20

That the rational soul properly is and is called soul; but the others are named homonymously. In which also the power of the mind extends through the whole body, suitably attaching to each part. But if some parts of creation have the nutritive faculty, or again others are governed by the perceptive power, with neither the former partaking of perception, nor the latter of the intellectual nature, and for this reason someone suspects a multitude of souls; such a one will not dogmatize the difference of souls according to a divisive argument; because everything conceived among beings, if it is completely what it is, is also properly named what it is called; but that which is not in all respects that which it has been named, also has its designation in vain. For example, if someone were to show a true loaf of bread, we say such a person properly applies the name to the subject. But if someone were to show in contrast to the natural one, one made of stone, which has the same shape, and equal size, and similarity of color, so that in most respects it seems to be the same as the original, but it lacks the ability to be food; on this account we would say that the stone has received the name of bread not properly, but by an improper use of the term. And all things according to the same principle, which are not in every respect what they are called, have their name by improper use. Thus, therefore, since the soul has its perfection in the intellectual and rational, everything that is not this can be homonymous with soul, but is not truly soul, but some vital energy, designated by the name of soul. Therefore also the nature of irrational creatures, as not lying far from this natural life, He who legislated for each thing likewise gave for the use of man, to be as a vegetable to those who partake. For all flesh, he says, you shall eat, as the green herb. For it seems to have a small advantage in its perceptive energy over that which is nourished and grows without it. Let this teach the lovers of the flesh not to let their minds run much on things that appear to the senses, but to occupy themselves with the prerogatives of the soul, as the true soul is contemplated in these, while perception is held equally even by irrational creatures. But the course of the argument has been diverted to another topic. For this was not the subject of our inquiry, that the activity according to the mind is more honorable among the things conceived in man than the material part of his subsistence; but that the mind is not contained in some part of us, but is equally in all and through all; neither encompassing from without, nor contained from within. For these things are properly said of jars or certain other bodies placed within one another.

But the communion of the mind with the corporeal has a connection that is inexpressible and inconceivable, being neither within (for the incorporeal is not contained by a body), nor encompassing without (for incorporeal things do not encompass anything); but in some way impossible to devise and incomprehensible, the mind, approaching nature and attaching to it, is contemplated both in it and about it, neither seated within, nor enfolded around; but as it is not possible to say or to think, except that when nature proceeds successfully according to its own sequence, the mind also becomes active. But if some disorder should befall it, the movement of the intellect also limps in that respect.

CHAPTER 10.

A contemplation of the divine saying which says, "Let us make man in our image and

our likeness." In which is examined, what is the principle of the image, and if the passible and mortal can be made like the blessed and impassible, and how in the image there is male and female, when these are not in the archetype. But let us take up again the divine voice, "Let us make man in our image and our likeness." As some imagined things small and unworthy of the greatness of man from external things, to the

