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saying these things. For such doctrines are truly worthy of the nonsense of frogs or jackdaws, or the irrationality of fish, or the insensibility of oaks, to say that one soul passes through so many. The cause of such absurdity is this: the supposition that souls pre-exist. For the beginning of such a doctrine, leading the argument in sequence to what is next and adjacent, proceeds, fabricating wonders up to this point. For if the soul, separated from the higher state of existence by some evil, after (as they say) it has once tasted the life of the body, again becomes a man, and life in the flesh is admittedly more subject to passion than the eternal and incorporeal life; it is altogether necessary that the soul in such a life, in which there are more opportunities for sinning, should fall into greater evil, and be disposed more passionately than before. But the passion of a human soul is its assimilation to the irrational; and having become accustomed to this, it flows into a bestial nature; and once travelling the road of evil, not even when it has become irrational does it ever cease from its progress toward evil. For the cessation of evil is the beginning of the impulse toward virtue; but there is no virtue in irrational beings. Therefore, it will of necessity always be changed for the worse, ever proceeding to what is more dishonorable, and always finding what is worse than the nature in which it is. And just as the sensible is subordinate to the rational, so also from this the transition is made to the insensible.

But up to this point their argument, though it is carried outside the truth, at least through some sequence derives one absurdity from another. But from this point on their doctrine is made into a myth through inconsistencies. For the logical consequence indicates the complete destruction of the soul. For the soul, having once slipped from the high state of existence, will be able to stop at no measure of evil, but through its relation to the passions, will pass from the rational to the irrational; and from that it will be transferred to the insensibility of plants; and somehow the inanimate is neighbor to 233 the insensible; and non-existence follows this. So that, on the whole, through this sequence, the soul will pass for them into non-being. Therefore, the return to what is better will necessarily be impossible for it again. And yet they bring the soul back from a bush to a man. Therefore, from these things they prove that life in a bush is more honorable than the incorporeal existence. For it has been shown that the progress of the soul toward the worse will in all likelihood descend to what is lower. But the inanimate is subordinate to the insensible nature, to which the premise of their doctrine leads the soul by consequence. But since they do not want this, they either confine the soul in the insensible, or if they bring it back from there to human life, they will prove (as has been said) the life of a tree to be more honorable than the first state, if from the one the fall to evil happened, while from the other the return to virtue occurs. Therefore, such an argument is headless and incomplete, which constructs that souls live by themselves before life in the flesh and are bound to bodies through evil. But as for those who say the soul is younger than the body, their absurdity has been established beforehand. Therefore, the argument from both is equally to be rejected. But I think our doctrine ought to be directed in truth through the middle of these opinions. And this is it, not to suppose, according to the Greek deceit, that souls circling with the universe, weighed down by some evil, and unable to keep up with the swiftness of the pole's motion, fall to the earth; nor again, to say that the soul comes into being for the sake of man, as if he were a clay statue pre-formed by reason. For then the intellectual nature would be shown to be less honorable than the clay figure.

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ταῦτα λέγων. Ὄντως γὰρ βατράχων τινῶν ἢ κολοιῶν φλυαρίας, ἢ ἀλογίας ἰχθύων, ἢ δρυῶν ἀν αισθησίας ἄξια τὰ τοιαῦτα δόγματα, τὸ μίαν ψυχὴν λέγειν διὰ τοσούτων ἐλθεῖν. Τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἀτοπίας αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ αἰτία, τὸ προϋφεστάναι τὰς ψυχὰς οἴε σθαι. ∆ι' ἀκολούθου γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ τοιούτου δόγμα τος ἐπὶ τὸ προσεχές τε καὶ παρακείμενον τὸν λόγον προάγουσα, μέχρι τούτου τερατευομένη διέξεισιν. Εἰ γὰρ διά τινος κακίας ἀποσπασθεῖσα τῆς ὑψηλο τέρας ἡ ψυχὴ πολιτείας, μετὰ τὸ (καθώς φασιν) ἅπαξ γεύσασθαι τοῦ σωματικοῦ βίου, πάλιν ἄνθρω πος γίνεται, ἐμπαθέστερος δὲ πάντως ὁ ἐν σαρκὶ βίος ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ τὸν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἀσώματον· ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὴν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γινομένην βίῳ, ἐν ᾧ πλείους αἱ πρὸς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰσὶν ἀφορμαὶ, ἐν πλείονί τε κακίᾳ γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐμπαθέστερον ἢ πρό τερον διατεθῆναι· ἀνθρωπίνης δὲ ψυχῆς πάθος, ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἄλογόν ἐστιν ὁμοίωσις· τούτῳ δὲ προσοι κειωθεῖσαν αὐτὴν, εἰς κτηνώδη φύσιν μεταῤῥυῆναι· ἅπαξ δὲ διὰ κακίας ὁδεύουσαν, μηδὲ ἐν ἀλόγῳ γενο μένην, τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν προόδου λῆξαί ποτε. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ στάσις, ἀρχὴ τῆς κατ' ἀρετήν ἐστιν ὁρ μῆς· ἀρετὴ δὲ ἐν ἀλόγοις οὐκ ἔστιν. Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλοιωθήσεται, πάντοτε πρὸς τὸ ἀτιμότερον προϊοῦσα, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τῆς ἐν ᾗ ἐστι φύσεως ἐξευρίσκουσα. Ὥσπερ δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ὑποβέβηκεν, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ἡ μετάπτωσις γίνεται.

