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signifying nourishment of vexation. This also seems to many of those educated in medicine, that according to the differences of the ailments, the visions of dreams also occur to the sick; some for those with stomach ailments, others for those whose membranes are afflicted, and again others for those in fevers, and not the same for those suffering from bile and those from phlegm, and again others for the plethoric, and for the wasted away. From which it is possible to see that the nutritive and growth power of the soul has something of the intellectual also sown together with it through the mixture, which is in a way assimilated to the particular disposition of the body, and the prevailing passion is adapted to the phantasms. Furthermore, for many, dreams are also shaped according to the states of character. The phantasms of the courageous man are different from those of the coward; the dreams of the licentious man are different from those of the temperate man; the generous man has one kind of fantasy, and the insatiable man another, with the intellect being nowhere involved, but the more irrational disposition in the soul imprinting such phantasms, remolding the images of those things to which it has been accustomed through waking practice, even in dreams.

CHAPTER 14.

That the mind is not in a part of the body. In which there is also a distinction between bodily and soulish movements. But we have wandered far from the matters at hand. For our argument proposed to show that the mind is not bound to some part of the body; but that it touches all of it equally, effecting movement suitably to the nature of the underlying part. And there is a case where the mind also follows the natural impulses, becoming like a servant. For often the nature of the body leads, instilling both a perception of what is painful and a desire for what is pleasant, so that it provides the first principles, either an appetite for food or in general implanting the impulse towards some pleasure, and the mind, receiving such impulses, by its own deliberations jointly provides the body with the resources for what is desired. But this is not the case for all, but only for those disposed in a more servile manner, who having enslaved reason to the impulses of nature, through the alliance of the mind servilely flatter what is pleasant according to the senses. But with the more perfect, it is not so. For the mind leads, choosing what is beneficial by reason and not by passion; and nature follows in the track of its leader. And since the argument found three differences according to the vital power, the one being nourished without sensation, the one being nourished and growing but lacking rational activity, and the rational and perfect one, extending through the whole power, so as to be in those others also and to possess more of the intellectual; let no one through these things suppose that three souls are constituted in the human composite, considered in their own descriptions, so as to think that human nature is some composition of many souls. But the true and perfect soul is one in nature, both intellectual and immaterial, which through the senses is mixed with the material nature. But all that is material, lying in change and alteration, if it partakes of the animating power, will be moved towards growth; but if it should fall away from the vital activity, its movement will resolve into decay. Therefore there is neither sensation without material substance, nor does the activity of sensation occur without the intellectual power.

CHAPTER 15.

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τροφὴν ἀχθηδόνος σημαινομένης. Τοῦτο καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν τὴν ἰατρικὴν πεπαιδευμένων δοκεῖ, παρὰ τὰς τῶν παθημάτων διαφορὰς, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνυπνίων ὄψεις τοῖς κάμνουσι γίνεσθαι; ἄλλας μὲν τῶν στομαχούντων, ἑτέρας δὲ τῶν κεκακωμένων τὰς μήνιγγας, καὶ τῶν ἐν πυρε τοῖς πάλιν ἑτέρας, τῶν τε κατὰ χολὴν, καὶ τῶν ἐν φλέγματι κακουμένων οὐ τὰς αὐτὰς, καὶ τῶν πλη θωρικῶν, καὶ τῶν ἐκτετηκότων πάλιν ἄλλας. Ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ἡ θρεπτική τε καὶ αὐξητικὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχῃ τι καὶ τοῦ νοεροῦ συγκατεσπαρμένον αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς ἀνακράσεως, ὁ τῇ ποιᾷ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος τρόπον τινὰ ἐξομοιοῦται, καὶ τὸ ἐπικρα τοῦν πάθος ταῖς φαντασίαις μεθαρμοζόμενον. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἠθῶν καταστάσεις τυποῦται πολλοῖς τὰ ἐνύπνια. Ἄλλα τοῦ ἀνδρείου, καὶ ἄλλα τοῦ δειλοῦ τὰ φαντάσματα· ἄλλοι τοῦ ἀκολάστου ὄνειροι, καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ σώφρονος· ἐν ἑτέροις ὁ μεταδοτικὸς, καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις φαντασιοῦται ὁ ἄπληστος, οὐδαμοῦ τῆς διανοίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀλογωτέρας διαθέσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας ἀνατυπούσης οἷς προ ειθίσθη διὰ τῆς καθ' ὕπαρ μελέτης, τούτων τὰς εἰ κόνας καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις ἀναπλαττούσης.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ι∆ʹ.

