Chapter XIV.—Concerning the volitions and free-will of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Since, then, Christ has two natures, we hold that He has also two natural wills and two natural energies. But since His two natures have one subsistence, we hold that it is one and the same person who wills and energises naturally in both natures, of which, and in which, and also which is Christ our Lord: and moreover that He wills and energises without separation but as a united whole. For He wills and energises in either form in close communion with the other677    Leo, Epist. 10, ad Flavian.. For things that have the same essence have also the same will and energy, while things that are different in essence are different in will and energy678    Max., Disp. cum Pyrrho.; and vice versa, things that have the same will and energy have the same essence, while things that are different in will and energy are different in essence.

Wherefore679    Supr., bk. ii. ch. 22. in the case of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit we recognise, from their sameness in will and energy, their sameness in nature. But in the case of the divine dispensation680    οἰκονομίας,incarnation. we recognise from their difference in will and energy the difference of the two natures, and as we perceive the difference of the two natures we confess that the wills and energies also are different. For just as the number of the natures of one and the same Christ, when considered and spoken of with piety, do not cause a division of the one Christ but merely bring out the fact that the difference between the natures is maintained even in the union, so it is with the number of wills and energies that belong essentially to His natures. (For He was endowed with the powers of willing and energising in both natures, for the sake of our salvation.) It does not introduce division: God forbid! but merely brings out the fact that the differences between them are safeguarded and preserved even in the union. For we hold that wills and energies are faculties belonging to nature, not to subsistence; I mean those faculties of will and energy by which He Who wills and energises does so. For if we allow that they belong to subsistence, we will be forced to say that the three subsistences of the Holy Trinity have different wills and different energies.

For it is to be noted681    Max., Dial. cum Pyrrho; Anast. in ῾Οδηγός, ch. 6, p. 40. that willing and the manner of willing are not the same thing. For to will is a faculty of nature, just as seeing is, for all men possess it; but the manner of willing does not depend on nature but on our judgment, just as does also the manner of seeing, whether well or ill. For all men do not will in the same way, nor do they all see in the same way. And this also we will grant in connection with energies. For the manner of willing, or seeing, or energising, is the mode of using the faculties of will and sight and energy, belonging only to him who uses them, and marking him off from others by the generally accepted difference.

Simple willing then is spoken of as volition or the faculty of will682    τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς θέλειν, θέλησις, ἤτοι ἡ θελητικὴ δύναμις., being a rational propension683    ὄρεξις. and natural will; but in a particular way willing, or that which underlies volition, is the object of will684    θέλητον, willed, the thing willed., and will dependent on judgment685    θέλημα γνωμικόν,dispositional volition, will of judgment.. Further that which has innate in it the faculty of volition is spoken of as capable of willing686    θελητικον, volitive. Volitivum, volitive, is the Scholastic translation θελητικόν.: as for instance the divine is capable of willing, and the human in like manner. But he who exercises volition, that is to say the subsistence, for instance Peter, is spoken of as willing.

Since, then687    Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh., Christ is one and His subsistence is one, He also Who wills both as God and as man is one and the same. And since He has two natures endowed with volition, inasmuch as they are rational (for whatever is rational is endowed with volition and free-will), we shall postulate two volitions or natural wills in Him. For He in His own person is capable of volition in accordance with both His natures. For He assumed that faculty of volition which belongs naturally to us. And since Christ, Who in His own person wills according to either nature, is one, we shall postulate the same object of will in His case, not as though He wills only those things which He willed naturally as God (for it is no part of Godhead to will to eat or drink and so forth), but as willing also those things which human nature requires for its support688    Max., ibid., and this without involving any opposition in judgment, but simply as the result of the individuality of the natures. For then it was that He thus willed naturally, when His divine volition so willed and permitted the flesh to suffer and do that which was proper to it.

But that volition is implanted in man by nature689    Max., ibid. is manifest from this. Excluding the divine life, there are three forms of life: the vegetative, the sentient, and the intellectual. The properties of the vegetative life are the functions of nourishment, and growth, and production: that of the sentient life is impulse: and that of the rational and intellectual life is freedom of will. If, then, nourishment belongs by nature to the vegetative life and impulse to the sentient, freedom of will by nature belongs to the rational and intellectual life. But freedom of will is nothing else than volition. The Word, therefore, having become flesh, endowed with life and mind and free-will, became also endowed with volition.

