Chapter VII.—He Attacks the Doctrine of the Manichæans Concerning Evil, God, and the Righteousness of the Patriarchs.

12. For I was ignorant as to that which really is, and was, as it were, violently moved to give my support to foolish deceivers, when they asked me, “Whence is evil?”121    The strange mixture of the pensive philosophy of Persia with Gnosticism and Christianity, propounded by Manichæus, attempted to solve this question, which was “the great object of heretical inquiry” (Mansel’s Gnostics, lec. i.). It was Augustin’s desire for knowledge concerning it that united him to this sect, and which also led him to forsake it, when he found therein nothing but empty fables (De Lib. Arb. i. sec. 4). Manichæus taught that evil and good were primeval, and had independent existences. Augustin, on the other hand, maintains that it was not possible for evil so to exist (De Civ. Dei, xi. sec. 22) but, as he here states, evil is “a privation of good.” The evil will has a causa deficiens, but not a causa efficiens (ibid. xii. 6), as is exemplified in the fall of the angels.—and, “Is God limited by a bodily shape, and has He hairs and nails?”—and, “Are they to be esteemed righteous who had many wives at once and did kill men, and sacrificed living creatures?”122    1 Kings xviii. 40. At which things I, in my ignorance, was much disturbed, and, retreating from the truth, I appeared to myself to be going towards it; because as yet I knew not that evil was naught but a privation of good, until in the end it ceases altogether to be; which how should I see, the sight of whose eyes saw no further than bodies, and of my mind no further than a phantasm? And I knew not God to be a Spirit,123    John iv. 24. not one who hath parts extended in length and breadth, nor whose being was bulk; for every bulk is less in a part than in the whole, and, if it be infinite, it must be less in such part as is limited by a certain space than in its infinity; and cannot be wholly everywhere, as Spirit, as God is. And what that should be in us, by which we were like unto God, and might rightly in Scripture be said to be after “the image of God,”124    Gen. i. 27; see vi. sec. 4, note. I was entirely ignorant.

13. Nor had I knowledge of that true inner righteousness, which doth not judge according to custom, but out of the most perfect law of God Almighty, by which the manners of places and times were adapted to those places and times—being itself the while the same always and everywhere, not one thing in one place, and another in another; according to which Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and Moses, and David, and all those commended by the mouth of God were righteous,125    Heb. xi. 8–40. but were judged unrighteous by foolish men, judging out of man’s judgment,126    1 Cor. iv. 3. and gauging by the petty standard of their own manners the manners of the whole human race. Like as if in an armoury, one knowing not what were adapted to the several members should put greaves on his head, or boot himself with a helmet, and then complain because they would not fit. Or as if, on some day when in the afternoon business was forbidden, one were to fume at not being allowed to sell as it was lawful to him in the forenoon. Or when in some house he sees a servant take something in his hand which the butler is not permitted to touch, or something done behind a stable which would be prohibited in the dining-room, and should be indignant that in one house, and one family, the same thing is not distributed everywhere to all. Such are they who cannot endure to hear something to have been lawful for righteous men in former times which is not so now; or that God, for certain temporal reasons, commanded them one thing, and these another, but both obeying the same righteousness; though they see, in one man, one day, and one house, different things to be fit for different members, and a thing which was formerly lawful after a time unlawful—that permitted or commanded in one corner, which done in another is justly prohibited and punished. Is justice, then, various and changeable? Nay, but the times over which she presides are not all alike, because they are times.127    The law of the development of revelation implied in the above passage is one to which Augustin frequently resorts in confutation of objections such as those to which he refers in the previous and following sections. It may likewise be effectively used when similar objections are raised by modern sceptics. In the Rabbinical books there is a tradition of the wanderings of the children of Israel, that not only did their clothes not wax old (Deut. xxix. 5) during those forty years, but that they grew with their growth. The written word is as it were the swaddling-clothes of the holy child Jesus; and as the revelation concerning Him—the Word Incarnate—grew, did the written word grow. God spoke in sundry parts [πολυέμρως] and in divers manners unto the fathers by the prophets (Heb. i. 1); but when the “fulness of the time was come” (Gal. iv. 4), He completed the revelation in His Son. Our Lord indicates this principle when He speaks of divorce in Matt. xix. 8. “Moses,” he says, “because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so.” (See Con. Faust. xix. 26, 29.) When objections, then, as to obsolete ritual usages, or the sins committed by Old Testament worthies are urged, the answer is plain: the ritual has become obsolete, because only intended for the infancy of revelation, and the sins, while recorded in, are not approved by Scripture, and those who committed them will be judged according to the measure of revelation they received. See also De Ver. Relig. xvii.; in Ps. lxxiii. 1, liv. 22; Con. Faust. xxii. 25; Trench, Hulsean Lecs. iv., v. (1845); and Candlish’s Reason and Revelation, pp. 58–75. But men, whose days upon the earth are few,128    Job xiv. 1. because by their own perception they cannot harmonize the causes of former ages and other nations, of which they had no experience, with these of which they have experience, though in one and the same body, day, or family, they can readily see what is suitable for each member, season, part, and person—to the one they take exception, to the other they submit.

