41

Proof that for both soul and body the cause of

existence is one and the same. But since man is one, being composed of both soul and body, one must assume that the principle of his constitution is one and common, so that he might not become older and younger than himself, with the bodily part preceding in him, and the other part following after. But by the foreknowing power of God, according to the argument rendered a little before, one must say that the whole fullness of humanity pre-existed, with the prophecy bearing witness to this, which says that God knows all things before their generation. And in the creation of each individual, one part is not to be set before the other, neither the soul before the body, nor the reverse; so that man may not be at variance with himself, being divided by a difference in time. 236 For since our nature is understood as twofold, according to the apostolic teaching, of the visible man and of the hidden; if one were to pre-exist, and the other to come after, the power of the Creator will be proven imperfect, not being sufficient for the whole at once, but dividing the work and busying itself in turn with each of the halves. But just as we say that in the wheat or in any other of the seeds, the entire form of the ear of corn is contained in potentiality—the grass, the stalk, the joints in between, the fruit, the awns—and we say that none of these pre-exists in the principle of nature, or comes into being before the nature of the seed, but that by a certain natural order the power inherent in the seed is made manifest, and not that another nature is introduced from without; according to the same reasoning we have also supposed that the human seed contains, sown together in the first occasion of its constitution, the power of its nature.

And that it unfolds and is made manifest through a certain natural sequence as it proceeds towards perfection, not taking anything from without as an occasion for its completion, but advancing itself to perfection through sequence. So that it is not true to say either that the soul is before the body, or the body without the soul, but that there is one principle for both, which, according to the higher reason, was laid down in the first will of God, and according to the other, is constituted in the occasions of generation. For just as it is not possible to see the articulation into limbs in that which is deposited for the conception of the body before its formation, so too it is not possible to perceive the properties of the soul in the same, before it has come forth into activity. And just as no one would doubt that what has been deposited is formed into the distinct joints and viscera, not by some other power entering from without, but by the inherent power naturally shifting to its activity; so also concerning the soul, it is possible to suppose the same analogously, that even if it is not recognized through any activities in what is visible, it is no less present in it. For the form of the man who is to be constituted is also potentially in it, but it is latent because it is not able to appear before the necessary sequence. Thus the soul is also in it though not appearing, and it will be revealed through its own proper and natural activity, proceeding along with the bodily growth. For since the power for conception is not separated from a dead body, but from an ensouled and living one, for this reason we say it is reasonable not to think that which is sent forth from a living thing for the occasion of life is dead and soulless. For what is soulless in the flesh is certainly also dead. And death comes by the privation of soul. But no one would say in this case that the privation is older than the possession, if someone were to establish that the soulless state, which is death, is older than the soul. 237 But if someone should seek clearer proof that that part lives which becomes the principle of the animal being constructed, it is possible through other signs as well, by which the ensouled is distinguished from the dead, and concerning this

41

Κατασκευὴ τοῦ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχῇ τε καὶ σώματι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς

ὑπάρξεως εἶναι. Ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ διὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος συνεστηκότος, μίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοινὴν τῆς συστάσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ προγενέστερός τε καὶ νεώτερος γένοιτο, τοῦ μὲν σωματικοῦ προτερεύοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ἐφυστερίζοντος. Ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν προγνωστικῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμει, κατὰ τὸν μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀποδο θέντα λόγον, ἅπαν προϋφεστάναι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον πλή ρωμα λέγειν, συμμαρτυρούσης εἰς τοῦτο τῆς προφη τείας, τῆς λεγούσης εἰδέναι τὰ πάντα τὸν Θεὸν πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν. Ἐν δὲ τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον δημιουργίᾳ μὴ προτιθέναι τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον, μήτε πρὸ τοῦ σώ ματος τὴν ψυχὴν, μήτε τὸ ἔμπαλιν· ὡς ἂν μὴ στασιά ζοι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῇ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δια 236 φορᾷ μεριζόμενος. ∆ιπλῆς γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν νοουμένης, κατὰ τὴν ἀποστολικὴν διδασκαλίαν, τοῦ τε φαινομένου ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τοῦ κεκρυμμένου· εἰ τὸ μὲν προϋπάρχοι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιγένοιτο, ἀτελής τις ἡ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος ἀπελεγχθήσεται δύναμις, οὐ τῷ παντὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον ἐξαρκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ διαιρουμένη τὸ ἔργον, καὶ ἀνὰ μέρος περὶ ἑκάτερον τῶν ἡμισευ μάτων ἀσχολουμένη. Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σίτῳ φαμὲν ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τῶν σπερμάτων, ἅπαν ἐμπεριει λῆφθαι τῇ δυνάμει τὸ κατὰ τὸν στάχυν εἶδος, τὸν χόρτον, τὴν καλάμην, τὰς διὰ μέσου ζώνας, τὸν καρ πὸν, τοὺς ἀνθέρικας, καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων ἐν τῷ τῆς φύσεως λόγῳ προϋπάρχειν, ἢ προγίνεσθαί φαμεν τῇ φύσει τοῦ σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ τάξει μέν τινι φυσικῇ τὴν ἐγκειμένην τῷ σπέρματι δύναμιν φανεροῦσθαι, οὐ μὴν ἑτέραν ἐπεισκρίνεσθαι φύσιν· κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σπορὰν ὑπειλήφαμεν ἔχειν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς συστάσεως ἀφορμῇ συνεσπαρ μένην τὴν τῆς φύσεως δύναμιν.