Further, that which is natural is not the result of training: for no one learns how to think, or live, or hunger, or thirst, or sleep. Nor do we learn how to will: so that willing is natural.

And again: if in the case of creatures devoid of reason nature rules, while nature is ruled in man who is moved of his own free-will and volition, it follows, then, that man is by nature endowed with volition.

And again: if man has been made after the image of the blessed and super-essential Godhead, and if the divine nature is by nature endowed with free-will and volition, it follows that man, as its image, is free by nature and volitive690    θελητικός, endowed with volition.. For the fathers defined freedom as volition691    θέλησις, will..

And further: if to will is a part of the nature of every man and not present in some and absent in others, and if that which is seen to be common to all is a characteristic feature of the nature that belongs to the individuals of the class, surely, then, man is by nature endowed with volition692    θελητικός..

And once more: if the nature receives neither more nor less, but all are equally endowed with volition and not some more than others, then by nature man is endowed with volition693    θελητικός.. So that since man is by nature endowed with volition, the Lord also must be by nature endowed with volition, not only because He is God, but also because He became man. For just as He assumed our nature, so also He has assumed naturally our will. And in this way the Fathers said that He formed our will in Himself694    καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οἱ Πατέρες τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τυπῶσαι αὐτὸν ἔφησαν θέλημα: and according to this the Fathers said that He typified, moulded, had the form of our will in Himself..

If the will is not natural, it must be either hypostatic or unnatural. But if it is hypostatic, the Son must thus, forsooth, have a different will from what the Father has: for that which is hypostatic is characteristic of subsistence only. And if it is unnatural, will must be a defection from nature: for what is unnatural is destructive of what is natural.

The God and Father of all things wills either as Father or as God. Now if as Father, His will will be different from that of the Son, for the Son is not the Father. But if as God, the Son is God and likewise the Holy Spirit is God, and so volition is part of His nature, that is, it is natural.

Besides695    Greg. Nyss., Cont. Apollin and others, Act. 10, sext. syn., if according to the view of the Fathers, those who have one and the same will have also one and the same essence, and if the divinity and humanity of Christ have one and the same will, then assuredly these have also one and the same essence.

And again: if according to the view of the Fathers the distinction between the natures is not seen in the single will, we must either, when we speak of the one will, cease to speak of the different natures in Christ or, when we speak of the different natures of Christ, cease to speak of the one will.

And further696    Max., Agatho pap. Epist. Syn. in VI Syn., Act. 4., the divine Gospel says, The Lord came into the borders of Tyre and Sidon and entered into a house, and would have no man know it; but He could not be hid697    St. Mark vii. 24.. If, then, His divine will is omnipotent, but yet, though He would, He could not be hid, surely it was as man that He would and could not, and so as man He must be endowed with volition.

And once again698    Max., ibid., the Gospel tells us that, He, having come into the place, said ‘I thirst’: and they gave Him some vinegar mixed with gall, and when He had tasted it He would not drink699    St. Matt. xxvii. 33 and 34; St. John xix. 28 and 29.. If, then, on the one hand it was as God that He suffered thirst and when He had tasted would not drink, surely He must be subject to passion700    ἐμπαθής, passible, sensible, possessed of sensibility. also as God, for thirst and taste are passions701    πάθος, sensibility.. But if it was not as God but altogether as man that He was athirst, likewise as man He must be endowed with volition702    In N. is added: καὶ εἰ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ πάθους λέγει· Πάτερ, εἰ δυνατὸν, παρελθέτω τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπ᾽ ἐμοῦ. Πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς σύ. ᾽Ιδοὺ δύο θελήσεις, θεϊκὴ ἅμα καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη..

Moreover, the blessed Paul the Apostle says, He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross703    Phil. ii. 8.. But obedience is subjection of the real will, not of the unreal will. For that which is irrational is not said to be obedient or disobedient704    Max., ut supr.. But the Lord having become obedient to the Father, became so not as God but as man. For as God He is not said to be obedient or disobedient. For these things are of the things that are under one’s hand705    τῶν ὑπὸ χεῖρα γὰρ ταῦτα., as the inspired Gregorius said706    Orat. 36, some distance from the beginning.. Wherefore, then, Christ is endowed with volition as man.

