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22

this is understood of the prototype; "For in Christ Jesus," as the Apostle says, "there is neither male nor female." But indeed the account says that man was divided into these. Therefore the constitution of our nature is somehow twofold, both that which is made like the Divine, and that which is divided into this distinction. For the account hints at something of this sort from the arrangement of what is written, saying first, that "God made man, in the image of God he made him;" and then adding to what was said, that "male and female he made them," which is foreign to the concepts concerning God. For I think that a great and lofty doctrine is handed down by the divine Scripture through these words. And the doctrine is this: Of two things that are in the highest degree distant from each other, the human is in the middle, between the divine and incorporeal nature, and the irrational and beastly life. For it is possible to observe in the human constitution the portion of each of the aforementioned things? of the divine, the rational and intellectual, which does not admit the distinction according to male and female; of the irrational, the bodily constitution and formation divided into male and female. For each of these is certainly in everyone who partakes of human life. But the intellectual comes first, as we learned from him who went through the creation of man in order, while the communion and kinship with the irrational is an after-growth for man. For first he says, that "God made man in the image of God," showing by these words, as the Apostle says, that in such a one there is not male and female. Then he adds the properties of human nature, that "male and female he made them." What then do we learn through this? And let no one be indignant with me for from afar bring 184 ing the argument to the proposed thought. God is by His own nature everything that is possible to conceive as good; or rather, being beyond all good that is conceived and comprehended, He creates human life for no other reason than because He is good. And being such, and for this reason having set out for the creation of human nature, He would not have shown the power of His goodness to be incomplete, giving one thing from His own attributes, but begrudging the participation of another; but the perfect form of goodness consists in this, in both bringing man from non-being into existence, and making him in want of no good things. Since the list of individual good things is long, it is not indeed possible to easily enumerate it. For this reason, the account, comprehending all things in a summary phrase, signified it by saying that man was made in the image of God. For this is equivalent to saying that He made human nature a partaker of every good. For if the Divine is the fullness of goods, and this is its image; then in being full of every good, the image has its likeness to the archetype. Therefore in us is the idea of all that is beautiful, and every virtue and wisdom, and everything that is conceived as better. And one of all these things is to be free from necessity, and not to be subject to any natural dominion; but to have a will with self-determination towards what it chooses. For virtue is a masterless and voluntary thing, and what is compelled and forced cannot be virtue. Therefore, since the image bears in all things the character of the prototype's beauty, if it did not have some difference, it would no longer be a likeness at all, but will be shown to be that very same thing in all respects, being in every way unvaried. What difference, then, do we perceive between the Divine itself and that which is made like the Divine? In that the one exists uncreated, while the other subsisted through creation. And the difference of such a property again produced a succession of other properties. For it is agreed in every way and altogether, that the uncreated nature is also unchangeable, and is always in the same state, while it is impossible for the created to exist without alteration. For the very from non-being into being

