Chapter XV.—There is Only a Moment of Present Time.

18. And yet we say that “time is long and time is short;” nor do we speak of this save of time past and future. A long time past, for example, we call a hundred years ago; in like manner a long time to come, a hundred years hence. But a short time past we call, say, ten days ago: and a short time to come, ten days hence. But in what sense is that long or short which is not? For the past is not now, and the future is not yet. Therefore let us not say, “It is long;” but let us say of the past, “It hath been long,” and of the future, “It will be long.” O my Lord, my light, shall not even here Thy truth deride man? For that past time which was long, was it long when it was already past, or when it was as yet present? For then it might be long when there was that which could be long, but when past it no longer was; wherefore that could not be long which was not at all. Let us not, therefore, say, “Time past hath been long;” for we shall not find what may have been long, seeing that since it was past it is not; but let us say “that present time was long, because when it was present it was long.” For it had not as yet passed away so as not to be, and therefore there was that which could be long. But after it passed, that ceased also to be long which ceased to be.

19. Let us therefore see, O human soul, whether present time can be long; for to thee is it given to perceive and to measure periods of time. What wilt thou reply to me? Is a hundred years when present a long time? See, first, whether a hundred years can be present. For if the first year of these is current, that is present, but the other ninety and nine are future, and therefore they are not as yet. But if the second year is current, one is already past, the other present, the rest future. And thus, if we fix on any middle year of this hundred as present, those before it are past, those after it are future; wherefore a hundred years cannot be present. See at least whether that year itself which is current can be present. For if its first month be current, the rest are future; if the second, the first hath already passed, and the remainder are not yet. Therefore neither is the year which is current as a whole present; and if it is not present as a whole, then the year is not present. For twelve months make the year, of which each individual month which is current is itself present, but the rest are either past or future. Although neither is that month which is current present, but one day only: if the first, the rest being to come, if the last, the rest being past; if any of the middle, then between past and future.

20. Behold, the present time, which alone we found could be called long, is abridged to the space scarcely of one day. But let us discuss even that, for there is not one day present as a whole. For it is made up of four-and-twenty hours of night and day, whereof the first hath the rest future, the last hath them past, but any one of the intervening hath those before it past, those after it future. And that one hour passeth away in fleeting particles. Whatever of it hath flown away is past, whatever remaineth is future. If any portion of time be conceived which cannot now be divided into even the minutest particles of moments, this only is that which may be called present; which, however, flies so rapidly from future to past, that it cannot be extended by any delay. For if it be extended, it is divided into the past and future; but the present hath no space. Where, therefore, is the time which we may call long? Is it nature? Indeed we do not say, “It is long,” because it is not yet, so as to be long; but we say, “It will be long.” When, then, will it be? For if even then, since as yet it is future, it will not be long, because what may be long is not as yet; but it shall be long, when from the future, which as yet is not, it shall already have begun to be, and will have become present, so that there could be that which may be long; then doth the present time cry out in the words above that it cannot be long.

CAPUT XV. Mensura temporis in quo.

18. Et tamen dicimus longum tempus, et breve tempus; neque hoc nisi de praeterito aut futuro dicimus. Praeteritum tempus longum, verbi gratia, vocamus ante centum annos; futurum itidem longum, post centum annos. Breve autem praeteritum, sicut puta, dicimus ante decem dies; et breve futurum, post decem dies. Sed quo pacto longum est aut breve, quod non est? Praeteritum enim jam non est, et futurum nondum est. Non itaque dicamus, Longum est; sed dicamus de praeterito, Longum fuit, et de futuro, Longum erit. Domine meus, lux mea, nonne et hic veritas tua deridebit hominem? Quod enim longum fuit praeteritum tempus, cum jam esset praeteritum longum fuit, an cum adhuc praesens esset? Tunc enim poterat esse longum, quando erat quod esset longum: praeteritum vero jam non erat; unde nec longum esse poterat, quod omnino non erat. Non ergo dicamus, Longum fuit praeteritum tempus; neque enim inveniemus quid fuerit longum, quando ex quo praeteritum est, non est: sed dicamus, Longum fuit illud praesens tempus; quia cum praesens esset, longum erat. Nondum enim praeterierat ut non esset, et ideo erat quod longum esse posset. Postea vero quam praeteriit, simul et longum esse destitit, quod esse destitit.

19. Videamus ergo, o anima humana, utrum praesens tempus possit esse longum; datum enim tibi est sentire moras atque metiri. Quid respondebis mihi? An centum anni praesentes longum tempus est? Vide prius utrum possint praesentes esse centum anni. Si enim primus eorum annus agitur, ipse praesens est; nonaginta vero et novem futuri sunt, et ideo nondum sunt: si autem secundus annus agitur, jam unus est 0817 praeteritus, alter praesens, caeteri futuri. Atque ita si mediorum quemlibet centenarii hujus numeri annum praesentem posuerimus; ante illum praeteriti erunt, post illum futuri: quocirca centum anni praesentes esse non poterunt. Vide saltem utrum qui agitur unus, ipse sit praesens. Et ejus enim si primus agitur mensis, futuri sunt caeteri; si secundus, jam et primus praeteriit, et reliqui nondum sunt. Ergo nec annus qui agitur, totus est praesens; et si non totus est praesens, non est annus praesens. Duodecim enim menses annus est, quorum quilibet unus mensis qui agitur, ipse praesens est; caeteri autem, praeteriti aut futuri. Quanquam neque mensis qui agitur, praesens est, sed unus dies: si primus, futuris caeteris; si novissimus, praeteritis caeteris; si mediorum quilibet, inter praeteritos et futuros.

20. Ecce praesens tempus quod solum inveniebamus longum appellandum, vix ad unius diei spatium contractum est. Sed discutiamus etiam ipsum, quia nec unus dies totus est praesens. Nocturnis enim et diurnis horis omnibus viginti quatuor expletur, quarum prima caeteras futuras habet, novissima praeteritas; aliqua vero interjectarum ante se praeteritas, post se futuras. Et ipsa una hora fugitivis particulis agitur: quidquid ejus avolavit, praeteritum est; quidquid ejus restat, futurum. Si quid intelligitur temporis, quod in nullas jam vel in minutissimas momentorum partes dividi possit, id solum est quod praesens dicatur. Quod tamen ita raptim a futuro in praeteritum transvolat, ut nulla morula extendatur. Nam si extenditur, dividitur in praeteritum et futurum: praesens autem nullum habet spatium. Ubi est ergo tempus quod longum dicamus? An futurum? Non quidem dicimus, Longum est, quia nondum est quod longum sit; sed dicimus, Longum erit. Quando igitur erit? Si enim et tunc cum adhuc futurum erit, non erit longum; quia quod sit longum, nondum erit: si autem tunc erit longum cum ex futuro, quod nondum est, esse jam coeperit, et praesens factum erit, ut possit esse quod longum sit; jam superioribus vocibus clamat praesens tempus, longum se esse non posse.