Ἀλλὰ μέχρι τούτου προϊὼν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς, εἰ καὶ ἔξω τῆς ἀληθείας φέρεται, ἀλλά γε διά τινος ἀκο λουθίας τὸ ἄτοπον ἐξ ἀτόπου μεταλαμβάνει. Τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη διὰ τῶν ἀσυναρτήτων αὐτοῖς τὸ δόγμα μυθοποιεῖται. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκολουθία παντελῆ δια φθορὰν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποδείκνυσιν. Ἡ γὰρ ἅπαξ τῆς ὑψηλῆς πολιτείας ἀπολισθήσασα, ἐν οὐδενὶ μέτρῳ κακίας στῆναι δυνήσεται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πάθη σχέσεως, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον μετα βήσεται· ἀπ' ἐκείνου δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν φυτῶν ἀναι σθησίαν μετατεθήσεται· τῷ δὲ ἀναισθήτῳ γειτνιᾷ 233 πως τὸ ἄψυχον· τούτῳ δὲ τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἕπεται. Ὥστε καθόλου διὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ μεταχωρήσει. Οὐκοῦν ἀμήχανος αὐτῇ πάλιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται ἡ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἐπάνο δος. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ θάμνου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπανάγουσιν. Οὐκοῦν προτιμοτέραν τὴν ἐν θάμνῳ ζωὴν τῆς ἀσωμάτου διαγωγῆς ἐκ τούτων ἀποδεικνύουσιν. ∆έδεικται γὰρ, ὅτι ἡ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον γενομένη πρόοδος τῆς ψυχῆς, πρὸς τὸ κατώτερον κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑποβήσεται. Ὑποβέβηκε δὲ τὴν ἀναί σθητον φύσιν τὸ ἄψυχον, εἰς ὃ δι' ἀκολουθίας ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἄγει. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο οὐ βούλονται ἢ τῷ ἀναισθήτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐγκα τακλείουσιν, ἢ εἴπερ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον αὐτὴν ἐπανάγοιεν βίον, προτιμότερον (καθὼς εἴρη) τὸν ξυλώδη βίον τῆς πρώτης ἀποδείξουσι κα ταστάσεως, εἴπερ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἡ πρὸς κακίαν κα τάπτωσις γέγονεν, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἡ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐπά νοδος γίνεται. Οὐκοῦν ἀκέφαλός τις καὶ ἀτελὴς ὁ τοιοῦτος διελέγχεται λόγος, ὁ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν πρὸ τῆς ἐν σαρκὶ ζωῆς βιοτεύειν κατασκευάζων, καὶ διὰ κακίας συνδεῖσθαι τοῖς σώμασι. Τῶν δέ γε νεωτέραν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι λεγόντων, προκατεσκευάσθη διὰ τῶν κατόπιν ἡ ἀτοπία. Οὐκοῦν ἀπόβλητος ἐπίσης ὁ παρ' ἀμφοτέρων λόγος. ∆ιὰ δὲ τοῦ μέσου τῶν ὑπολήψεων εὐθύνειν οἶμαι δεῖν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ἡμέτερον δόγμα. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, τὸ μήτε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἀπάτην ἐν κακίᾳ τινὶ βαρη θείσας τὰς τῷ παντὶ συμπεριπολούσας ψυχὰς, ἀδυ ναμίᾳ τοῦ συμπαραθέειν τῇ ὀξύτητι τῆς τοῦ πόλου κινήσεως, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καταπίπτειν οἴεσθαι· μηδ' αὖ πάλιν οἱονεὶ πήλινον ἀνδριάντα προδιαπλασθέντα τῷ λόγῳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τούτου ἕνεκα τὴν ψυχὴν γίνε σθαι λέγειν. Ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἀτιμοτέρα τοῦ πηλίνου πλά σματος ἡ νοερὰ φύσις ἀποδειχθείη.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΚΘʹ.