Chapter X.—He Refutes the Opinion of the Manichæans as to Two Kinds of Minds,—One Good and the Other Evil.

22. Let them perish from Thy presence,544    Jas. iv. 6, and l Pet. v. 5.    Ps. lxviii. 2. O God, as “vain talkers and deceivers”545    “This,”says Watts, “was likely to be the book of Amelius the Platonist, who hath indeed this beginning of St. John’s Gospel, calling the apostle a barbarian.” This Amelius was a disciple of Plotinus, who was the first to develope and formulate the Neo-Platonic doctrines, and of whom it is said that he would not have his likeness taken, nor be reminded of his birthday, because it would recall the existence of the body he so much despised. A popular account of the theories of Plotinus, and their connection with the doctrines of Plato and of Christianity respectively, will be found in Archer Butler’s Lectures on Ancient Philosophy, vol. ii. pp. 348–358. For a more systematic view of his writings, see Ueberweg’s History of Philosophy, sec. 68. Augustin alludes again in his De Vita Beata (sec. 4) to the influence the Platonic writings had on him at this time; and it is interesting to note how in God’s providence they were drawing him to seek a fuller knowledge of Him, just as in his nineteenth year (book iii. sec. 7, above) the Hortensius of Cicero stimulated him to the pursuit of wisdom. Thus in his experience was exemplified the truth embodied in the saying of Clemens Alexandrinus,—“Philosophy led the Greeks to Christ, as the law did the Jews.” Archbishop Trench, in his Hulsean Lectures (lecs. 1 and 3, 1846, “Christ the Desire of all Nations”), enters with interesting detail into this question, specially as it relates to the heathen world. “None,” he says in lecture 3, “can thoughtfully read the early history of the Church without marking how hard the Jewish Christians found it to make their own the true idea of a Son of God, as indeed is witnessed by the whole Epistle to the Hebrews—how comparatively easy the Gentile converts; how the Hebrew Christians were continually in danger of sinking down into Ebionite heresies, making Christ but a man as other men, refusing to go on unto perfection, or to realize the truth of His higher nature; while, on the other hand, the genial promptness is as remarkable with which the Gentile Church welcomed and embraced the offered truth, ‘God manifest in the flesh.’ We feel that there must have been effectual preparations in the latter, which wrought its greater readiness for receiving and heartily embracing this truth when it arrived.” The passage from Amelius the Platonist, referred to at the beginning of this note, is examined in Burton’s Bampton Lectures, note 90. It has been adverted to by Eusebius, Theodoret, and perhaps by Augustin in the De Civ. Dei, x. 29, quoted in note 2, sec. 25, below. See Kayes’ Clement, pp. 116–124.    Titus i. 10. of the soul do perish, who, observing that there were two wills in deliberating, affirm that there are two kinds of minds in us,—one good, the other evil.546    See i. sec. 23, note, above, and also his Life, in the last vol. of the Benedictine edition of his works, for a very fair estimate of his knowledge of Greek.    And that therefore they were not responsible for their evil deeds, it not being they that sinned, but the nature of evil in them. See iv. sec. 26, and note, above, where the Manichæan doctrines in this matter are fully treated. They themselves verily are evil when they hold these evil opinions; and they shall become good when they hold the truth, and shall consent unto the truth, that Thy apostle may say unto them, “Ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord.”547    The Neo-Platonic ideas as to the “Word” or Λόγος, which Augustin (1) contrasts during the remainder of this book with the doctrine of the gospel, had its germ in the writings of Plato. The Greek term expresses both reason and the expression of reason in speech; and the Fathers frequently illustrate, by reference to this connection between ideas and uttered words, the fact that the “Word” that was with God had an incarnate existence in the world as the “Word” made flesh. By the Logos of the Alexandrian school something very different was meant from the Christian doctrine as to the incarnation, of which the above can only be taken as a dim illustration. It has been questioned, indeed, whether the philosophers, from Plotinus to the Gnostics of the time of St. John, believed the Logos and the supreme God to have in any sense separate “personalities.” Dr. Burton, in his Bampton Lectures, concludes that they did not (lect. vii. p. 215, and note 93; compare Dorner, Person of Christ, i. 27, Clark); and quotes Origen when he points out to Celsus, that “while the heathen use the reason of God as another term for God Himself, the Christians use the term Logos for the Son of God.” Another point of difference which appears in Augustin’s review of Platonism above, is found in the Platonist’s discarding the idea of the Logos becoming man. This the very genius of their philosophy forbade them to hold, since they looked on matter as impure. (2) It has been charged against Christianity by Gibbon and other sceptical writers, that it has borrowed largely from the doctrines of Plato; and it has been said that this doctrine of the Logos was taken from them by Justin Martyr. This charge, says Burton (ibid. p. 194), “has laid open in its supporters more inconsistencies and more misstatements than any other which ever has been advanced.” We have alluded in the note to book iii. sec. 8, above, to Justin Martyr’s search after truth. He endeavoured to find it successively in the Stoical, the Peripatetic, the Pythagorean, and the Platonic schools; and he appears to have thought as highly of Plato’s philosophy as did Augustin. He does not, however, fail to criticise his doctrine when inconsistent with Christianity (see Burton, ibid. notes 18 and 86). Justin Martyr has apparently been chosen for attack as being the earliest of the post-apostolic Fathers. Burton, however, shows that Ignatius, who knew St. John, and was bishop of Antioch thirty years before his death, used precisely the same expression as applied to Christ (ibid. p. 204). This would appear to be a conclusive answer to this objection. (3) It may be well to note here Burton’s general conclusions as to the employment of this term Logos in St. John, since it occurs frequently in this part of the Confessions. Every one must have observed St. John’s use of the term is peculiar as compared with the other apostles, but it is not always borne in mind that a generation probably elapsed between the date of his gospel and that of the other apostolic writings. In this interval the Gnostic heresy had made great advances; and it would appear that John, finding this term Logos prevalent when he wrote, infused into it a nobler meaning, and pointed out to those being led away by this heresy that there was indeed One who might be called “the Word”—One who was not, indeed, God’s mind, or as the word that comes from the mouth and passes away, but One who, while He had been “made flesh” like unto us, was yet co-eternal with God. “You will perceive,” says Archer Butler (Ancient Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 10), “how natural, or rather how necessary, is such a process, when you remember that this is exactly what every teacher must do who speaks of God to a heathen; he adopts the term, but he refines and exalts its meaning. Nor, indeed, is the procedure different in any use whatever of language in sacred senses and for sacred purposes. It has been justly remarked, by (I think) Isaac Casaubon, that the principle of all these adaptations is expressed in the sentence of St. Paul, Ὀν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν.” On the charge against Christianity of having borrowed from heathenism, reference may be made to Trench’s Hulsean Lectures, lect. i. (1846); and for the sources of Gnosticism, and St. John’s treatment of heresies as to the “Word,” lects. ii. and v. in Mansel’s Gnostic Heresies will be consulted with profit.    Eph. v. 8. But, they, desiring to be light, not “in the Lord,” but in themselves, conceiving the nature of the soul to be the same as that which God is,548    John i. 1–5.    See iv. sec. 26, note, above. are made more gross darkness; for that through a shocking arrogancy they went farther from Thee, “the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.”549    Ibid. i. 7, 8.    John i. 9. Take heed what you say, and blush for shame; draw near unto Him and be “lightened,” and your faces shall not be “ashamed.”550    See note, sec. 23, below.    Ps. xxxiv. 5. I, when I was deliberating upon serving the Lord my God now, as I had long purposed,—I it was who willed, I who was unwilling. It was I, even I myself. I neither willed entirely, nor was entirely unwilling. Therefore was I at war with myself, and destroyed by myself. And this destruction overtook me against my will, and yet showed not the presence of another mind, but the punishment of mine own.551    John i. 9.    See v. sec. 2, note 6, above, and x. sec. 5, note, below. “Now, then, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me,”552    Ibid. i. 10.    Rom. vii. 17.—the punishment of a more unconfined sin, in that I was a son of Adam.

