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is itself, and that nothing diverse is observed in what is simple. But as it is, with all things being composed, touch is one thing, smell another, and the others likewise are disposed without fellowship and without mixture with each other; since it is present equally and suitably to each, one must certainly suppose it to be something other than the sensible nature, so that no diversity may be mixed with the intelligible. "Who has known the mind of the Lord?" says the Apostle. But I say, besides this, Who has understood his own mind? Let those who place the nature of God within their own 156 comprehension say whether they have understood themselves, whether they have recognized the nature of their own mind. It is of many parts, and very composite. And how can the intelligible be in a composite state? Or what is the manner of the mixture of heterogeneous things? But it is simple and uncompounded; and how is it dispersed into the multiplicity of the senses? How in unity is there diversity? How in diversity is there unity? But I found the solution to these difficulties by having recourse to the very voice of God. For he says, "Let us make man in our image and likeness." For the image, so long as it is deficient in none of those things conceived in the archetype, is properly an image; but in whatever it falls away from its likeness to the original, in that part it is not an image. Therefore, since one of the things contemplated concerning the divine nature is the incomprehensibility of its substance, it is altogether necessary that in this also the image should have its imitation of the archetype. For if the nature of the image were comprehended, but the original were beyond comprehension, the opposition of the things observed would prove the failure of the image. But since the nature of our mind, which is in the image of its creator, escapes our knowledge, it has an accurate likeness to what is superior, characterizing the incomprehensible nature by its own unknowability.

CHAPTER 12.

An examination of where the ruling principle should be considered to be, in which also is a natural account of tears and

of laughter, and a certain physical theorem concerning the fellowship between matter, nature, and mind.

Let all conjectural idle talk, therefore, be silent, of those who confine the intelligible activity to certain bodily parts, of whom some place the ruling principle in the heart, while others say that the mind dwells in the brain, upholding such notions by certain superficial probabilities. For the one who assigns the ruling principle to the heart makes its position in place a proof of the argument, because it seems somehow to occupy the middle region of the whole body, so that the motion of choice is easily distributed from the middle to the whole body, and thus proceeds into action. And he makes the sorrowful and passionate disposition of man a testimony to the argument, because such passions seem somehow to move this part to sympathy. But those who dedicate the brain to reasoning say that the head has been built by nature as a kind of acropolis for the whole body, and that the mind dwells in it like a king, guarded round about by the senses, as by certain messengers or shield-bearers. And these too make a sign of such a supposition, that the reasoning of those whose meninges have been injured is disturbed, and that those who are heavy-headed with drunkenness become ignorant of what is fitting. 157

And each of those who support these opinions adds some more physical reasons for such a supposition concerning the ruling principle. For one says that the movement from thought has a kinship with the fiery element, because both fire and thought are ever-moving. And since it is agreed that heat springs from the part of the heart, for this reason the movement of the mind with the easy motion of heat

