Chapter XVIII.

59. And inasmuch as when such things are either provided against the time to come, or reserved, if there is no cause wherefore you should expend them, it is uncertain with what intention it is done, since it may be done with a single heart, and also with a double one, He has seasonably added in this passage: “Judge not,424    Sine scientia, amore, necessitate (“without knowledge, love, necessity.”—Bengel). The discussion is one of the most thorough and satisfactory sections of Augustin’s commentary. that ye be not judged.425    Judicetur de vobis…judicabitur; Vulgate, judicemini…judicabimini. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged,426    Judicetur de vobis…judicabitur; Vulgate, judicemini…judicabimini. and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.” In this passage, I am of opinion that we are taught nothing else, but that in the case of those actions respecting which it is doubtful with what intention they are done, we are to put the better construction on them. For when it is written, “By their fruits ye shall know them,” the statement has reference to things which manifestly cannot be done with a good intention; such as debaucheries, or blasphemies, or thefts, or drunkenness, and all such things, of which we are permitted to judge, according to the apostle’s statement: “For what have I to do to judge them also that are without? do not ye judge them that are within?”427    1 Cor. v. 12. But concerning the kind of food, because every kind of human food can be taken indiscriminately with a good intention and a single heart, without the vice of concupiscence, the same apostle forbids that they who ate flesh and drank wine be judged by those who abstained from such kinds of sustenance: “Let not him that eateth,” says he, “despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not, judge him that eateth.” There also he says: “Who art thou that judges another man’s servant? to his own master he standeth or falleth.”428    Rom. xiv. 3, 4. For in reference to such matters as can be done with a good and single and noble intention, although they may also be done with an intention the reverse of good, those parties wished, howbeit they were [mere] men, to pronounce judgment upon the secrets of the heart, of which God alone is Judge.

60. To this category belongs also what he says in another passage: “Therefore judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the thoughts429    Cogitationes; Vulgate, consilia. of the hearts: and then shall every man have praise of God.”430    1 Cor. iv. 5. There are therefore certain ambiguous actions, respecting which we are ignorant with what intention they are performed, because they may be done both with a good or with an evil one, of which it is rash to judge, especially for the purpose of condemning. Now the time will come for these to be judged, when the Lord “will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts.” In another passage also the same apostle says: “Some men’s aims are manifest beforehand, going before to judgment; and some men they follow after.” He calls those sins manifest, with regard to which it is clear with what intention they are done; these go before to judgment, because if a judgment shall follow, it is not rash. But those which are concealed follow, because neither shall they remain hid in their own time. So we must understand with respect to good works also. For he adds to this effect: “Likewise also the good works of some are manifest beforehand; and they that are otherwise cannot be hid.”431    1 Tim. v. 24, 25. Let us judge, therefore, with respect to those which are manifest; but respecting those which are concealed, let us leave the judgment to God: for they also cannot be hid, whether they be good or evil, when the time shall come for them to be manifested.

61. There are two things, moreover, in which we ought to beware of rash judgment; when it is uncertain with what intention any thing is done; or when it is uncertain what sort of a person he is going to be, who at preset is manifestly either good or bad. If, therefore, any one, for example, complaining of his stomach, would not fast, and you, not believing this, were to attribute it to the vice of gluttony, you would judge rashly. Likewise, if you were to come to know the gluttony and drunkenness as being manifest, and were so to administer reproof as if the man could never be amended and changed, you would nevertheless judge rashly. Let us not therefore reprove those things about which we do not know with what intention they are done; nor let us so reprove those things which are manifest, as that we should despair of a return to a right state of mind; and thus we shall avoid the judgment of which in the present instance it is said, “Judge not, that ye be not judged.”

