Chapter XXI.—How a Happy Life May Be Retained in the Memory.

30. But is it so as one who has seen Carthage remembers it? No. For a happy life is not visible to the eye, because it is not a body. Is it, then, as we remember numbers? No. For he that hath these in his knowledge strives not to attain further; but a happy life we have in our knowledge, and, therefore, do we love it, while yet we wish further to attain it that we may be happy. Is it, then, as we remember eloquence? No. For although some, when they hear this name, call the thing to mind, who, indeed, are not yet eloquent, and many who wish to be so, whence it appears to be in their knowledge; yet have these by their bodily perceptions noticed that others are eloquent, and been delighted with it, and long to be so,—although they would not be delighted save for some interior knowledge, nor desire to be so unless they were delighted,—but a happy life we can by no bodily perception make experience of in others. Is it, then, as we remember joy? It may be so; for my joy I remember, even when sad, like as I do a happy life when I am miserable. Nor did I ever with perception of the body either see, hear, smell, taste, or touch my joy; but I experienced it in my mind when I rejoiced; and the knowledge of it clung to my memory, so that I can call it to mind sometimes with disdain and at others with desire, according to the difference of the things wherein I now remember that I rejoiced. For even from unclean things have I been bathed with a certain joy, which now calling to mind, I detest and execrate; at other times, from good and honest things, which, with longing, I call to mind, though perchance they be not nigh at hand, and then with sadness do I call to mind a former joy.

31. Where and when, then, did I experience my happy life, that I should call it to mind, and love and long for it? Nor is it I alone or a few others who wish to be happy, but truly all; which, unless by certain knowledge we knew, we should not wish with so certain a will. But how is this, that if two men be asked whether they would wish to serve as soldiers one, it may be, would reply that he would, the other that he would not; but if they were asked whether they would wish to be happy, both of them would unhesitatingly say that they would; and this one would wish to serve, and the other not, from no other motive but to be happy? Is it, perchance, that as one joys in this, and another in that, so do all men agree in their wish for happiness, as they would agree, were they asked, in wishing to have joy,—and this joy they call a happy life? Although, then, one pursues joy in this way, and another in that, all have one goal, which they strive to attain, namely, to have joy. This life, being a thing which no one can say he has not experienced, it is on that account found in the memory, and recognised whenever the name of a happy life is heard.

CAPUT XXI. Quomodo memoria beatam vitam continet.

30. Numquid ita ut meminit Carthaginem qui vidit? Non: vita enim beata non videtur oculis, quia non est corpus. Numquid sicut meminimus numeros? Non: hos enim qui habet in notitia, non adhuc quaerit adipisci; vitam vero beatam habemus in notitia, ideoque amamus eam, et tamen adhuc adipisci eam volumus ut beati simus. Numquid sicut meminimus eloquentiam? Non: quamvis enim hoc nomine audito recordentur ipsam rem qui etiam nondum sunt eloquentes, multique esse cupiant, unde apparet eam esse in eorum notitia; tamen per corporis sensus alios eloquentes animadverterunt et delectati sunt et hoc esse desiderant (quanquam nisi ex interiore notitia non delectarentur, neque hoc esse vellent nisi delectarentur); beatam vero vitam nullo sensu corporis in aliis experimur. Numquid sicut meminimus gaudium? Fortasse ita. Nam gaudium meum etiam tristis memini, sicut vitam beatam miser: neque unquam corporis sensu gaudium meum vel vidi, vel audivi, 0793 vel odoratus sum, vel gustavi, vel tetigi; sed expertus sum in animo meo quando laetatus sum, et adhaesit ejus notitia memoriae meae, ut id reminisci valeam aliquando cum aspernatione, aliquando cum desiderio, pro earum rerum diversitate de quibus me gavisum esse memini. Nam et de turpibus gaudio quodam perfusus sum, quod nunc recordans detestor atque exsecror; aliquando de bonis et honestis, quod desiderans recolo, tametsi forte non adsunt, et ideo tristis gaudium pristinum recolo.

31. Ubi ergo et quando expertus sum vitam meam beatam ut recorder eam, et amen et desiderem? Nec ego tantum, aut cum paucis, sed beati prorsus omnes esse volumus. Quod nisi certa notitia nossemus, non tam certa voluntate vellemus. Sed quid est hoc quod si quaeratur a duobus, utrum militare velint, fieri posset ut alter eorum velle se, alter nolle respondeat: si autem ab eis quaeratur, utrum beati esse velint, fieri possit ut uterque statim se sine ulla dubitatione dicat optare; nec ob aliud velit ille militare, nec ob aliud iste nolit, nisi ut beati sint? Nam forte quoniam alius hinc, alius inde gaudet; ita se omnes beatos esse velle consonant, quemadmodum consonarent, si hoc interrogarentur, se velle gaudere, atque ipsum gaudium vitam beatam vocant. Quod etsi alius hinc, alius illinc assequitur, unum est tamen quo pervenire omnes nituntur ut gaudeant. Quae quoniam res est quam se expertum non esse nemo potest dicere, propterea reperta in memoria recognoscitur, quando beatae vitae nomen auditur.