Ὅτι οὐκ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος ὁ νοῦς. Ἐν ᾧ καὶ διάκρισις τῶν τε σωματικῶν

καὶ ψυχικῶν κι νημάτων. Ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν προκειμένων ἀπεπλανήθημεν. ∆εῖξαι γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος προέθετο τὸ, μὴ μέρει τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδεδέσθαι τὸν νοῦν· ἀλλὰ παντὸς κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐφάπτεσθαι, καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει τοῦ ὑπο κειμένου μέρους ἐνεργοῦντα τὴν κίνησιν. Ἔστι δὲ ὅπου καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ὁρμαῖς ὁ νοῦς, οἷον ὑπηρέτης γενόμενος. Καθηγεῖται γὰρ πολλάκις ἡ τοῦ σώματος φύσις, καὶ τοῦ λυποῦντος αἴσθησιν ἐντιθεῖσα, καὶ τοῦ εὐφραίνοντος ἐπιθυμίαν, ὥστε ταύτην μὲν τὰς πρώτας παρέχειν ἀρχὰς, ἢ βρώσεως ὄρεξιν, ἤ τινος ὅλως τῶν καθ' ἡδονὴν τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐμποιοῦσαν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐκδεχόμενον τὰς τοιαύτας ὁρμὰς, ταῖς οἰκείαις περινοίαις τὰς πρὸς τὸ ποθού 176 μενον ἀφορμὰς συνεκπορίζειν τῷ σώματι. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ μόνων τῶν ἀν δραποδωδέστερον διακειμένων, οἳ δουλώσαντες τὸν λόγον ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῆς φύσεως, διὰ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ συμμαχίας τὸ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδὺ δουλοπρε πῶς κολακεύουσιν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τελειοτέρων οὐχ οὕτως γίνεται. Καθηγεῖται γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, λόγῳ καὶ οὐχὶ πάθει τὸ λυσιτελὲς προαιρούμενος· ἡ δὲ φύσις κατ' ἴχνος ἕπεται τῷ προκαθηγουμένῳ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρεῖς κατὰ τὴν ζωτικὴν δύναμιν διαφορὰς ὁ λόγος εὗρε, τὴν μὲν τρεφομένην χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, τὴν δὲ τρεφομένην μὲν καὶ αὐξανομένην, ἀμοιροῦ σαν δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ἐνεργείας, τὴν δὲ λογικὴν καὶ τελείαν δι' ἁπάσης διήκουσαν τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἐκείναις εἶναι καὶ τῆς νοερᾶς τὸ πλέον ἔχειν· μηδεὶς διὰ τούτων ὑπονοείτω τρεῖς συγκεκροτῆσθαι ψυχὰς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι, ἐν ἰδίαις περι γραφαῖς θεωρουμένας, ὥστε συγκρότημά τι πολλῶν ψυχῶν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν εἶναι νομίζειν. Ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀληθής τε καὶ τελεία ψυχὴ, μία τῇ φύσει ἐστὶν, ἡ νοερά τε καὶ ἄϋλος, ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῇ ὑλικῇ καταμιγνυμένη φύσει. Τὸ δὲ ὑλῶδες ἅπαν ἐν τροπῇ τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσει κείμενον, εἰ μὲν μετέχοι τῆς ψυ χούσης δυνάμεως, κατὰ αὔξησιν κινηθήσεται· εἰ δὲ ἀποπέσοι τῆς ζωτικῆς ἐνεργείας, εἰς φθορὰν ἀναλύσει τὴν κίνησιν. Οὔτε οὖν αἴσθησις χωρὶς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας, οὔτε τῆς νοερᾶς δυνάμεως χωρὶς, αἰσθήσεως ἐνέρ γεια γίνεται.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΕʹ.