Chap. vI.—that neither the whole universe nor the elements are god, nor are they possessed of life.

In like manner, if the land on which we tread, and which we subdue and cultivate for food, is not a god, then the plains and mountains will not be gods; and if these are not so, it follows that the whole of the earth cannot appear to be God. In like manner, if the water, which is adapted to the wants148    Is subservient to.   of living creatures for the purpose of drinking and bathing, is not a god, neither are the fountains gods from which the water flows. And if the fountains are not gods, neither are the rivers, which are collected from the fountains. And if the rivers also are not gods, it follows that the sea, which is made up of rivers, cannot be considered as God. But if neither the heaven, nor the earth, nor the sea, which are the parts of the world, can be gods, it follows that the world altogether is not God; whereas the same Stoics contend that it is both living and wise, and therefore God. But in this they are so inconsistent, that nothing is said by them which they do not also overthrow. For they argue thus: It is impossible that that which produces from itself sensible objects should itself be insensible. But the world produces man, who is endowed with sensibility; therefore it must also itself be sensible. Also they argue: that cannot be without sensibility, a part of which is sensible; therefore, because man is sensible, the world, of which man is a part, also possesses sensibility. The propositions149    Lactantius speaks after the manner of Cicero, and uses the word proposition to express that which logicians call the major proposition, as containing the major term: the word assumption expresses that which is called the minor proposition, as containing the minor term.   themselves are true, that that which produces a being endowed with sense is itself sensible; and that that possesses sense, a part of which is endowed with sense. But the assumptions by which they draw their conclusions are false; for the world does not produce man, nor is man a part of the world. For the same God who created the world, also created man from the beginning: and man is not a part of the world, in the same manner in which a limb is a part of the body; for it is possible for the world to be without man, as it is for a city or house. Now, as a house is the dwelling-place of one man, and a city of one people, so also the world is the abode150    Thus Cicero, De Finibus, iii., says: “But they think that the universe is governed by the power of the gods, and that it is, as it were, a city and state common to men and gods, and that every one of us is a part of that universe.”   of the whole human race; and that which is inhabited is one thing, that which inhabits another. But these persons, in their eagerness to prove that which they had falsely assumed, that the world is possessed of sensibility, and is God, did not perceive the consequences of their own arguments. For if man is a part of the world, and if the world is endowed with sensibility because man is sensible, therefore it follows that, because man is mortal, the world must also of necessity be mortal, and not only mortal, but also liable to all kinds of disease and suffering. And, on the contrary, if the world is God, its parts also are plainly immortal: therefore man also is God, because he is, as you say, a part of the world. And if man, then also both beasts of burden and cattle, and the other kinds of beasts and of birds, and fishes, since these also in the same manner are possessed of sensibility, and are parts of the world. But this is endurable; for the Egyptians worship even these. But the matter comes to this: that even frogs, and gnats, and ants appear to be gods, because these also have sensibility, and are parts of the world. Thus arguments drawn from a false source always lead to foolish and absurd conclusions. Why should I mention that the same philosophers assert that the world was constructed151    If the world was created out of nothing, as Christians are taught to believe, it was not born; for birth (γένεσις) takes place when matter assumes another substantial form.—Betuleius.   for the sake of gods and men as a common dwelling? Therefore the world is neither god, nor living, if it has been made: for a living creature is not made, but born; and if it has been built, it has been built as a house or ship is built. Therefore there is a builder of the world, even God; and the world which has been made is distinct from Him who made it. Now, how inconsistent and absurd is it, that when they affirm that the heavenly fires152    The stars.   and the other elements of the world are gods, they also say that the world itself is God! How is it possible that out of a great heap of gods one God can be made up? If the stars are gods, it follows that the world is not God, but the dwelling-place of gods. But if the world is God, it follows that all the things which are in it are not gods, but members153    Membra, “limbs,” “parts.”   of God, which clearly cannot by themselves154    Sola, “alone.” Another reading is solius, “of the only God.”   take the name of God. For no one can rightly say that the members of one man are many men; but, however, there is no similar comparison between a living being and the world. For because a living being is endowed with sensibility, its members also have sensibility; nor do they become senseless155    Brutescunt.   unless they are separated from the body. But what resemblance does the world present to this? Truly they themselves tell us, since they do not deny that it was made, that it might be, as it were, a common abode for gods and men. If, therefore, it has been constructed as an abode, it is neither itself God, nor are the elements which are its parts; because a house cannot bear rule over itself, nor can the parts of which a house consists. Therefore they are refuted not only by the truth, but even by their own words. For as a house, made for the purpose of being inhabited, has no sensibility by itself, and is subject to the master who built or inhabits it; so the world, having no sensibility of itself, is subject to God its Maker, who made it for His own use.  

