Chapter III.—That the Cause of Evil is the Free Judgment of the Will.

4. But I also, as yet, although I said and was firmly persuaded, that Thou our Lord, the true God, who madest not only our souls but our bodies, and not our souls and bodies alone, but all creatures and all things, wert uncontaminable and inconvertible, and in no part mutable: yet understood I not readily and clearly what was the cause of evil. And yet, whatever it was, I perceived that it must be so sought out as not to constrain me by it to believe that the immutable God was mutable, lest I myself should become the thing that I was seeking out. I sought, therefore, for it free from care, certain of the untruthfulness of what these asserted, whom I shunned with my whole heart; for I perceived that through seeking after the origin of evil, they were filled with malice, in that they liked better to think that Thy Substance did suffer evil than that their own did commit it.365    See iv. sec. 26, note, above.    Simplicianus succeeded Ambrose, 397 A.D. He has already been referred to, in the extract from De Civ. Dei, in note 1, p. 113, above as “the old saint Simplicianus, afterwards Bishop of Milan.” In Ep. p. 37, Augustin addresses him as “his father, most worthy of being cherished with respect and sincere affection.” When Simplicianus is spoken of above as “the father of Ambrose in receiving Thy grace,” reference is doubtless made to his having been instrumental in his conversion—he having “begotten” him “through the gospel” (1 Cor. iv. 15). Ambrose, when writing to him (Ep. 65), concludes, “Vale, et nos parentis affectu dilige, ut facis.”

5. And I directed my attention to discern what I now heard, that free will366    See iii. sec. 12, note, and iv. sec. 26, note, above.    Col. ii. 8. was the cause of our doing evil, and Thy righteous judgment of our suffering it. But I was unable clearly to discern it. So, then, trying to draw the eye of my mind from that pit, I was plunged again therein, and trying often, was as often plunged back again. But this raised me towards Thy light, that I knew as well that I had a will as that I had life: when, therefore, I was willing or unwilling to do anything, I was most certain that it was none but myself that was willing and unwilling; and immediately I perceived that there was the cause of my sin. But what I did against my will I saw that I suffered rather than did, and that judged I not to be my fault, but my punishment; whereby, believing Thee to be most just, I quickly confessed myself to be not unjustly punished. But again I said: “Who made me? Was it not my God, who is not only good, but goodness itself? Whence came I then to will to do evil, and to be unwilling to do good, that there might be cause for my just punishment? Who was it that put this in me, and implanted in me the root of bitterness, seeing I was altogether made by my most sweet God? If the devil were the author, whence is that devil? And if he also, by his own perverse will, of a good angel became a devil, whence also was the evil will in him whereby he became a devil, seeing that the angel was made altogether good by that most Good Creator?” By these reflections was I again cast down and stifled; yet not plunged into that hell of error (where no man confesseth unto Thee),367    Ps. vi. 5.    i.e. the Platonists. to think that Thou dost suffer evil, rather than that man doth it.

CAPUT III. Liberum arbitrium causa peccati.

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4. Sed et ego adhuc, quamvis incontaminabilem et inconvertibilem, et nulla ex parte mutabilem dicerem, firmeque sentirem Dominum nostrum Deum verum, qui fecisti non solum animas nostras, sed etiam corpora, nec tantum animas nostras et corpora, sed omnes et omnia; non tenebam explicitam et enodatam causam mali: quaecumque tamen esset, sic eam quaerendam videbam, ut non per illam constringerer Deum incommutabilem mutabilem credere, ne ipse fierem quod quaerebam. Itaque securus eam quaerebam, et certus non esse verum quod illi dicerent, quos toto animo fugiebam; quia videbam, quaerendo unde malum, repletos malitia, qua opinarentur tuam potius substantiam male pati, quam suam male facere.

5. Et intendebam ut cernerem quod audiebam, liberum voluntatis arbitrium causam esse ut male faceremus, et rectum judicium tuum ut pateremur; et eam liquidam cernere non valebam. Itaque aciem mentis de profundo educere conatus, mergebar iterum; et saepe conatus, margebar iterum atque iterum. Sublevabat enim me in lucem tuam quod tam me sciebam habere voluntatem, quam me vivere. Itaque cum aliquid vellem aut nollem, non alium quam me velle ac nolle certissimus eram, et ibi esse causam peccati mei jam jamque animadvertebam. Quod autem invitus facerem, pati me potius quam facere videbam; et id non culpam, sed poenam esse judicabam, qua me non injuste plecti, te justum cogitans, cito fatebar. Sed rursus dicebam: Quis fecit me? Nonne Deus meus, non tantum bonus, sed ipsum bonum? Unde igitur mihi male velle et bene nolle, ut esset cur juste poenas luerem? Quis in me hoc posuit, et insevit mihi plantarium amaritudinis, cum totus fierem a dulcissimo Deo meo? Si diabolus auctor, unde ipse diabolus? Quod si et ipse perversa voluntate ex bono angelo diabolus factus est; unde et in ipso voluntas mala qua diabolus fieret, quando totus angelus a conditore optimo factus esset bonus ? His cogitationibus deprimebar iterum et suffocabar: sed non usque ad illum infernum subducebar erroris, ubi nemo confitetur tibi, dum tu potius mala pati, quam homo facere putatur.