62. But what He says may cause perplexity: “For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.” Is it the case, then, that if we shall judge any thing with a rash judgment, God will also judge rashly with respect to us? or if we shall measure any thing with an unjust measure, is there with God also an unjust measure, according to which it shall be measured to us again? (for by the expression measure also, I suppose the judgment itself is meant.) By no means does God either judge rashly, or recompense to any one with an unjust measure; but it is so expressed, inasmuch as that very same rashness wherewith you punish another must necessarily punish yourself. Unless, perchance, it is to be imagined that injustice does harm in some way to him against whom it goes forth, but in no way to him from whom it goes forth; but nay, it often does no harm to him who suffers the injury, but it must necessarily do harm to him who inflicts it. For what harm did the injustice of the persecutors do to the martyrs? None; but very much to the persecutors themselves. For although some of them were turned from the error of their ways, yet at the time at which they were acting as persecutors, their wickedness was blinding them. So also a rash judgment frequently does no harm to him who is the object of the rash judgment; but to him who judges rashly, the rashness itself must necessarily do harm. According to such a rule, I judge of that saying also: “Every one that strikes432    Omnis qui percusserit; Vulgate, omnes qui acceperint. with the sword shall perish with the sword.”433    Matt. xxvi. 52. For how many take the sword, and yet do not perish with the sword, Peter himself being an instance! But lest any should think that he escaped such punishment by the pardon of his sins (although nothing could be more absurd than to think that the punishment of the sword, which did not befall Peter, could have been greater than that of the cross, which actually befell him), yet what would they say of the malefactors who were crucified with our Lord; for both he who got pardon, got it after he was crucified, and the other did not get it at all?434    Luke xxiii. 33–43. Or had they perhaps crucified all whom they had slain; and did they therefore themselves too deserve to suffer the same thing? It is ridiculous to think so. For what else is meant by the statement, “For all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword,” but that the soul dies by that very sin, whatever it may be, which it has committed?

CAPUT XVIII.---59. Et quoniam cum ista vel procurantur in futurum, vel si causa non est quare illa impendas, reservantur, incertum est quo animo fiat, cum possit simplici corde fieri, possit et duplici, opportune hoc loco subjecit: Nolite judicare, ne judicetur de vobis: in quo enim judicio judicaveritis, judicabitur de vobis; et in qua mensura mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis. Hoc loco nihil aliud nobis praecipi existimo, nisi ut ea facta quae dubium est quo animo fiant, in meliorem partem interpretemur. Quod enim scriptum est, Ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos, de manifestis dictum est, quae non possunt bono animo fieri: sicut sunt stupra, vel blasphemiae, vel furta, vel ebriositates, et si qua sunt talia, de quibus nobis judicare permittitur, dicente Apostolo, Quid enim mihi de iis qui foris sunt judicare? Nonne de iis qui intus sunt vos judicatis (I Cor. V, 12)? De genere autem ciborum, quia possunt bono animo et simplici corde sine vitio concupiscentiae quicumque humani cibi indifferenter sumi, prohibet idem apostolus judicari eos qui carnibus vescebantur et vinum bibebant, ab eis qui se ab hujusmodi alimentis temperabant: Qui manducat, inquit, non manducantem non spernat; et qui non manducat, manducantem non judicet. Ibi etiam ait: Tu quis es, qui judices alienum servum? domino suo stat, aut cadit (Rom. XIV, 3, 4). De talibus enim rebus quae possunt bono et simplici et magno animo fieri, quamvis possint etiam non bono, volebant illi cum homines essent, in occulta cordis ferre sententiam, 1297 de quibus solus Deus judicat.