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αὐτὸν εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ποικίλον ἐν τῷ ἀπλῷ θεωρεῖσθαι. Νυνὶ δὲ πάντων συντιθεμένων, ἄλλο μέν τι τὴν ἁφὴν εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ἀκοινωνήτως τε καὶ ἀμίκτως πρὸς ἄλληλα διακειμένων, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἑκά στῃ καταλλήλως πάρεστιν, ἕτερόν τινα πάντως αὐ τὸν χρὴ παρὰ τὴν αἰσθητὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι φύσιν, ὡς ἂν μή τις ποικιλία τῷ νοητῷ συμμιχθείη. «Τίς ἔγνω νοῦν Κυρίου;» φησὶν ὁ Ἀπόστολος. Ἐγὼ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτό φημι, Τίς τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν κατενόησεν; Εἰπάτω σαν οἱ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἐντὸς ποιούμενοι τῆς ἑαυ 156 τῶν καταλήψεως, εἰ ἑαυτοὺς κατενόησαν; εἰ τοῦ ἰδίου νοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἐπέγνωσαν; Πολυμερής τίς ἐστι, καὶ πολυσύνθετος. Καὶ πῶς τὸ νοητὸν ἐν συνθέσει; ἢ τίς ὁ τῆς τῶν ἑτερογενῶν ἀνακράσεως τρόπος; Ἀλλ' ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀσύνθετος· καὶ πῶς εἰς τὴν πολυ μέρειαν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν διασπείρεται; πῶς ἐν μονό τητι τὸ ποικίλον; πῶς ἐν ποικιλίᾳ τὸ ἕν; Ἀλλ' ἔγνων τῶν ἠπορημένων τὴν λύσιν ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀνα δραμὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν φωνήν· «Ποιήσωμεν» γὰρ, φη σὶν, «ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέ ραν.» Ἡ γὰρ εἰκὼν ἕως ἂν ἐν μηδενὶ λείπηται τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον νοουμένων, κυρίως ἐστὶν εἰκών· καθ' ὃ δ' ἂν διαπέσῃ τῆς πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον ὁμοιό τητος, κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος εἰκὼν οὐκ ἔστιν. Οὐ κοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἒν τῶν περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν θεωρουμέ νων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας· ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὴν εἰκόνα πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἔχειν τὴν μίμησιν. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῆς εἰκόνος φύσις κατελαμ βάνετο, τὸ δὲ πρωτότυπον ὑπὲρ κατάληψιν ἦν· ἡ ἐναντιότης τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων τὸ διημαρτημένον τῆς εἰκόνος διήλεγχεν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ διαφεύγει τὴν γνῶσιν ἡ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἡμέτερον φύσις, ὅς ἐστι κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, ἀκριβῆ πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκείμε νον ἔχει τὴν ὁμοιότητα, τῷ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀγνώστῳ χαρακτηρίζων τὴν ἀκατάληπτον φύσιν.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΒʹ.

Ἐξέτασις, ἐν τίνι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν νομιστέον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ δακρύων καὶ περὶ

γέλωτος φυσιολο γία, καὶ θεώρημά τι φυσικὸν περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸν νοῦν κοινωνίας. Σιγάτω τοίνυν πᾶσα στοχαστικὴ ματαιολογία τῶν μορίοις τισὶ σωματικοῖς τὴν νοητὴν ἐναποκλειόντων ἐνέργειαν, ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐν καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τί θενται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ τὸν νοῦν ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαί φα σιν, ἐπιπολαίοις τισὶ πιθανότησι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπι νοίας κρατοῦντες. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῇ καρδίᾳ προστιθεὶς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, τὴν κατὰ τόπον αὐτῆς θέσιν ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τεκμήριον, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν πως τὴν μέσην τοῦ παντὸς σώματος ἐπέχειν χώραν αὐτὴν, ὡς τῆς προαιρετικῆς κινήσεως εὐκόλως ἐκ τοῦ μέσου πρὸς ἅπαν μεριζομένης σῶμα, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἐνέργειαν προϊούσης. Καὶ μαρτύριον ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τὴν λυπηράν τε καὶ θυμώδη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διάθεσιν, ὅτι δοκεῖ πως τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη συγκινεῖν τὸ μέρος τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν συμπάθειαν. Οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀφιεροῦν τες τῷ λογισμῷ, ὥσπερ ἀκρόπολίν τινα τοῦ παντὸς σώματος τὴν κεφαλὴν δεδομῆσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λέγουσιν· ἐνοικεῖν δὲ ταύτῃ καθάπερ τινὰ βασιλέα τὸν νοῦν, οἷόν τισιν ἀγγελιαφόροις ἢ ὑπασπισταῖ, τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν κύκλῳ δορυφορούμενον. Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τῆς τοιαύτης ὑπονοίας ποιοῦνται, τὸ παράγεσθαι τοῦ καθεστῶτος τὸν λογισμὸν τῶν κεκα κωμένων τὰς μήνιγγας, καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ πρέ 157 ποντος γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐν μέθῃ καρηβαρήσαντας.

Προστιθέασι δὲ καί τινας φυσικωτέρας αἰτίας τῆς τοιαύ της περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὑπονοίας ἑκάτερος τῶν ταύς ταῖς δόξαις παρισταμένων. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ πυρῶδες συγγενῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἐκ τῆς διανοίας κίνησιν λέγει, διὰ τὸ ἀεικίνητον εἶναι καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ πηγάζειν ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τῆς καρδίας ἡ θερμότης ὁμολογεῖται· διὰ τοῦτο τῷ εὐ κινήτῳ τῆς θερμότητος τὴν τοῦ νοῦ κίνησιν