While, however, we assert that will is natural, we hold not that it is dominated by necessity, but that it is free. For if it is rational, it must be absolutely free. For it is not only the divine and uncreated nature that is free from the bonds of necessity, but also the intellectual and created nature. And this is manifest: for God, being by nature good and being by nature the Creator and by nature God, is not all this of necessity. For who is there to introduce this necessity?

It is to be observed further707    Max., Disp. cum Pyrrh., that freedom of will is used in several senses, one in connection with God, another in connection with angels, and a third in connection with men. For used in reference to God it is to be understood in a superessential manner, and in reference to angels it is to be taken in the sense that the election is concomitant with the state708    ὡς συντρεχούσης τῇ ἕξει τῆς προχειρίσεως, the choice, or decision, being synchronous with the moral disposition., and admits of the interposition of no interval of time at all: for while the angel possesses free-will by nature, he uses it without let or hindrance, having neither antipathy on the part of the body to overcome nor any assailant. Again, used in reference to men, it is to be taken in the sense that the state is considered to be anterior in time to the election. For man is free and has free-will by nature, but he has also the assault of the devil to impede him and the motion of the body: and thus through the assault and the weight of the body, election comes to be later than the state.

If, then, Adam709    Max., Disp. cum Pyrrh. obeyed of his own will and ate of his own will, surely in us the will is the first part to suffer. And if the will is the first to suffer, and the Word Incarnate did not assume this with the rest of our nature, it follows that we have not been freed from sin.

Moreover, if the faculty of free-will which is in nature is His work and yet He did not assume it, He either condemned His own workmanship as not good, or grudged us the comfort it brought, and so deprived us of the full benefit, and shewed that He was Himself subject to passion since He was not willing or not able to work out our perfect salvation.

Moreover, one cannot speak of one compound thing made of two wills in the same way as a subsistence is a composition of two natures. Firstly because the compositions are of things in subsistence (hypotasis), not of things viewed in a different category, not in one proper to them710    πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν ἐν ὑποστάσει ὄντων, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐκ ἰδί& 251· θεωρουμένων εἰσί.: and secondly, because if we speak of composition of wills and energies, we will be obliged to speak of composition of the other natural properties, such as the uncreated and the created, the invisible and the visible, and so on. And what will be the name of the will that is compounded out of two wills? For the compound cannot be called by the name of the elements that make it up. For otherwise we should call that which is compounded of natures nature and not subsistence. And further, if we say that there is one compound will in Christ, we separate Him in will from the Father, for the Father’s will is not compound. It remains, therefore, to say that the subsistence of Christ alone is compound and common, as in the case of the natures so also in that of the natural properties.

And we cannot711    Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh., if we wish to be accurate, speak of Christ as having judgment (γνώμη) and preference712    Max., Epist. ad Marin.. For judgment is a disposition with reference to the decision arrived at after investigation and deliberation concerning something unknown, that is to say, after counsel and decision. And after judgment comes preference713    προαίρεσις., which chooses out and selects the one rather than the other. But the Lord being not mere man but also God, and knowing all things, had no need of inquiry, and investigation, and counsel, and decision, and by nature made whatever is good His own and whatever is bad foreign to Him714    Basil, on Ps. xliv., or rather on Isaiah vii.. For thus says Isaiah the prophet, Before the child shall know to prefer the evil, he shall choose the good; because before the child knows good or evil, he refuses wickedness by choosing the good715    Is. vii. 16, sec. LXX.. For the word “before” proves that it is not with investigation and deliberation, as is the way with us, but as God and as subsisting in a divine manner in the flesh, that is to say, being united in subsistence to the flesh, and because of His very existence and all-embracing knowledge, that He is possessed of good in His own nature. For the virtues are natural qualities716    Φυσικαὶ μεν γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ; cf. Cicero, De leg. 1., and are implanted in all by nature and in equal measure, even if we do not all in equal measure employ our natural energies. By the transgression we were driven from the natural to the unnatural717    Supr., bk. ii., ch. 30.. But the Lord led us back from the unnatural into the natural718    Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.. For this is what is the meaning of in our image, after our likeness719    Gen. i. 26.. And the discipline and trouble of this life were not designed as a means for our attaining virtue which was foreign to our nature, but to enable us to cast aside the evil that was foreign and contrary to our nature: just as on laboriously removing from steel the rust which is not natural to it but acquired through neglect, we reveal the natural brightness of the steel.