60. Ad hoc pertinet etiam illud quod alio loco dicit: Nolite ante tempus quidquam judicare, quoadusque veniat Dominus, qui et illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum, et manifestabit cogitationes cordis: et tunc laus erit unicuique a Deo (I Cor. IV, 5). Sunt ergo quaedam facta media, quae ignoramus quo animo fiant, quia et bono et malo fieri possunt, de quibus temerarium est judicare, maxime ut condemnemus. Horum autem veniet tempus ut judicentur, cum Dominus illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum, et manifestabit cogitationes cordis. Item alio loco dicit idem apostolus: Quorumdam hominum peccata manifesta sunt, praecedentia ad judicium; quaedam autem et subsequuntur. Manifesta ea dicit, de quibus clarum est quo animo fiant: haec praecedunt ad judicium; id est, quia si fuerit ista subsecutum judicium, non est temerarium. Subsequuntur autem illa quae occulta sunt; quia nec ipsa latebunt tempore suo. Sic et de bonis factis intelligendum est. Nam ita subjungit: Similiter et facta bona manifesta sunt; et quaecumque aliter se habent, abscondi non possunt (I Tim. V, 24, 25). De manifestis ergo judicemus; de occultis vero Deo judicium relinquamus: quia et ipsa abscondi non possunt, sive mala sive bona, cum tempus advenerit quo manifestentur.

61. Duo sunt autem in quibus temerarium judicium cavere debemus; cum incertum est quo animo quidque factum sit, vel cum incertum est qualis futurus sit qui nunc vel bonus vel malus apparet. Si ergo quispiam, verbi gratia, conquestus de stomacho jejunare noluit, et tu id non credens edacitatis id vitio tribueris, temere judicabis. Item si manifestam edacitatem ebriositatemque cognoveris, et ita reprehenderis quasi nunquam ille possit corrigi atque mutari, nihilominus temere judicabis. Non ergo reprehendamus ea quae nescimus quo animo fiant; neque ita reprehendamus quae manifesta sunt, ut desperemus sanitatem; et vitabimus judicium de quo nunc dicitur, Nolite judicare, ne judicetur de vobis.

62. Potest autem movere quod ait, In quo enim judicio judicaveritis, judicabitur de vobis; et in qua mensura mensi fueritis, in ea remetietur vobis. Numquid enim si nos judicio temerario judicaverimus, temere etiam de nobis Deus judicabit? aut numquid si in mensura iniqua mensi fuerimus, et apud Deum iniqua mensura est unde nobis remetietur? nam et mensurae nomine ipsum judicium significatum arbitror. Nullo modo Deus vel temere judicat, vel iniqua mensura cuiquam rependit: sed hoc dictum est, quoniam temeritas qua punis alium, eadem ipsa te puniat necesse est. Nisi forte arbitrandum est quod iniquitas ei noceat aliquid in quem procedit, ei autem nihil a quo procedit: imo vero saepe nihil nocet ei, qui patitur injuriam, ei autem qui facit necesse est ut noceat. Quid enim nocuit martyribus iniquitas persequentium? ipsis autem persecutoribus plurimum. Quia etsi aliqui eorum correcti sunt, eo tamen tempore quo persequebantur, excaecabat illos malitia eorum. Sic et temerarium judicium pierumque nihil nocet ei de 1298 quo temere judicatur; ei autem qui temere judicat, ipsa temeritas necesse est ut noceat. Ista regula etiam illud dictum arbitror: Omnis qui percusserit gladio, gladio morietur (Matth. XXVI, 52). Quam multi enim gladio percutiunt, nec tamen gladio moriuntur, sicut neque ipse Petrus? Sed ne istum venia peccatorum talem evasisse poenam quis putet, quanquam nihil absurdius, quam ut majorem putet gladii poenam esse potuisse, quae Petro non accidit, quam crucis quae accidit: quid tamen de latronibus dicturus est, qui cum Domino crucifixi sunt; quia et ille qui meruit veniam, posteaquam crucifixus est meruit (Luc. XXIII, 33-43), et alter omnino non meruit? An forte omnes quos occiderant, crucifixerant; et propterea hoc etiam ipsi pati meruerunt? Ridiculum est hoc putare. Quid ergo aliud dictum est, Omnis enim qui gladio percusserit, gladio morietur, nisi quia ipso peccato anima moritur, quodcumque commiserit?