23. For if there be as many contrary natures as there are conflicting wills, there will not now be two natures only, but many. If any one deliberate whether he should go to their conventicle, or to the theatre, those men553    Ibid. i. 11.    The Manichæans. at once cry out, “Behold, here are two natures,—one good, drawing this way, another bad, drawing back that way; for whence else is this indecision between conflicting wills?” But I reply that both are bad—that which draws to them, and that which draws back to the theatre. But they believe not that will to be other than good which draws to them. Supposing, then, one of us should deliberate, and through the conflict of his two wills should waver whether he should go to the theatre or to our church, would not these also waver what to answer? For either they must confess, which they are not willing to do, that the will which leads to our church is good, as well as that of those who have received and are held by the mysteries of theirs, or they must imagine that there are two evil natures and two evil minds in one man, at war one with the other; and that will not be true which they say, that there is one good and another bad; or they must be converted to the truth, and no longer deny that where any one deliberates, there is one soul fluctuating between conflicting wills.

24. Let them no more say, then, when they perceive two wills to be antagonistic to each other in the same man, that the contest is between two opposing minds, of two opposing substances, from two opposing principles, the one good and the other bad. For Thou, O true God, dost disprove, check, and convince them; like as when both wills are bad, one deliberates whether he should kill a man by poison, or by the sword; whether he should take possession of this or that estate of another’s, when he cannot both; whether he should purchase pleasure by prodigality, or retain his money by covetousness; whether he should go to the circus or the theatre, if both are open on the same day; or, thirdly, whether he should rob another man’s house, if he have the opportunity; or, fourthly, whether he should commit adultery, if at the same time he have the means of doing so,—all these things concurring in the same point of time, and all being equally longed for, although impossible to be enacted at one time. For they rend the mind amid four, or even (among the vast variety of things men desire) more antagonistic wills, nor do they yet affirm that there are so many different substances. Thus also is it in wills which are good. For I ask them, is it a good thing to have delight in reading the apostle, or good to have delight in a sober psalm, or good to discourse on the gospel? To each of these they will answer, “It is good.” What, then, if all equally delight us, and all at the same time? Do not different wills distract the mind, when a man is deliberating which he should rather choose? Yet are they all good, and are at variance until one be fixed upon, whither the whole united will may be borne, which before was divided into many. Thus, also, when above eternity delights us, and the pleasure of temporal good holds us down below, it is the same soul which willeth not that or this with an entire will, and is therefore torn asunder with grievous perplexities, while out of truth it prefers that, but out of custom forbears not this.