Observe further that the word judgment (γνώμη) is used in many ways and in many senses. Sometimes it signifies exhortation: as when the divine apostle says, Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord; yet I give my judgment720    1 Cor. vii. 25.: sometimes it means counsel, as when the prophet David says, They have taken crafty counsel against Thy people721    Ps. lxxxiii. 3.: sometimes it means a decree, as when we read in Daniel, Concerning whom (or, what) went this shameless decree forth722    Dan. ii. 15. περὶ τίνος ἐξῆλθεν ἡ γνώμη ἡ ἀναιδὴς αὕτη. In our A.V., Why is the decree so hasty from the king?? At other times it is used in the sense of belief, or opinion, or purpose, and, to put it shortly, the word judgment has twenty-eight723    Text, κατὰ εἴκοσι ὀκτὼ: Variants, κατὰ κοινοῦ, κατὰ πολύ, secundum multa (old trans.), and secundum plurima (Faber). Maximus gave 28 meanings of γνώμη. different meanings.

Περὶ θελημάτων καὶ αὐτεξουσίων τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ

Ἐπειδὴ μὲν οὖν δύο φύσεις τοῦ Χριστοῦ, δύο αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ θελήματα καὶ τὰς φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας φαμέν. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ μία τῶν δύο αὐτοῦ φύσεων ἡ ὑπόστασις, ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν φαμεν θέλοντά τε καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα φυσικῶς κατ' ἄμφω, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν αἷς καὶ ἅπερ ἐστὶ Χριστὸς ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν, θέλειν δὲ καὶ ἐνεργεῖν οὐ διῃρημένως, ἀλλ' ἡνωμένως: θέλει γὰρ καὶ «ἐνεργεῖ ἑκατέρα μορφὴ μετὰ τῆς θατέρου κοινωνίας». Ὧν γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἡ αὐτή, τούτων καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ αὐτή: ὧν δὲ διάφορος ἡ οὐσία, τούτων διάφορος καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια. Καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, ὧν ἡ θέλησις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ αὐτή, τούτων καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ αὐτή: ὧν δὲ διάφορος ἡ θέλησις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, τούτων καὶ ἡ οὐσία διάφορος.

Διὸ δὴ ἐπὶ μὲν πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐκ τῆς ταυτότητος τῆς τε ἐνεργείας καὶ τοῦ θελήματος τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως ἐπιγινώσκομεν. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θείας οἰκονομίας ἐκ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν θελημάτων καὶ τὴν τῶν φύσεων διαφορὰν ἐπιγινώσκομεν καὶ τὴν τῶν φύσεων διαφορὰν εἰδότες συνομολογοῦμεν καὶ τὸ τῶν θελημάτων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν διάφορον. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς φύσεων Χριστοῦ ὁ ἀριθμὸς εὐσεβῶς νοούμενός τε καὶ λεγόμενος οὐ διαιρεῖ τὸν ἕνα Χριστόν, ἀλλὰ σῳζομένην καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει παρίστησι τῶν φύσεων τὴν διαφοράν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν οὐσιωδῶς προσόντων ταῖς αὐτοῦ φύσεσι θελημάτων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν (κατ' ἄμφω γὰρ τὰς φύσεις θελητικὸς ἦν καὶ ἐνεργητικὸς τῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας) οὐ διαίρεσιν εἰσάγει_μὴ γένοιτο_, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δηλοῖ καὶ μόνον, κἂν τῇ ἑνώσει, φυλακὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν: φυσικὰ γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὑποστατικά φαμεν τὰ θελήματα καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας. Λέγω δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν θελητικὴν καὶ ἐνεργητικὴν δύναμιν, καθ' ἣν θέλει καὶ ἐνεργεῖ τά τε θέλοντα καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα. Εἰ γὰρ ὑποστατικὰ δῶμεν αὐτά, ἑτεροθελεῖς καὶ ἑτεροενεργεῖς τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα.

