αʹ Ὅτι ἀκατάληπτον τὸ θεῖον καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν
[Book III] Περὶ τῆς θείας οἰκονομίας καὶ περὶ τῆς δι' ἡμᾶς κηδεμονίας καὶ τῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας
Chapter XXVII.—Concerning the reason of our endowment with Free-will.
We hold, therefore, that free-will477 This is supplied by Combefis from Nemesius. comes on the scene at the same moment as reason, and that change and alteration are congenital to all that is produced. For all that is produced is also subject to change478 Nemes., ch. 41.. For those things must be subject to change whose production has its origin in change. And change consists in being brought into being out of nothing, and in transforming a substratum of matter into something different. Inanimate things, then, and things without reason undergo the aforementioned bodily changes, while the changes of things endowed with reason depend on choice. For reason consists of a speculative and a practical part. The speculative part is the contemplation of the nature of things, and the practical consists in deliberation and defines the true reason for what is to be done. The speculative side is called mind or wisdom, and the practical side is called reason or prudence. Every one, then, who deliberates does so in the belief that the choice of what is to be done lies in his hands, that he may choose what seems best as the result of his deliberation, and having chosen may act upon it. And if this is so, free-will must necessarily be very closely related to reason. For either man is an irrational being, or, if he is rational, he is master of his acts and endowed with free-will. Hence also creatures without reason do not enjoy free-will: for nature leads them rather than they nature, and so they do not oppose the natural appetite, but as soon as their appetite longs after anything they rush headlong after it. But man, being rational, leads nature rather than nature him, and so when he desires aught he has the power to curb his appetite or to indulge it as he pleases. Hence also creatures devoid of reason are the subjects neither of praise nor blame, while man is the subject of both praise and blame479 This sentence is omitted in Basil and some mss..
Note also that the angels, being rational, are endowed with free-will, and, inasmuch as they are created, are liable to change. This in fact is made plain by the devil who, although made good by the Creator, became of his own free-will the inventor of evil, and by the powers who revolted with him480 Nemesius speaks of this at greater length., that is the demons, and by the other troops of angels who abode in goodness.
Διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν αὐτεξούσιοι γεγόναμεν
Φαμὲν τοίνυν εὐθέως τῷ λογικῷ συνεισέρχεσθαι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. Πᾶν γὰρ γεννητὸν καὶ τρεπτόν ἐστιν. Ὧν γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἀπὸ τροπῆς ἤρξατο, ἀνάγκῃ ταῦτα τρεπτὰ εἶναι. Τροπὴ δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραχθῆναι καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα καὶ ἄλογα τρέπονται κατὰ τὰς προειρημένας σωματικὰς ἀλλοιώσεις, τὰ δὲ λογικὰ κατὰ προαίρεσιν: τοῦ γὰρ λογικοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι θεωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν, θεωρητικὸν μὲν τὸ κατανοοῦν, ὡς ἔχει τὰ ὄντα, πρακτικὸν δὲ τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ ὁρίζον τοῖς πρακτοῖς τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. Καὶ καλοῦσι τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν νοῦν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεωρητικὸν σοφίαν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν φρόνησιν. Πᾶς οὖν ὁ βουλευόμενος ὡς ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως οὔσης τῶν πρακτῶν βουλεύεται, ἵνα τὸ προκριθὲν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς ἕληται καὶ ἑλόμενος πράξῃ: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρυφίσταται τῷ λογικῷ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον: ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται λογικόν, ἢ λογικὸν ὂν κύριον ἔσται πράξεων καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. Ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα οὔκ εἰσιν αὐτεξούσια: ἄγονται γὰρ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἤπερ ἄγουσι: διὸ οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγουσι τῇ φυσικῇ ὀρέξει, ἀλλ', ἅμα ὀρεχθῶσί τινος, ὁρμῶσι πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος λογικὸς ὢν ἄγει μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν, ἤπερ ἄγεται: διὸ καὶ ὀρεγόμενος, εἴπερ ἐθέλοι, ἐξουσίαν ἔχει τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀναχαιτίσαι ἢ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῇ. Ὅθεν τὰ μὲν ἄλογα οὐδὲ ἐπαινεῖται οὐδὲ ψέγεται, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐπαινεῖται καὶ ψέγεται.
Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι λογικοὶ ὄντες αὐτεξούσιοι ὑπάρχουσι καὶ ὡς κτιστοὶ καὶ τρεπτοί. Καὶ ἔδειξεν ὁ μὲν διάβολος ἀγαθὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γενόμενος, αὐτεξουσίως δὲ τῆς κακίας εὑρετὴς γεγονώς, καὶ αἱ σὺν αὐτῷ ἀποστατήσασαι δυνάμεις ἤγουν οἱ δαίμονες, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τάγματα τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ διαμείναντα.