0281A CAPUT VI. Quod nec mundus totus, nec elementa sint Deus, nec animata.

Simili modo si terra, quam calcamus, 0281A quam subigimus et colimus ad victum, deus non est, nec campi quidem ac montes dii erunt: sed si hi non sunt, ergo ne tellus quidem universa Deus videri potest. Item si aqua, quae servit animantibus ad usum bibendi aut lavandi, deus non est, nec fontes quidem, ex quibus aqua profluit. Si fontes non sunt, nec flumina quidem, quae de fontibus colliguntur. Si flumina quoque dii non sunt, ergo et mare, quod ex fluminibus constat, Deus haberi non potest. Quod si neque coelum, neque terra, neque mare, quae mundi partes 0281B sunt, dii esse possunt; ergo ne mundus quidem totus Deus est, quem iidem ipsi stoïci, et animantem, et sapientem esse contendunt, et propterea Deum: in quo tam inconstantes fuerunt, ut nihil dictum sit ab his quod non ab iisdem fuerit eversum. Sic enim argumentantur: Fieri non posse, ut sensu careat, quod sensibilia ex se generat. Mundus autem generat hominem, qui est sensu praeditus; ergo et ipsum sensibilem esse. Item: Sine sensu esse non posse, cujus pars habeat sensum; igitur quia homo sensibilis est, etiam mundo, cujus pars homo est, inesse 0282A sensum. Propositiones quidem verae sunt, et sensibile esse, quod sensu praeditum gignat, et habere sensum, cujus pars sensu aucta sit: sed assumptiones falsae, quibus argumenta concludunt, quia neque mundus generat hominem, neque homo mundi pars est. Nam hominem a principio idem Deus fecit, qui et mundum: et non est mundi pars homo, sicut corporis membrum; potest enim mundus esse sine homine, sicut urbs, et domus. Atqui ut domus unius hominis habitaculum est, et urbs unius populi; sic et mundus domicilium totius generis humani. Et aliud est, quod incolitur, aliud quod incolit. Sed illi, dum student id, quod falso susceperant, confirmare, et sensibilem esse mundum, et Deum, argumentorum suorum consequentia non viderunt. Nam 0282B si mundi pars est homo, et sensibilis est mundus, quia homo sentit: ergo quia mortalis est homo, mortalis sit et mundus necesse est; nec tantum mortalis, sed et omnibus morbis et passionibus subjectus.

Et e contrario: Si Deus est mundus, et partes ejus utique immortales sunt; ergo et homo Deus est, quia pars est (ut dicitis) mundi. Si homo; ergo et jumenta, et pecudes, et caetera genera bestiarum, et avium, et piscium; quoniam et illa eodem modo sentiunt, et mundi partes sunt. At hoc tolerabile est: nam et haec colunt Aegyptii. Sed res eo pervenit, ut 0283A et ranae, 0283A et culices, et formicae dii esse videantur, quia et ipsis inest sensus, et partes mundi sunt. Ita semper argumenta ex falso petita ineptos et absurdos exitus habent. Quid, quod iidem ipsi aiunt, deorum et hominum causa mundum esse constructum, quasi communem domum: ergo nec mundus Deus est, nec animans, si constructus est; animans enim non construitur, sed nascitur. Et si est aedificatus sic utique tamquam domus, tamquam navis; est ergo aliquis artifex mundi Deus; et seorsum erit mundus, qui factus est, seorsum ille, qui fecit. Jam illud quam repugnans et absurdum, quod cum coelestes ignes caeteraque mundi elementa deos affirment, item ipsum deum mundum dicunt. Quomodo potest ex deorum multorum acervo unus Deus confici? Si astra dii sunt, mundus ergo non Deus, sed domicilium 0283B deorum est. Si vero Deus mundus est; ergo omnia illa quae sunt in eo dii non sunt, sed Dei membra, quae utique sola Dei nomen accipere non possunt. Nec enim recte quis dixerit, membra hominis unius multos homines esse: sed tamen non est similis comparatio animalis et mundi. Animal enim, quia sensu praeditum est, etiam membra ejus habent sensum, nec, nisi a corpore divulsa, brutescunt. Cujus igitur rei similitudinem gerit mundus? Nimirum ipsi docent, cum factum esse non diffitentur, ut esset diis et hominibus quasi communis domus. Si ergo est constructus, ut domus, nec ipse Deus est, nec elementa, quae sunt partes ejus; quia neque domus habere dominium sui potest, neque illa de quibus 0283C domus constat. Non tantum igitur veritate, sed 0284A etiam verbis suis revincuntur. Sicut enim domus, in usum habitandi facta, per se nihil sentit, dominoque subjecta est, qui eam fecit, aut incolit: ita mundus, per se nihil sentiens, factori Deo subjacet, qui eum in usum sui fecit.