Ἰστέον γάρ, ὡς οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι, θέλειν καὶ πῶς θέλειν: τὸ μὲν γὰρ θέλειν φύσεως ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν (πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποις πρόσεστι), τὸ δὲ πῶς θέλειν οὐ φύσεως, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πῶς ὁρᾶν, καλῶς ἢ κακῶς (οὐ γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι ὁμοίως θέλουσιν οὐδ' ὁμοίως ὁρῶσι). Τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δώσομεν: τὸ γὰρ πῶς θέλειν, πῶς ὁρᾶν, πῶς ἐνεργεῖν τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ θέλειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν χρήσεως, μόνῳ τῷ κεχρημένῳ προσὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην διαφορὰν χωρίζον.

Λέγεται οὖν τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς θέλειν θέλησις ἤτοι ἡ θελητικὴ δύναμις λογικὴ οὖσα ὄρεξις καὶ θέλημα φυσικόν: τὸ δὲ πῶς θέλειν ἤτοι τὸ τῇ θελήσει ὑποκείμενον θελητὸν καὶ θέλημα γνωμικόν: θελητικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ πεφυκὸς θέλειν, οἷον θελητική ἐστιν ἡ θεία φύσις, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη: θέλων δέ ἐστιν ὁ κεχρημένος τῇ θελήσει ἤτοι ἡ ὑπόστασις οἷον ὁ Πέτρος.

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν εἷς μέν ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ μία αὐτοῦ ἡ ὑπόστασις, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ θέλων καὶ ἐνεργῶν θεϊκῶς τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δύο φύσεις ἔχει θελητικὰς ὡς λογικάς (πᾶν γὰρ λογικὸν θελητικόν τε καὶ αὐτεξούσιον), δύο θελήσεις ἤτοι θελήματα φυσικὰ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐροῦμεν. Θελητικὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ αὐτὸς κατ' ἄμφω ταῖς αὐτοῦ φύσεσιν: τὴν γὰρ φυσικῶς ἐνυπάρχουσαν ἡμῖν θελητικὴν δύναμιν ἀνέλαβε. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ θέλων καθ' ἑκατέραν φύσιν, τὸ αὐτὸ θελητὸν λέξομεν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὐχὶ μόνα θέλοντος, ἃ φυσικῶς ὡς θεὸς ἤθελεν (οὐ γὰρ θεότητος τὸ θέλειν φαγεῖν, πιεῖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα), ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ συστατικὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως, οὐκ ἐναντιότητι γνώμης, ἀλλ' ἐν ἰδιότητι τῶν φύσεων: τότε γὰρ ταῦτα φυσικῶς ἤθελεν, ὅτε ἡ θεία αὐτοῦ θέλησις ἤθελε καὶ παρεχώρει τῇ σαρκὶ πάσχειν καὶ πράττειν τὰ ἴδια.

Ὅτι δὲ φυσικῶς πρόσεστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡ θέλησις, ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον. Ὑπεξαιρουμένης τῆς θείας τρία εἴδη ζωῆς εἰσιν: ἡ φυτική, ἡ αἰσθητική, ἡ νοερά. Τῆς μὲν οὖν φυτικῆς ἴδιον ἡ θρεπτική, ἡ αὐξητική, ἡ γεννητικὴ κίνησις: τῆς δὲ αἰσθητικῆς ἡ καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησις: τῆς δὲ λογικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς ἡ αὐτεξούσιος. Εἰ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν πρόσεστι τῇ φυτικῇ ἡ θρεπτικὴ καὶ τῇ αἰσθητικῇ ἡ καθ' ὁρμὴν κίνησις, κατὰ φύσιν ἄρα πρόσεστι καὶ τῇ λογικῇ καὶ νοερᾷ ἡ αὐτεξούσιος: αὐτεξουσιότης δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ἡ θέλησις: γεγονὼς τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἔμψυχος, νοερὰ καὶ αὐτεξούσιος, γέγονε καὶ θελητικός.

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀδίδακτά εἰσι τὰ φυσικά: οὐδεὶς γὰρ λογίζεσθαι ἢ ζῆν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ διψῆν ἢ ὑπνοῖν μανθάνει. Οὔτε δὲ θέλειν μανθάνομεν: ὥστε φυσικὸν τὸ θέλειν.

