8. R. I allow so much: but yet if any one should say to thee, I will give thee to know God as well as thou dost know Alypius, wouldst thou not give thanks, and say, It is enough? A. I should give thanks indeed: but I should not say, It is enough. R. Why, I pray? A. Because I do not even know God so well as I know Alypius, and yet I do not know Alypius well enough. R. Beware then lest shamelessly thou wouldest fain be satisfied in the knowledge of God, who hast not even such a knowledge of Alypius as satisfies. A. Non sequitur. For, comparing it with the stars, what is of lower account than my supper? and yet what I shall sup on to-morrow I know not: but in what sign the moon will be, I need take no shame to profess that I know. R. Is it then enough for thee to know God as well as thou dost know in what sign the moon will hold her course to-morrow? A. It is not enough, for this I test by the senses. But I do not know whether or not either God, or some hidden cause of nature may suddenly change the moon’s ordinary course, which if it came to pass, would render false all that I had presumed. R. And believest thou that this may happen? A. I do not believe. But I at least am seeking what I may know, not what I may believe. Now everything that we know, we may with reason perhaps be said to believe, but not to know everything which we believe. R. In this matter therefore you reject all testimony of the senses? A. I utterly reject it. R. That friend of yours then, whom you say you do not yet know, is it by sense that you wish to know him or by intellectual perception? A. Whatever in him I know by sense, if indeed anything is known by sense, is both mean and sufficiently known. But that part which bears affection to me, that is, the mind itself, I desire to know intellectually. R. Can it, indeed, be known otherwise? A. By no means. R. Do you venture then to call your friend, your inmost friend, unknown to you? A. Why not venture? For I account most equitable that law of friendship, by which it is prescribed, that as one is to bear no less, so he is to bear no more affection to his friend than to himself. Since then I know not myself, what injury does he suffer, whom I declare to be unknown to me, above all since (as I believe) he does not even know himself? R. If then these things which thou wouldst fain know, are of such a sort as are to be intellectually attained, when I said it was shameless in thee to crave to know God, when thou knowest not even Alypius, thou oughtest not to have urged to me the similitude of thy supper and the moon, if these things, as thou hast said, appertain to sense.

CAPUT III. Cognitio Dei.

8. R. Accipio istud: sed tamen si quis tibi diceret, Faciam te sic Deum nosse, quomodo nosti Alypium; nonne gratias ageres, et diceres, Satis est? A. Agerem quidem gratias, sed satis esse non dicerem. R. Cur, quaeso? A. Quia Deum ne sic quidem novi quomodo Alypium, et tamen Alypium non satis novi. R. Vide ergo ne impudenter velis satis Deum nosse, qui Alypium non satis nosti. A. Non sequitur. Nam in comparatione siderum, quid est mea coena vilius? et tamen cras quid sim coenaturus ignoro; quo autem signo luna futura sit, non impudenter me scire profiteor. R. Ergo vel ita Deum nosse tibi satis est, ut nosti quo cras signo luna cursura sit? A. Non est satis: nam hoc sensibus approbo. Ignoro autem utrum vel Deus vel aliqua naturae occulta causa subito lunae ordinem cursumque commutet: quod si acciderit, totum illud quod praesumpseram, falsum erit. R. Et credis hoc fieri posse? A. Non credo. Sed ego quid sciam quaero, non quid credam. Omne autem quod scimus, recte fortasse etiam credere dicimur; at non omne quod credimus, etiam scire. R. Respuis igitur in hac causa omne testimonium sensuum? A. Prorsus respuo. R. Quid? illum familiarem tuum quem te adhuc ignorare dixisti, sensu vis nosse, an intellectu? A. Sensu quidem quod in eo novi, si tamen sensu aliquid noscitur, et vile est, et satis est: illam vero partem qua mihi amicus est, id est ipsum animum, intellectu assequi cupio. R. Potestne aliter nosci? A. Nullo modo. R. Amicum igitur tuum et vehementer familiarem, audes tibi dicere esse ignotum? A. Quidni audeam? Illam enim legem amicitiae justissimam esse arbitror, qua praescribitur ut sicut non minus, ita nec plus quisque amicum quam seipsum diligat. Itaque cum memetipsum ignorem, qua potest a me affici contumelia, quem mihi esse dixero ignotum, cum praesertim, ut credo, ne ipse quidem se noverit? R. Si ergo ista quae scire vis, ex eo sunt genere quae intellectus assequitur, cum dicerem impudenter te velle Deum scire, cum Alypium nescias, non debuisti 0874 mihi coenam tuam et lunam proferre pro simili, si haec, ut dixisti, ad sensum pertinent.