Ἐξαπλοῦσθαι δὲ καὶ φανεροῦσθαι διά τινος φυσικῆς ἀκολουθίας πρὸς τὸ τέλειον προϊοῦσαν, οὐ προσλαμβάνουσάν τι τῶν ἔξωθεν εἰς ἀφορμὴν τελειώσεως· ἀλλ' ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὸ τέλειον δι' ἀκολουθίας προάγουσαν. Ὡς μήτε ψυχὴν πρὸ τοῦ σώματος, μήτε χωρῖς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μίαν ἀμφοτέρων ἀρχὴν, κατὰ μὲν τὸν ὑψηλότερον λόγον, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ βουλή ματι καταβληθεῖσαν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἕτερον, ἐν ταῖς τῆς γενέσεως ἀφορμαῖς συνισταμένην. Ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τὴν κατὰ μέλη διάρθρωσιν ἐνιδεῖν τῷ πρὸς τὴν σύλληψιν τοῦ σώματος ἐντιθεμένῳ πρὸ τῆς διαπλά σεως· οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἰδιότητας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δυνατόν ἐστι κατανοῆσαι, πρὶν προελθεῖν εἰς ἐνέργειαν. Καὶ ὥσπερ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀμφιβάλοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἄρθρων τε καὶ σπλάγχνων διαφορὰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐντεθὲν σχηματίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλης τινὸς δυνάμεως ἐπεισερχομένης, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐγκειμένης φυσικῶς πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς μεθισταμένης· οὕτω καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναλόγως ἔστι τὸ ἶσον ὑπονοῆσαι, ὅτι κἂν μὴ διά τινων ἐνεργειῶν ἐν τῷ φαινομένῳ γνωρίζηται, οὐδὲν ἧττόν ἐστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ μέλλοντος συνίστασθαι ἀνθρώπου ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐστὶ τῇ δυνάμει, λανθάνει δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι δυνατὸν πρὸς τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀκολουθίας ἀναφανῆναι. Οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχή ἐστι μὲν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ φαινομένη, φανή σεται δὲ διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἑαυτῆς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνερ γείας, τῇ σωματικῇ αὐξήσει συμπροϊοῦσα. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ νεκροῦ σώματος ἡ πρὸς τὴν σύλληψιν δύναμις ἀποκρίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐμψύχου καὶ ζῶντος· διὰ τοῦτό φαμεν εὔλογον εἶναι μὴ νεκρὸν καὶ ἄψυχον οἴεσθαι τὸ ἀπὸ ζῶντος εἰς ζωῆς ἀφορμὴν προϊέμενον. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν σαρκὶ ἄψυχον, καὶ νεκρόν ἐστι πάντως. Ἡ δὲ νεκρότης κατὰ στέρησιν ψυχῆς γίνεται. Οὐκ ἂν δέ τις ἐπὶ τούτου πρεσβυτέραν τῆς ἕξεως εἴποι τὴν στέρησιν, εἴπερ τὸ ἄψυχον, ὅπερ νεκρότης ἐστὶ, τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναί τις κατασκευάζει πρεσβύτερον. 237 Εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἐναργέστερον ζητοίη τεκμήριον τοῦ ζῇν ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος, ὅπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κατασκευαζομέ νου γίνεται ζώου, δυνατόν ἐστι καὶ δι' ἄλλων ση μείων, δι' ὧν τὸ ἔμψυχον ἐκ τοῦ νεκροῦ διακρίνεται, καὶ περὶ τούτου