Καὶ πάλιν: Εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἄγει μὲν ἡ φύσις, ἄγεται δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐξουσιαστικῶς κατὰ θέλησιν κινουμένῳ, ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Καὶ πάλιν: Εἰ κατ' εἰκόνα τῆς μακαρίας καὶ ὑπερουσίου θεότητος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεγένηται, αὐτεξούσιος δὲ φύσει καὶ θελητικὴ ἡ θεία φύσις, ἄρα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὡς αὐτῆς εἰκὼν αὐτεξούσιος φύσει καὶ θελητικός. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτεξούσιον θέλησιν ὡρίσαντο οἱ πατέρες.

Ἔτι δὲ εἰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐνυπάρχει τὸ θέλειν καὶ οὐ τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσιν ἐνθεωρούμενον φύσιν χαρακτηρίζει ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις, ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

Καὶ αὖθις: Εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται, ἐπίσης δὲ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει τὸ θέλειν καὶ οὐ τοῖς μὲν πλέον, τοῖς δὲ ἔλαττον, ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος: ὥστε εἰ φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὁ κύριος, οὐ μόνον καθὸ θεός, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος γέγονε, φύσει θελητικός ἐστιν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν ἀνέλαβεν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον θέλημα φύσει ἀνείληφεν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο οἱ πατέρες τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τυπῶσαι αὐτὸν ἔφησαν θέλημα.

Εἰ φυσικὸν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ θέλημα, ἢ ὑποστατικὸν ἔσται ἢ παρὰ φύσιν: ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑποστατικόν, ἑτερόβουλος οὕτω γε ἔσται ὁ υἱὸς τῷ πατρί: μόνης γὰρ ὑποστάσεως χαρακτηριστικὸν τὸ ὑποστατικόν: εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, ἔκπτωσις τῆς φύσεως ἔσται τὸ θέλημα: φθαρτικὰ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τὰ παρὰ φύσιν.

Ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ καθὸ πατὴρ θέλει ἢ καθὸ θεός. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν καθὸ πατήρ, ἄλλο αὐτοῦ ἔσται παρὰ τὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ θέλημα: οὐ γὰρ πατὴρ ὁ υἱός. Εἰ δὲ καθὸ θεός, θεὸς δὲ ὁ υἱός, θεὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον: ἄρα τὸ θέλημα φύσεως ἤγουν φυσικόν.

Ἔτι εἰ κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας, ὧν τὸ θέλημα ἕν, τούτων καὶ ἡ οὐσία μία, ἓν δὲ θέλημα τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ, ἄρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ τούτων ἔσται καὶ ἡ οὐσία.

Καὶ πάλιν: Εἰ κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας ἡ τῆς φύσεως διαφορὰ τῷ ἑνὶ θελήματι οὐ διαφαίνεται, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἓν θέλημα λέγοντας φυσικὴν ἐν Χριστῷ μὴ λέγειν διαφορὰν ἢ φυσικὴν λέγοντας διαφορὰν ἓν θέλημα μὴ λέγειν.

Καὶ αὖθις: Εἰ, καθώς φησι τὸ θεῖον εὐαγγέλιον, ἐλθὼν ὁ κύριος εἰς τὰ μέρη Τύρου καὶ Σιδῶνος «καὶ εἰσελθὼν εἰς οἶκον οὐδένα ἠθέλησε γνῶναι καὶ οὐκ ἠδυνήθη λαθεῖν», εἰ τὸ θεῖον αὐτοῦ θέλημα παντοδύναμον, θελήσας δὲ λαθεῖν οὐ δεδύνηται, ἄρα καθὸ ἄνθρωπος θελήσας οὐκ ἠδυνήθη καὶ θελητικὸς ἦν καὶ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος.

Καὶ πάλιν: «Ἐλθών», φησίν, «εἰς τὸν τόπον» «εἶπε: Διψῶ». «Καὶ ἔδωκαν αὐτῷ οἶνον μετὰ χολῆς μεμιγμένον, καὶ γευσάμενος οὐκ ἠθέλησε πιεῖν». Εἰ μὲν οὖν καθὸ θεὸς ἐδίψησε καὶ γευσάμενος οὐκ ἠθέλησε πιεῖν, ἐμπαθὴς ἄρα καθὸ θεός: πάθος γὰρ ἥ τε δίψα καὶ ἡ γεῦσις. Εἰ δὲ οὐ καθὸ θεός, πάντως καθὸ ἄνθρωπος θελητικὸς ἦν.