CAPUT X. Adversus Manichaeos qui ex duabus contrariis voluntatibus duas contrarias naturas asseverant.

22. Pereant a facie tua, Deus, sicuti pereunt vaniloqui et mentis seductores, qui cum duas voluntates in deliberando animadverterint, duas naturas duarum mentium esse asseverant, unam bonam, alteram malam. Ipsi vere mali sunt, cum ista mala sentiunt, et iidem ipsi boni erunt si vera senserint, verisque consenserint, ut dicat eis Apostolus tuus: Fuistis aliquando tenebrae; nunc autem lux in Domino (Ephes. V, 8). Isti enim dum volunt esse lux, non in Domino, sed in seipsis, putando animae naturam hoc esse quod Deus est, ita facti sunt densiores tenebrae; quoniam longius a te recesserunt horrenda arrogantia, a te vero lumine illuminante omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum (Joan. I, 9). Attendite quid dicatis, et erubescite, et accedite ad eum et illuminamini, et vultus vestri non erubescent (Psal. XXXIII, 6). Ego cum deliberabam ut jam servirem Domino Deo meo, sicut diu disposueram, ego eram qui volebam, ego qui nolebam; ego, ego eram. Nec plene volebam, nec plene nolebam. Ideo mecum contendebam, et dissipabar a meipso. Et ipsa dissipatio me invito quidem fiebat, nec tamen ostendebat naturam mentis alienae, sed poenam meae. Et ideo non jam ego operabar illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum (Rom. VII, 14) de supplicio liberioris peccati, quia eram filius Adam.

23. Nam si tot sunt contrariae naturae, quot voluntates sibi resistunt; non jam duae, sed plures erunt. Si deliberet quisquam utrum ad conventiculum eorum pergat, an ad theatrum; clamant isti: Ecce duae naturae; una bona hac ducit, altera mala illac reducit. Nam unde ista cunctatio sibimet adversantium voluntatum? Ego autem dico ambas malas, et quae ad illos ducit, et quae ad theatrum reducit. Sed non credunt nisi bonam esse qua itur ad eos. Quid si ergo quisquam nostrum deliberet, et secum altercantibus duabus voluntatibus fluctuet, utrum ad theatrum pergat, an ad ecclesiam nostram? nonne et isti quid respondeant fluctuabunt? Aut enim fatebuntur, quod nolunt, bona voluntate pergi in ecclesiam nostram, sicut in eam pergunt qui sacramentis ejus imbuti sunt atque detinentur: aut duas malas naturas, et duas malas mentes in uno homine confligere putabunt; et non erit verum quod solent dicere, unam bonam et alteram 0760 malam: aut convertentur ad verum, et non negabunt, cum quisque deliberat, animam unam diversis voluntatibus aestuare.

24. Jam ergo non dicant, cum duas voluntates in homine uno adversari sibi sentiunt, duas contrarias mentes de duabus contrariis substantiis et de duobus contrariis principiis contendere, unam bonam, alteram malam. Nam tu, Deus verax, improbas eos, et redarguis atque convincis eos, sicut in utraque mala voluntate, cum quisque deliberat utrum hominem veneno interimat an ferro; utrum fundum alienum illum, an illum invadat, quando utrumque non potest; utrum emat voluptatem luxuria, an pecuniam servet avaritia; utrum ad circum pergat, an ad theatrum, si uno die utrumque exhibeatur; addo etiam tertium, an ad furtum de domo aliena, si subest occasio; addo et quartum, an ad committendum adulterium, si et inde simul facultas aperitur, si omnia concurrant in unum articulum temporis, pariterque cupiantur omnia quae simul agi nequeunt: discerpunt enim animum sibimet adversantibus quatuor voluntatibus, vel etiam pluribus in tanta copia rerum quae appetuntur, nec tamen tantam multitudinem diversarum substantiarum solent dicere: ita et in bonis voluntatibus. Nam quaero ab eis utrum bonum sit delectari lectione Apostoli, et utrum bonum sit delectari psalmo sobrio, et utrum bonum sit Evangelium disserere. Respondebunt ad singula: Bonum. Quid si ergo pariter delectent omnia simulque uno tempore? Nonne diversae voluntates distendunt cor hominis, cum deliberatur quid potissimum arripiamus? Et omnes bonae sunt, et certant secum, donec eligatur unum, quo feratur tota voluntas una, quae in plures dividebatur. Ita etiam cum aeternitas delectat superius, et temporalis boni voluptas retentat inferius, eadem anima est non tota voluntate illud aut hoc volens; et ideo discerpitur gravi molestia, dum illud veritate praeponit, hoc familiaritate non ponit .