2.  Yet it would be most unreasonable of all, if, while we refuse to regard it as a righteous thing to defraud, insult, accuse, or treat unjustly in any way, great or small, those who are our kindred, and consider wrong done to those nearest to us the worst of all; we were yet to imagine that it would be an act of justice to deprive them of such an oration as is due most of all to the good, and spend more words upon those who are evil, and beg for indulgent treatment, than on those who are excellent and merely claim their due.  For if we are not prevented, as would be far more just, from praising men who have lived outside our own circle, because we do not know and cannot personally testify to their merits, shall we be prevented from praising those whom we do know, because of our friendship, or the envy of the multitude, and especially those who have departed hence, whom it is too late to ingratiate ourselves with, since they have escaped, amongst all other things, from the reach of praise or blame.

Βʹ. Πάντων δ' ἀτοπώτατον, εἰ ἀποστερεῖν μέν τι τοὺς ἰδίους, ἢ λοιδορεῖσθαι, ἢ κατηγορεῖν, ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὸν ἣ μεῖζον, οὐκ εὐαγὲς εἶναι θήσομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων κάκιστον τὴν κατὰ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων παρανομίαν: λόγου δὲ ἀποστεροῦντες, ὃ πάντων μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐστιν ὀφειλόμενον, καὶ ᾧ τὴν μνήμην ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀθάνατον καταστήσαιμεν, ἔπειτα δίκαιόν τι ποιεῖν οἰησόμεθα, καὶ πλείω λόγον ἕξομεν τῶν πονηρῶν τὸ πρὸς χάριν αἰτιωμένων ἢ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀπαιτούντων τὸ πρὸς ἀξίαν. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔξωθεν ἐπαινεῖν οὐ κωλύει τὸ ἄγνωστον καὶ ἀμάρτυρον (καίτοι γε πολλῷ δικαιότερον ἦν), τοὺς γινωσκομένους δὲ ἡ φιλία κωλύσει, καὶ ὁ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν φθόνος, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἀπηλλαγμένους, καὶ οἷς ἄωρον τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, καταλιποῦσι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας ἢ ψέγοντας.