Chapter XXV.—Concerning what is in our own power, that is, concerning Free-will469    τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου. See also III. 34..

The first enquiry involved in the consideration of free-will, that is, of what is in our own power, is whether anything is in our power470    Nemes., ch. 39.: for there are many who deny this. The second is, what are the things that are in our power, and over what things do we have authority? The third is, what is the reason for which God Who created us endued us with free-will? So then we shall take up the first question, and firstly we shall prove that of those things which even our opponents grant, some are within our power. And let us proceed thus.

Of all the things that happen, the cause is said to be either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, or chance, or accident. But God’s function has to do with essence and providence: necessity deals with the movement of things that ever keep to the same course: fate with the necessary accomplishment of the things it brings to pass (for fate itself implies necessity): nature with birth, growth, destruction, plants and animals; chance with what is rare and unexpected. For chance is defined as the meeting and concurrence of two causes, originating in choice but bringing to pass something other than what is natural: for example, if a man finds a treasure while digging a ditch471    Text, ταφρον. Variant, τάφον.: for the man who hid the treasure did not do so that the other might find it, nor did the finder dig with the purpose of finding the treasure: but the former hid it that he might take it away when he wished, and the other’s aim was to dig the ditch: whereas something happened quite different from what both had in view. Accident again deals with casual occurrences that take place among lifeless or irrational things, apart from nature and art. This then is their doctrine. Under which, then, of these categories are we to bring what happens through the agency of man, if indeed man is not the cause and beginning of action472    Text, πράξεως. mss. πράξεων, as in Nemesius.? for it would not be right to ascribe to God actions that are sometimes base and unjust: nor may we ascribe these to necessity, for they are not such as ever continue the same: nor to fate, for fate implies not possibility only but necessity: nor to nature, for nature’s province is animals and plants: nor to chance, for the actions of men are not rare and unexpected: nor to accident, for that is used in reference to the casual occurrences that take place in the world of lifeless and irrational things. We are left then with this fact, that the man who acts and makes is himself the author of his own works, and is a creature endowed with free-will.

Further, if man is the author of no action, the faculty of deliberation is quite superfluous: for to what purpose could deliberation be put if man is the master of none of his actions? for all deliberation is for the sake of action. But to prove that the fairest and most precious of man’s endowments is quite superfluous would be the height of absurdity. If then man deliberates, he deliberates with a view to action. For all deliberation is with a view to and on account of action.

Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τουτέστι τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου

Ὁ περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου λόγος τουτέστι τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρώτην μὲν ἔχει ζήτησιν, εἰ ἔστι ἐφ' ἡμῖν: πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιβαίνοντες. Δευτέραν δέ, τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνων ἐξουσίαν ἔχομεν. Τρίτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξετάσαι, δι' ἣν ὁ ποιήσας ἡμᾶς θεὸς αὐτεξουσίους ἐποίησεν. Ἀναλαβόντες οὖν περὶ τοῦ πρώτου, πρῶτον εἴπωμεν ἀποδεικνύντες, ὅτι ἔστι τινὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνοις ὁμολογουμένων καὶ εἴπωμεν οὕτως:

Τῶν γινομένων πάντων ἢ θεόν φασιν αἴτιον εἶναι ἢ ἀνάγκην ἢ εἱμαρμένην ἢ φύσιν ἢ τύχην ἢ τὸ αὐτόματον. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν θεοῦ ἔργον οὐσία καὶ πρόνοια: τῆς δὲ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων ἡ κίνησις: τῆς δὲ εἱμαρμένης τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δι' αὐτῆς ἐπιτελεῖσθαι (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἀνάγκης ἐστί): τῆς δὲ φύσεως γένεσις, αὔξησις, φθορά, φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα: τῆς δὲ τύχης τὰ σπάνια καὶ ἀπροσδόκητα (ὁρίζονται γὰρ τὴν τύχην σύμπτωσιν καὶ συνδρομὴν δύο αἰτίων ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχόντων, ἄλλο τι, παρ' ὃ πέφυκεν, ἀποτελούντων, ὡς τάφρον ὀρύσσοντα θησαυρὸν εὑρεῖν: οὔτε γὰρ ὁ θεὶς τὸν θησαυρὸν οὕτως ἔθηκεν, ὥστε τοῦτον εὑρεῖν, οὔτε ὁ εὑρὼν οὕτως ὤρυξεν, ὡς εὑρεῖν θησαυρόν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἵν' ὅταν θέλῃ, ἀνέληται, ὁ δὲ ἵνα τάφρον ὀρύξῃ: συνέπεσε δὲ ἄλλο τι, παρ' ὃ προῃροῦντο ἀμφότεροι): τοῦ δὲ αὐτομάτου τὰ τῶν ἀψύχων ἢ ἀλόγων συμπτώματα ἄνευ φύσεως καὶ τέχνης. Οὕτως αὐτοί φασι. Τίνι τοίνυν τούτων ὑπαγάγωμεν τὰ διὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἴπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεως; Οὐδὲ γὰρ θεῷ θεμιτὸν ἐπιγράφειν αἰσχρὰς ἔσθ' ὅτε πράξεις καὶ ἀδίκους οὐδὲ ἀνάγκῃ (οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων ἐστίν) οὐδὲ εἱμαρμένῃ (οὐ γὰρ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης λέγουσιν) οὔτε φύσει (φύσεως γὰρ ἔργα ζῷα καὶ φυτά) οὐδὲ τύχῃ (οὐ γὰρ σπάνιοι καὶ ἀπροσδόκητοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ πράξεις) οὔτε τῷ αὐτομάτῳ (ἀψύχων γὰρ λέγουσιν ἢ ἀλόγων συμπτώματα τοῦ αὐτομάτου). Λείπεται δὴ αὐτὸν τὸν πράττοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα ἄνθρωπον ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ἰδίων ἔργων καὶ αὐτεξούσιον.

Ἔτι, εἰ μηδεμιᾶς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πράξεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος, περιττῶς ἔχει τὸ βουλεύεσθαι: εἰς τί γὰρ χρήσεται τῇ βουλῇ μηδεμιᾶς ὢν κύριος πράξεως; Πᾶσα γὰρ βουλὴ πράξεως ἕνεκα. Τὸ δὲ κάλλιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ περιττὸν ἀποφαίνειν τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἂν εἴη. Εἰ τοίνυν βουλεύεται, πράξεως ἕνεκα βουλεύεται: πᾶσα γὰρ βουλὴ πράξεως ἕνεκα καὶ διὰ πρᾶξιν.