Καὶ ὁ μακάριος δὲ Παῦλος ὁ ἀπόστολος: «Γενόμενος», φησίν, «ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ». Ἡ ὑπακοὴ τοῦ ὄντος θελήματός ἐστιν ὑποταγή, οὐ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἄλογον ὑπήκοον ἢ παρήκοον λέξομεν: ὑπήκοος δὲ γενόμενος τῷ πατρὶ ὁ κύριος οὐ καθὸ θεὸς γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος. «Καθὸ γὰρ θεὸς οὔτε ὑπήκοος οὔτε παρήκοος: τῶν ὑπὸ χεῖρα γὰρ ταῦτα», καθὼς ὁ θεηγόρος ἔφη Γρηγόριος. Θελητικὸς ἄρα καὶ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος ὁ Χριστός.

Φυσικὸν δὲ τὸ θέλημα λέγοντες, οὐκ ἠναγκασμένον τοῦτό φαμεν, ἀλλ' αὐτεξούσιον: εἰ γὰρ λογικόν, πάντως καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ ἡ θεία καὶ ἄκτιστος φύσις οὐδὲν ἠναγκασμένον ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ νοερὰ καὶ κτιστή. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον: φύσει γὰρ ὢν ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεὸς καὶ φύσει δημιουργὸς καὶ φύσει θεὸς οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ ταῦτά ἐστι. Τίς γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπάγων;

Δεῖ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς αὐτεξουσιότης ὁμωνύμως λέγεται, ἄλλως μὲν ἐπὶ θεοῦ, ἄλλως δὲ ἐπὶ ἀγγέλων, καὶ ἄλλως ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων. Ἐπὶ θεοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερουσίως, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀγγέλων ὡς συντρεχούσης τῇ ἕξει τῆς προχειρήσεως καὶ παρενθήκην ὅλως χρόνου μὴ παραδεχομένης (ἔχων γὰρ φυσικῶς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἀπαρεμποδίστως τούτῳ κέχρηται, μηδὲ τὴν ἐκ σωμάτων ἀντιπάθειαν ἔχων μηδὲ τὸν προσβάλλοντα), ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ὡς χρονικῶς τῆς ἕξεως προεπινοουμένης τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως: αὐτεξούσιος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ φυσικῶς ἔχει τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου προσβολὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν. Διὰ οὖν τὴν προσβολὴν καὶ τὸ βάρος τοῦ σώματος ἐφυστερίζει ἡ προχείρησις τῆς ἕξεως.

Εἰ οὖν θέλων ὁ Ἀδὰμ ὑπήκουσε καὶ θελήσας ἔφαγεν, ἄρα πρωτοπαθὴς ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ θέλησις: εἰ δὲ πρωτοπαθὴς ἡ θέλησις, ταύτην δὲ μετὰ τῆς φύσεως ὁ λόγος σαρκωθεὶς οὐκ ἀνέλαβεν, οὐκ ἄρα ἔξω τῆς ἁμαρτίας γεγόναμεν.

Ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἔργον αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτεξούσιος τῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχει δύναμις, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ ἀνέλαβεν, ἢ καταγνοὺς τῆς οἰκείας δημιουργίας ὡς οὐ καλῆς ἢ φθονήσας ἡμῖν τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν θεραπείας, ἡμᾶς μὲν τῆς παντελοῦς ἀποστερῶν θεραπείας, ἑαυτὸν δὲ ὑπὸ πάθος ὄντα δεικνὺς τῷ μὴ θέλειν ἢ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τελείως σῴζειν.

Ἀδύνατον δὲ ἕν τι σύνθετον ἐκ τῶν δύο θελημάτων λέγειν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν φύσεων σύνθετον τὴν ὑπόστασιν. Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν ἐν ὑποστάσει ὄντων καὶ οὐ τῶν ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ καὶ οὐκ ἰδίῳ θεωρουμένων εἰσί: δεύτερον δέ, ὅτι, εἰ τῶν θελημάτων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν σύνθεσιν λέξομεν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων σύνθεσιν εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθησόμεθα, τοῦ ἀκτίστου καὶ κτιστοῦ, τοῦ ἀοράτου καὶ ὁρατοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Πῶς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θελημάτων σύνθετον θέλημα προσαγορευθήσεται (ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ σύνθετον τῇ τῶν συντεθέντων ὀνομάζεσθαι προσηγορίᾳ), ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν φύσεων σύνθετον φύσιν προσαγορεύσομεν καὶ οὐχ ὑπόστασιν; Ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰ ἓν σύνθετον θέλημα ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ λέξομεν, θελήματι τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὸν χωρίζομεν: οὐ γὰρ σύνθετον τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θέλημα. Λείπεται τοίνυν εἰπεῖν μόνην τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Χριστοῦ σύνθετον καὶ κοινὴν ὥσπερ τῶν φύσεων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αὐτοῦ.