20

Ὅτι κυρίως ψυχὴ, ἡ λογικὴ καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέ γεται· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ὁμωνύμως κατονομάζονται. Ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ, διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος διήκειν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ δύναμιν, καταλλήλως ἑκάστου μέρους προσαπτομένην. Εἰ δέ τινα τῆς κτίσεως τὴν θρεπτικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει, ἢ πάλιν ἕτερα τῇ αἰσθητικῇ διοικεῖται δυνά μει, μήτε ἐκεῖνα αἰσθήσεως, μήτε ταῦτα τῆς νοερᾶς μετέχοντα φύσεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτό τις ψυχῶν πλῆθος καθυποπτεύει· οὐ κατὰ τὸν διαιροῦντα λόγον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν διαφορὰν δογματίσει· διότι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι νοούμενον, εἰ μὲν τελείως εἴη ὅπερ ἐστὶ, κυρίως καὶ ὀνομάζεται ὅπερ λέγεται· τὸ δὲ μὴ διὰ πάντων ὂν ἐκεῖνο, ὃ κατωνόμασται, ματαίαν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἔχει. Οἷον εἴ τις τὸν ἀληθῆ δείξειεν ἄρτον, φαμὲν τὸν τοιοῦτον κυρίως ἐπιλέγειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ ὄνομα. Εἰ δέ τις τὸν ἀπὸ λίθου τεχνη θέντα τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἀντιπαραδείξειεν, ᾧ σχῆμα μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἶσον, καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρώ ματος ὁμοιότης, ὥστε διὰ τῶν πλείστων τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ δοκεῖν, ἐπιλείπει δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ τροφὴν δύνασθαι εἶναι· παρὰ τοῦτο οὐ κυρίως, ἀλλ' ἐκ καταχρήσεως τῆς ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ ἄρτου τε τυχηκέναι τὸν λίθον λέγωμεν. Καὶ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂ μὴ δι' ὅλων ἐστὶν ὅπερ λέγεται, ἐκ καταχρήσεως ἔχει τὴν κλῆσιν. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ νοερῷ τε καὶ λογικῷ τὸ τέλειον 177 ἐχούσης, πᾶν ὁ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὁμώνυμον μὲν εἶναι δύναται τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐ μὴν καὶ ὄντως ψυχὴ, ἀλλά τις ἐνέργεια ζωτικὴ, τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς κλήσει συγκεκρι μένη. ∆ιὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν, ὡς οὐ πόῤῥω τῆς φυσικῆς ταύτης ζωῆς κειμένην, ὁμοίως ἔδωκε τῇ χρήσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον νομοθε τήσας, ὡς ἀντὶ λαχάνου τοῖς μετέχουσιν εἶναι. Πάντα γὰρ, φησὶ, τὰ κρέα φάγεσθε, ὡς λάχανα χόρτου. Μι κρὸν γάρ τι πλεονεκτεῖν δοκεῖ τῇ αἰσθητικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ δίχα ταύτης τρεφομένου τε καὶ αὐξανομένου. Παιδευσάτω τοῦτο τοὺς φιλοσάρκους, μὴ πολὺ τοῖς κατ' αἴσθησιν φαινομένοις προσδραμεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ψυχικοῖς προτερήμασι προσασχολεῖσθαι, ὡς τῆς ἀληθοῦς ψυχῆς ἐν τούτοις θεωρουμένης, τῆς δὲ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις τὸ ἴσον ἐχούσης. Ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἕτερον ἡ ἀκολουθία παρηνέχθη τοῦ λόγου. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῇ θεωρίᾳ προέκειτο, ὅτι προτιμώ τερον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ νοουμένων ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνέργεια ἢ τὸ ὑλικὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως· ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ νοῦς περιέχεται, ἀλλ' ἐπίσης ἐν πᾶσι καὶ διὰ πάντων ἐστίν· οὔτε ἔξωθεν περιλαμβάνων, οὔτε ἔνδοθεν κρατούμενος. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπὶ κάδων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν σωμάτων ἀλλήλοις ἐντιθεμένων κυρίως λέγεται.

Ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ σωματικὸν κοινωνία ἄφραστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητον τὴν συνάφειαν ἔχει, οὔτε ἐντὸς οὖσα (οὔτε γὰρ ἐγκρα τεῖται σώματι τὸ ἀσώματον), οὔτε ἐκτὸς περιέ χουσα (οὐ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει τι τὰ ἀσώματα)· ἀλλὰ κατά τινα τρόπον ἀμήχανόν τε καὶ ἀκατανόητον ἐγ γίζων ὁ νοῦς τῇ φύσει, καὶ προσαπτόμενος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖται, οὔτε ἐγκαθήμενος, οὔτε περιπτυσσόμενος· ἀλλὰ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἢ νοῆσαι, πλὴν ὅτι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῆς εἱρμὸν εὐοδου μένης τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργὸς γίνεται. Εἰ δέ τι πλημμέλημα περὶ ταύτην συμπέσοι, σκάζει κατ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἡ κίνησις.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ιʹ.

Θεωρία τοῦ θείου ῥητοῦ εἰπόντος, «Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ

ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν.» Ἐν ᾧ ἐξετάζεται, τίς ὁ τῆς εἰκόνος λόγος, καὶ εἰ ὁμοιοῦται τῷ μακαρίῳ τε καὶ ἀπαθεῖ τὸ ἐμ παθὲς καὶ ἐπίκηρον, καὶ πῶς ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τὸ ἄῤῥεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ, ἐν τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ τούτων οὐκ ὄντων. Ἀλλ' ἐπαναλάβωμεν πάλιν τὴν θείαν φωνὴν, «Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν.» Ὡς μικρά τε καὶ ἀνάξια τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώ που μεγαλοφυΐας τῶν ἔξωθέν τινες ἐφαντάσθησαν, τῇ