the pleasing quality of honey.

Though these are different, the same object introduces a single knowledge, being brought into the mind in many ways, by taste, or smell, or hearing, and often also by touch, and by sight. For one who has seen honey, and heard its name, and taken it by taste, and recognized its vapor by smell, and tested it by touch, has known the same thing through each of the sense-organs. But again we are taught various and manifold things through a single sense; with hearing receiving all kinds of sounds, and perception through the eyes having an indiscriminate activity in the observation of heterogeneous things. For it falls alike upon white, and black, and all colors that stand in opposition. Thus taste, thus smell, thus comprehension through touch, each through its own perception implants the knowledge of all kinds of things.

CHAPTER 11.

That the nature of man is incomprehensible. What then is it according to its own nature

the mind, which distributes itself among the powers of sense, and through each one appropriately takes up the knowledge of existing things? For that it is something other than the senses, I think no sensible person would doubt. For if it were the same as sense, it would have an affinity for one of the things activated by sense, because it is simple

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πάντα συῤῥεῖ τὰ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς εἰσχεόμενα; τίνες οἱ ὑπομνηματογράφοι τῶν εἰσαγομένων ἐν αὐτῇ λόγων; καὶ ποῖα δοχεῖα τῶν ἐντιθεμένων τῇ ἀκοῇ νοημάτων; καὶ πῶς, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀλλήλοις ἐπεμβαλλο μένων, σύγχυσις καὶ πλάνη κατὰ τὴν ἐπάλληλον θέσιν τῶν ἐγκειμένων οὐ γίνεται; Τὸ ἴσον δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὄφεων ἐνεργείας θαυμάσειεν. Ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ διὰ τούτων ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἔξω τοῦ σώματος ἐπιδράσσεται, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕλκει τῶν φαινομένων τὰ εἴδωλα, τοὺς χαρα κτῆρας τῶν ὁρατῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καταγράφων.

Καὶ ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολύχωρος εἴη πόλις ἐκ διαφόρων εἰσόδων τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν συμφοιτῶντας εἰσδεχομένη, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατά τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συνδραμόντες οἱ πάντες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ οἰκήσεις, ἄλλοι κατὰ τὰς ἐκκλησίας, ἢ τὰς πλατείας, ἢ τοὺς στεν ωποὺς, ἢ τὰ θέατρα, κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἕκαστος γνώμην μεταχωροῦσι· τοιαύτην τινὰ βλέπω καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ πόλιν τὴν ἔνδοθεν ἐν ἡμῖν συνῳκισμένην, ἢν διάφο ροι μὲν αἱ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴσοδοι καταπληροῦσιν· ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰσιόντων φιλοκρινῶν τε καὶ δι εξετάζων ὁ νοῦς, τοῖς καταλλήλοις τῆς γνώσεως τό ποις ἐναποτίθεται. Καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὑποδείγματος, ἔστι πολλάκις ὁμοφύλους τινὰς ὄντας καὶ συγγενεῖς μηδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς πύλης ἐντὸς γενέσθαι, ἄλλου κατ' ἄλλην εἴσοδον κατὰ τὸ συμβὰν εἰσδραμόντος, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον ἐντὸς τῆς περιβολῆς τοῦ τείχους γενόμενοι, πάλιν μετ' ἀλλήλων εἰσὶ, 153 πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἰκείως ἔχοντες· καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἔστιν εὑρεῖν γινόμενον· οἱ γὰρ ἀπεξενωμένοι τε καὶ ἄγνωστοι ἀλλήλων μιᾷ χρῶνται πρὸς τὴν πόλιν εἰσ όδῳ πολλάκις, ἀλλ' οὐ συνάπτει τούτους ἀλλήλοις ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἴσοδον κοινωνία· δύνανται γὰρ καὶ ἐντὸς γενόμενοι διακριθῆναι πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον· τοιοῦτόν τι βλέπω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν εὐρυχωρίας. Πολ λάκις γὰρ καὶ ἐκ διαφόρων αἰσθητηρίων μία γνῶσις ἡμῖν συναγείρεται, τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος πολυμερῶς πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις μεριζομένου. Πάλιν δ' αὖ τὸ ἐν αντίον, ἔστιν ἐκ μιᾶς τινος τῶν αἰσθήσεων πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα μαθεῖν, οὐδὲν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. συμβαίνοντα· οἷον (κρεῖττον γὰρ ἐν ὑποδείγματι διασαφηνίσαι τὸν λόγον), προκείσθω ζητεῖσθαί τι περὶ χυμῶν ἰδιότητος, τί μὲν ἡδὺ πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν, τί δὲ φευκτὸν τοῖς γευομένοις ἐστίν. Οὐκοῦν εὑρέθη διὰ τῆς πείρας ἤ τε τῆς χολῆς πικρότης, καὶ τὸ προσηνὲς τῆς κατὰ τὸ μέλι ποιότητος.

∆ιαφόρων δὲ ὄντων τούτων, μίαν εἰσάγει γνῶσιν τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα, πολυμερῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰσοικιζόμενον, ἢ γεύσει, ἢ ὀσφρήσει, ἢ ἀκοῇ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῇ ἀφῇ, καὶ τῇ ὄψει. Καὶ γὰρ ἰδών τις τὸ μέλι, καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀκούσας, καὶ τῇ γεύσει λαβὼν, καὶ τὸν ἀτμὸν διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἐπιγνοὺς, καὶ τῇ ἀφῇ δοκιμάσας, τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα δι' ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐγνώ ρισε. Ποικίλα δὲ πάλιν καὶ πολυειδῆ διὰ μιᾶς τινος αἰσθήσεως διδασκόμεθα· τῆς τε ἀκοῆς παντοίας δε χομένης φωνὰς, τῆς τε διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀντι λήψεως ἀδιάκριτον ἐχούσης τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ἑτερογενῶν θεωρίας. Ὁμοίως γὰρ λευκῷ τε προσπί πτει, καὶ μέλανι, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διεστῶσι τῷ χρώματι. Οὕτως ἡ γεῦσις, οὕτως ἡ ὄσφρησις, οὕτως ἡ διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς κατανόησις, παντο δαπῶν πραγμάτων ἑκάστη διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀντιλή ψεως τὴν γνῶσιν ἐντίθησιν.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΑʹ.

Ὅτι ἀθεώρητος ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις. Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν

ὁ νοῦς, ὁ ἐν αἰσθητικαῖς δυνάμεσιν ἑαυτὸν ἐπιμερίζων, καὶ δι' ἑκάστης καταλλήλως τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν ἀναλαμ βάνων; Ὅτι γὰρ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί τινα τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀμφιβάλλειν. Εἰ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἦν τῇ αἰσθήσει, πρὸς ἒν πάντως εἶχε τῶν κατ' αἴσθησιν ἐνεργουμένων τὴν οἰκειότητα, διὰ τὸ ἁπλοῦν μὲν