22

τοῦτο τοῦ πρωτοτύπου νοεῖται· «Ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ,» καθώς φησιν ὁ Ἀπόστολος, «οὔτεἄῤῥεν οὔτε θῆλύ ἐστιν.» Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰς ταῦτα διῃ ρῆσθαι ὁ λόγος φησὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Οὐκοῦν διπλῆ τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κατασκευὴ, ἤ τε πρὸς τὸ Θεῖον ὡμοιωμένη, ἥ τε πρὸς τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην διῃρημένη. Τοιοῦτον γάρ τι ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῆς συν τάξεως τῶν γεγραμμένων αἰνίττεται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὼν, ὅτι «Ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν·» πάλιν δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπαγαγὼν, ὅτι «Ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποί ησεν αὐτοὺς,» ὅπερ ἀλλότριον τῶν περὶ Θεοῦ νοουμένων ἐστίν. Οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ δόγμα τι μέγα καὶ ὑψηλὸν διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπὸ τῆς θείας Γραφῆς παραδίδοσθαι. Τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· ∆ύο τινῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκρότατον πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστη κότων, μέσον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, τῆς τε θείας καὶ ἀσωμάτου φύσεως, καὶ τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ κτηνώδους ζωῆς. Ἔξεστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι θεωρῆσαι τὴν μοῖραν; τοῦ μὲν θείου τὸ λογικόν τε καὶ διανοητικὸν, ὃ τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἄῤῥεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορὰν οὐ προσίεται· τοῦ δὲ ἀλόγου τὴν σωματικὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ διάπλασιν εἰς ἄῤῥεν τε καὶ θῆλυ μεμερισμένην. Ἑκάτερον γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶ πάντως ἐν παντὶ τῷ μετέχοντι τῆς ἀν θρωπίνης ζωῆς. Ἀλλὰ προτερεύειν τὸ νοερὸν, καθὼς παρὰ τοῦ τὴν ἀνθρωπογονίαν ἐν τάξει διεξελθόντος ἐμάθομεν, ἐπιγεννηματικὴν δὲ εἶναι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον κοινωνίαν τε καὶ συγγένειαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ φησιν, ὅτι «Ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον,» δεικνὺς διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων, καθώς φησιν ὁ Ἀπόστολος, ὅτι ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἄῤῥεν καὶ θῆλυ οὐκ ἔστιν. Εἶτα ἐπάγει τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὰ ἰδιώματα, ὅτι «Ἄῤῥεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς.» Τί οὖν διὰ τούτου μανθά νομεν; Καί μοι μηδεὶς νεμεσάτω πόῤῥωθεν προσ 184 άγοντι τὸν λόγον τῷ προκειμένῳ νοήματι. Θεὸς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει πᾶν ὅτι περ ἔστι κατ' ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν ἀγαθὸν, ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ νοουμένου τε καὶ καταλαμβανομένου ἐπέκεινα ὢν, οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι κτίζει τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ζωὴν, ἣ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. Τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν δημιουργίαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ὁρμήσας, οὐκ ἂν ἡμιτελῆ τὴν τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἐνεδείξατο δύνα μιν, τὸ μέν τι δοὺς ἐκ τῶν προσόντων αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ φθονήσας τῆς μετουσίας· ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον τῆς ἀγα θότητος εἶδος ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν, ἐκ τοῦ καὶ παραγαγεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς γένεσιν, καὶ ἀνεν δεῆ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπεργάσασθαι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολὺς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν ὁ κατάλογος, οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἀριθμῷ ῥᾳδίως τοῦτον διαλαβεῖν. ∆ιὰ τοῦτο περι ληπτικῇ τῇ φωνῇ ἅπαντα συλλαβὼν ὁ λόγος ἐσήμα νεν, ἐν τῷ εἰπεῖν, κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ἶσον γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο τῷ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι παν τὸς ἀγαθοῦ μέτοχον τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἐποίησεν. Εἰ γὰρ πλήρωμα μὲν ἀγαθῶν τὸ Θεῖον, ἐκείνου δὲ τοῦτο εἰκών· ἄρ' ἐν τῷ πλῆρες εἶναι παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἡ εἰκὼν ἔχει τὴν ὁμοιότητα. Οὐκοῦν ἐστιν ἐν ἡμῖν παντὸς μὲν καλοῦ ἰδέα, πᾶσα δὲ ἀρετὴ καὶ σοφία, καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπέρ ἐστι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον νοούμενον. Ἓν δὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ τὸ ἐλεύ θερον ἀνάγκης εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ὑπεζεῦχθαί τινι φυσικῇ δυναστείᾳ· ἀλλ' αὐτεξούσιον πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην. Ἀδέσποτον γάρ τι χρῆμα ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἑκούσιον, τὸ δὲ κατηναγκασμένον καὶ βεβιασμένον ἀρετὴ εἶναι οὐ δύναται. Ἐν πᾶσι τοίνυν τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ πρωτοτύπου κάλλους τὸν χαρακτῆρα φερούσης, εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχῃ, οὐκέτι ἂν εἴη πάν τως ὁμοίωμα, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνο διὰ πάντων ἀνα δειχθήσεται, τὸ ἐν παντὶ ἀπαράλλακτον. Τίνα τοίνυν αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ Θείου, καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ Θεῖον ὡμοιω μένου τὴν διαφορὰν καθορῶμεν; Ἐν τῷ, τὸ μὲν ἀκτίστως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ διὰ κτίσεως ὑποστῆναι. Ἡ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης ἰδιότητος διαφορὰ πάλιν ἑτέρων ἰδιωμά των ἀκολουθίαν ἐποίησε. Συνομολογεῖται γὰρ πάντη τε καὶ πάντως, τὴν μὲν ἄκτιστον φύσιν καὶ ἄτρε πτον εἶναι, καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ κτιστὴν ἀδύνατον ἄνευ ἀλλοιώσεως συστῆναι. Αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι