Chapter XX.—That there are not two Kingdoms.

That there are not two kingdoms1214    Athan., Cont. Gentes., one good and one bad, we shall see from this. For good and evil are opposed to one another and mutually destructive, and cannot exist in one another or with one another. Each of them, therefore, in its own division will belong to the whole, and first1215    Athan., Cont. omnes hæret. they will be circumscribed, not by the whole alone but also each of them by part of the whole.

Next I ask1216    Damasc., Dial. Cont. Manich., who it is that assigns1217    Text, ἀποτεμνόμενος. Variants, ἀποτεμόμενος and ἀπονεμόμενος. to each its place. For they will not affirm that they have come to a friendly agreement with, or been reconciled to, one another. For evil is not evil when it is at peace with, and reconciled to, goodness, nor is goodness good when it is on amicable terms with evil. But if He Who has marked off to each of these its own sphere of action is something different from them, He must the rather be God.

One of two things indeed is necessary, either that they come in contact with and destroy one another, or that there exists some intermediate place where neither goodness nor evil exists, separating both from one another, like a partition. And so there will be no longer two but three kingdoms.

Again, one of these alternatives is necessary, either that they are at peace, which is quite incompatible with evil (for that which is at peace is not evil), or they are at strife, which is incompatible with goodness (for that which is at strife is not perfectly good), or the evil is at strife and the good does not retaliate, but is destroyed by the evil, or they are ever in trouble and distress1218    Text, κακοῦσθαι. Variant, κακουχεῖσθαι., which is not a mark of goodness. There is, therefore, but one kingdom, delivered from all evil.

But if this is so, they say, whence comes evil1219    Basil, Hom.Deum non esse caus. mal.? For it is quite impossible that evil should originate from goodness. We answer then, that evil is nothing else than absence of goodness and a lapsing1220    Text, παραδρομή. Variant, παρα. ροπή, cf. infra. from what is natural into what is unnatural: for nothing evil is natural. For all things, whatsoever God made, are very good1221    Gen. i. 31., so far as they were made: if, therefore, they remain just as they were created, they are very good, but when they voluntarily depart from what is natural and turn to what is unnatural, they slip into evil.

By nature, therefore, all things are servants of the Creator and obey Him. Whenever, then, any of His creatures voluntarily rebels and becomes disobedient to his Maker, he introduces evil into himself. For evil is not any essence nor a property of essence, but an accident, that is, a voluntary deviation from what is natural into what is unnatural, which is sin.

Whence, then, comes sin1222    Basil, Hom.Deum non esse caus. mal.? It is an invention of the free-will of the devil. Is the devil, then, evil? In so far as he was brought into existence he is not evil but good. For he was created by his Maker a bright and very brilliant angel, endowed with free-will as being rational. But he voluntarily departed from the virtue that is natural and came into the darkness of evil, being far removed from God, Who alone is good and can give life and light. For from Him every good thing derives its goodness, and so far as it is separated from Him in will (for it is not in place), it falls into evil.

Ὅτι οὐ δύο ἀρχαί

Ὅτι οὐ δύο ἀρχαί, μία ἀγαθὴ καὶ μία πονηρά, ἐντεῦθεν εἰσόμεθα: ἐναντία γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ ἀλλήλων φθαρτικὰ καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἢ σὺν ἀλλήλοις οὐχ ὑφιστάμενα. Ἐν μέρει τοίνυν τούτων ἕκαστον ἔσται τοῦ παντός. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν περιγραφήσονται οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ παντὸς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ μέρους τοῦ παντὸς τούτων ἕκαστον.

Ἔπειτα τίς ὁ τὴν χώραν ἑκάστῳ ἀποτεμόμενος; Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλοις συνενεχθῆναι καὶ συμβιβασθῆναι φήσουσιν, ἐπεὶ οὐ κακὸν τὸ κακὸν εἰρήνην ἄγον πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν τε συμβιβαζόμενον, οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν πρὸς τὸ κακὸν φιλικῶς διακείμενον. Εἰ δὲ ἕτερος τούτων ἑκάστῳ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφώρισε διατριβήν, ἐκεῖνος μᾶλλον ἔσται θεός.

Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ δυοῖν θάτερον ἢ ἅπτεσθαι καὶ φθείρειν ἀλλήλους ἢ εἶναί τι μέσον, ἐν ᾧ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κακὸν ἔσται, ὥσπερ τι διάφραγμα διεῖργον ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἀμφότερα. Καὶ οὐκέτι δύο, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται.

Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τούτων τὸ ἕτερον ἢ εἰρηνεύειν, ὅπερ τὸ κακὸν οὐ δύναται (τὸ γὰρ εἰρηνεῦον οὐ κακόν), ἢ μάχεσθαι, ὅπερ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐ δύναται (τὸ γὰρ μαχόμενον οὐ τελέως ἀγαθόν), ἢ τὸ μὲν κακὸν μάχεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἀντιμάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ φθείρεσθαι, ἢ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ κακοῦσθαι, ὅπερ οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γνώρισμα. Μία τοίνυν ἀρχὴ ἀγαθὴ πάσης κακίας ἀπηλλαγμένη.

Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, φασί, πόθεν τὸ κακόν; Ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακὸν ἔχειν τὴν γένεσιν. Φαμὲν οὖν, ὅτι τὸ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἰ μὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν παρατροπή: οὐδὲν γὰρ κακὸν κατὰ φύσιν. Πάντα γάρ, ὅσα ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός, καλὰ λίαν, καθὸ γέγονεν. Οὕτω τοίνυν μένοντα, καθὼς ἔκτισται, καλὰ λίαν εἰσίν, ἑκουσίως δὲ ἀποφοιτῶντα ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐρχόμενα, ἐν τῷ κακῷ γίνονται.

Κατὰ φύσιν μὲν οὖν πάντα δοῦλα καὶ ὑπήκοα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ. Ὅταν οὖν ἑκουσίως τι τῶν κτισμάτων ἀφηνιάσῃ καὶ παρήκοον τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτὸ γένηται, ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνεστήσατο τὴν κακίαν: κακία γὰρ οὐκ οὐσία τίς ἐστιν οὐδὲ οὐσίας ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἤτοι ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἑκούσιος παρατροπή, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἁμαρτία.

Πόθεν οὖν ἡ ἁμαρτία; _Τῆς αὐτεξουσίου γνώμης τοῦ διαβόλου εὕρημα. _Κακὸς οὖν ὁ διάβολος; _Καθὸ μὲν γέγονεν, οὐ κακός, ἀλλ' ἀγαθός: ἄγγελος γὰρ λαμπρὸς καὶ φωτεινὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἔκτισται, αὐτεξούσιος ὡς λογικός, ἑκουσίως τε τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀρετῆς ἀπεφοίτησε καὶ ἐν τῷ ζόφῳ τῆς κακίας γέγονε, θεοῦ μακρυνθεὶς τοῦ μόνου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φωτοποιοῦ: ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθύνεται, καὶ καθόσον ἐξ αὐτοῦ μακρύνεται γνώμῃ (οὐ γὰρ τόπῳ), ἐν τῷ κακῷ γέγονεν.