Γνώμην δὲ καὶ προαίρεσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίου λέγειν ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ κυριολεκτεῖν βουλόμεθα. Ἡ γνώμη γὰρ μετὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ζήτησιν καὶ βούλευσιν ἤτοι βουλὴν καὶ κρίσιν πρὸς τὸ κριθέν ἐστι διάθεσις. Μεθ' ἣν ἡ προαίρεσις ἐκλεγομένη καὶ αἱρουμένη πρὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον. Ὁ δὲ κύριος οὐ φιλὸς ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ θεὸς καὶ πάντα εἰδὼς ἀνενδεὴς σκέψεως καὶ ζητήσεως καὶ βουλῆς ὑπῆρχε καὶ κρίσεως καὶ φυσικῶς τήν τε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν εἶχεν οἰκείωσιν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κακὸν ἀλλοτρίωσιν. Οὕτω γοῦν καὶ Ἡσαΐας φησίν, ὅτι «πρὶν ἢ γνῶναι τὸ παιδίον ἢ προελέσθαι πονηρά, ἐκλέξεται τὸ ἀγαθόν: διότι πρὶν ἢ γνῶναι τὸ παιδίον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἀπειθεῖ πονηρίᾳ τοῦ ἐκλέξασθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν». Τὸ γὰρ «πρὶν» δηλοῖ, ὅτι οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς ζητήσας καὶ βουλευσάμενος ἀλλὰ θεὸς ὢν καὶ θεϊκῶς καὶ τὸ κατὰ σάρκα ὑποστάς, τουτέστι καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἡνωμένος τῇ σαρκί, αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι καὶ τὸ πάντα εἰδέναι τὸ ἐκ φύσεως εἶχεν ἀγαθόν: φυσικαὶ γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ φυσικῶς καὶ ἐπίσης πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχουσιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντες ἐπίσης ἐνεργοῦμεν τὰ τῆς φύσεως. Ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν διὰ τῆς παραβάσεως ἠλάσαμεν. Ὁ δὲ κύριος ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπανήγαγε: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. Καὶ ἡ ἄσκησις δὲ καὶ οἱ ταύτης πόνοι οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἐπικτήσασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔξωθεν ἐπείσακτον οὖσαν ἐπενοήθησαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τὴν ἐπείσακτον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κακίαν ἀποβαλέσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σιδήρου ἰὸν οὐ φυσικὸν ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμελείας ἐπιγενόμενον διὰ μόχθου ἀποβάλλοντες τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ σιδήρου λαμπρότητα ἐμφανίζομεν.

Ἰστέον δέ, ὡς τὸ τῆς γνώμης ὄνομα πολύτροπον καὶ πολυσήμαντόν ἐστι. Ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν παραίνεσιν, ὥς φησιν ὁ θεῖος ἀπόστολος: «Περὶ δὲ τῶν παρθένων ἐπιταγὴν κυρίου οὐκ ἔχω, γνώμην δὲ δίδωμι:» ποτὲ δὲ βουλήν, ὡς ὅταν φησὶν ὁ προφήτης Δαυίδ: «Ἐπὶ τὸν λαόν σου κατεπανουργεύσαντο γνώμην», ποτὲ δὲ ψῆφον, ὡς ὁ Δανιήλ: «Περὶ τίνος ἐξῆλθεν ἡ γνώμη ἡ ἀναιδὴς αὕτη;», ποτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ πίστεως ἢ δόξης ἢ φρονήματος, καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, κατὰ εἴκοσιν ὀκτὼ σημαινόμενα λαμβάνεται τὸ τῆς γνώμης ὄνομα.