14. These things I then knew not, nor observed. They met my eyes on every side, and I saw them not. I composed poems, in which it was not permitted me to place every foot everywhere, but in one metre one way, and in another, nor even in any one verse the same foot in all places. Yet the art itself by which I composed had not different principles for these different cases, but comprised all in one. Still I saw not how that righteousness, which good and holy men submitted to, far more excellently and sublimely comprehended in one all those things which God commanded, and in no part varied, though in varying times it did not prescribe all things at once, but distributed and enjoined what was proper for each. And I, being blind, blamed those pious fathers, not only for making use of present things as God commanded and inspired them to do, but also for foreshowing things to come as God was revealing them.129    Here, as at the end of sec. 17, he alludes to the typical and allegorical character of Old Testament histories. Though he does not with Origen go so far as to disparage the letter of Scripture (see De Civ. Dei, xiii. 21), but upholds it, he constantly employs the allegorical principle. He (alluding to the patriarchs) goes so far, indeed, as to say (Con. Faust., xxii. 24), that “not only the speech but the life of these men was prophetic; and the whole kingdom of the Hebrews was like a great prophet;” and again: “We may discover a prophecy of the coming of Christ and of the Church both in what they said and what they did”. This method of interpretation he first learned from Ambrose. See note on “the letter killeth,” etc. (below, vi. sec. 6), for the danger attending it. On the general subject, reference may also be made to his in Ps. cxxxvi. 3; Serm. 2; De Tentat. Abr. sec. 7; and De Civ. Dei, xvii. 3.

CAPUT VII. Doctrina Manichaeorum absurda cui suffragabatur.

12. Nesciebam enim aliud vere quod est; et quasi acutule movebar ut suffragarer stultis deceptoribus, cum a me quaererent unde malum; et utrum forma corporea Deus finiretur et haberet capillos et ungues; et utrum justi existimandi essent qui haberent uxores multas simul, et occiderent homines, et sacrificarent de animalibus. Quibus rerum ignarus perturbabar; et recedens a veritate, ire in eam mihi videbar; quia non noveram malum non esse nisi privationem boni, usque ad quod omnino non est. Quod unde viderem, cujus videre usque ad corpus erat oculis, et animo usque ad phantasma? Et non noveram Deum esse spiritum, non cui membra essent per longum et latum, nec cui esse moles esset: quia moles in parte minor est quam in toto suo; et si infinita sit, minor est in aliqua parte certo spatio definita, quam per infinitum; et non est tota ubique, sicut spiritus, sicut Deus. Et quid in nobis esset, secundum quod essemus similes Deo et recte in Scriptura diceremur ad imaginem Dei (Gen. I, 27), prorsus ignorabam.

13. Et non noveram justitiam veram interiorem, non ex consuetudine judicantem, sed ex lege rectissima Dei omnipotentis, qua formarentur mores regionum et dierum pro regionibus et diebus; cum ipsa ubique ac semper esset, non alibi alia, nec alias aliter; secundum quam justi essent Abraham, et Isaac, et Jacob, et Moyses, et David, et illi omnes laudati ore Dei: sed eos ab imperitis judicari iniquos, judicantibus ex humano die, et universos mores humani generis ex parte moris sui metientibus, tanquam si quis nescius in armamentis quid cui membro accommodatum sit, ocrea velit caput contegi, et galea calceari; et murmuret quod non apte conveniat: aut in uno die indicto a pomeridianis horis justitio, quisquam stomachetur non sibi concedi quid venale proponere, quia mane concessum est: aut in una domo videat aliquid tractari manibus a quoquam servo, quod facere 0689 non sinatur qui pocula ministrat: aut aliquid post praesepia fieri, quod ante mensam prohibeatur; et indignetur, cum sit unum habitaculum et una familia, non ubique atque omnibus idem tribui. Sic sunt isti qui indignantur, cum audierint illo saeculo licuisse justis aliquid, quod isto non licet justis; et quia illis aliud praecepit Deus, istis aliud pro temporalibus causis, cum eidem justitiae utrique servierint: cum in uno homine, et in uno die, et in unis aedibus videant aliud alii membro congruere, et aliud jamdudum licuisse, post horam non licere; quiddam in illo angulo permitti aut juberi, quod in isto juste vetetur et vindicetur. Numquid justitia varia est et mutabilis? Sed tempora quibus praesidet, non pariter eunt; tempora enim sunt. Homines autem quorum vita super terram brevis est, quia sensu non valent causas contexere saeculorum priorum, aliarumque gentium quas experti non sunt, cum his quas experti sunt; in uno autem corpore, vel die, vel domo, facile possunt videre quid cui membro, quibus momentis, quibus partibus personisve congruat: in illis offenduntur, his serviunt.

14. Haec ego tunc nesciebam, et non advertebam; et feriebant undique ista oculos meos, et non videbam. Et cantabam carmina, et non mihi licebat ponere pedem quemlibet ubilibet, sed in alio atque alio metro aliter atque aliter; et in uno aliquo versu, non omnibus locis eumdem pedem. Et ars ipsa qua canebam, non habebat aliud alibi, sed omnia simul. Et non intuebar justitiam cui servirent boni et sancti homines, longe excellentius atque sublimius habere simul omnia quae praecepit , et nulla ex parte variari, et tamen variis temporibus non omnia simul, sed propria distribuentem ac praecipientem. Et reprehendebam caecus pios patres; non solum sicut Deus juberet atque inspiraret utentes praesentibus, verum quoque sicut Deus revelaret futura praenuntiantes.