Chap. ix.—of the devil, the world, god, providence, man, and his wisdom.

I will therefore set forth the method of all these things, that difficult and obscure subjects may be more easily understood; and I will bring to light all these deceptions181    The tricks of a juggler.      The sounds uttered by the beasts, by which they are able to distinguish one another. [Rousseau’s theory goes further.]   of the pretended deity, led by which men have departed very far from the way of truth. But I will retrace the matter far back from its source; that if any, unacquainted with the truth and ignorant, shall apply himself to the reading of this book, he may be instructed, and may understand what can in truth be “the source and origin of these evils;” and having received light, may perceive his own errors and those of the whole human race.  

Since God was possessed182    Most prudent.   of the greatest foresight for planning, and of the greatest skill for carrying out in action, before He commenced this business of the world,—inasmuch as there was in Him, and always is, the fountain of full and most complete goodness,—in order that goodness might spring as a stream from Him, and might flow forth afar, He produced a Spirit like to Himself, who might be endowed with the perfections of God the Father. But how He willed that, I will endeavour to show in the fourth book.183    Chap. vi., infra   Then He made another being, in whom the disposition of the divine origin did not remain. Therefore he was infected with his own envy as with poison, and passed from good to evil; and at his own will, which had been given to him by God unfettered,184    Free.   he acquired for himself a contrary name. From which it appears that the source of all evils is envy. For he envied his predecessor,185    The Son of God, afterwards spoken of.   who through his stedfastness186    By perseverance. There seems to be a contrast between the Son, who remained stedfast, and the evil spirits who fell.   is acceptable and dear to God the Father. This being, who from good became evil by his own act, is called by the Greeks diabolus:187    διάβολος, “slanderer or accuser.” The Greek and Latin words employed by Lactantius have the same meaning.   we call him accuser, because he reports to God the faults to which he himself entices us. God, therefore, when He began the fabric of the world, set over the whole work that first and greatest Son, and used Him at the same time as a counsellor and artificer, in planning, arranging, and accomplishing, since He is complete both in knowledge,188    Providence.   and judgment, and power; concerning whom I now speak more sparingly, because in another place189    Book iv. ch. vi., etc. [Deus, igitur, machinator constitutorque rerum, etc.]   both His excellence, and His name, and His nature must be related by us. Let no one inquire of what materials God made these works so great and wonderful: for He made all things out of nothing.  

Nor are the poets to be listened to, who say that in the beginning was a chaos, that is, a confusion of matter and the elements; but that God afterwards divided all that mass, and having separated each object from the confused heap, and arranged them in order, He constructed and adorned the world. Now it is easy to reply to these persons, who do not understand the power of God: for they believe that He can produce nothing, except out of materials already existing190    Lying under; answering to the Greek expression ὑποκειμένη ὕλη, subject matter.   and prepared; in which error philosophers also were involved. For Cicero, while discussing the nature of the gods,191    Not now found in the treatise which bears this title.   thus speaks: “First of all, therefore, it is not probable192    Capable of proof.   that the matter193    Materia; perhaps from “mater,” mother stuff—matter out of which anything is composed.   from which all things arose was made by divine providence, but that it has, and has had, a force and nature of its own. As therefore the builder, when he is about to erect any building, does not himself make the materials, but uses those which are already prepared, and the statuary194    The moulder. The ancients made statues of wax or clay, as well as of wood, ivory, and marble.   also uses the wax; so that divine providence ought to have had materials at hand, not of its own production, but already prepared for use. But if matter was not made by God, then neither was the earth, and water, and air, and fire, made by God.” Oh, how many faults there are in these ten lines! First, that he who in almost all his other disputations and books was a maintainer of the divine providence, and who used very acute arguments in assailing those who denied the existence of a providence, now himself, as a traitor or deserter, endeavoured to take away providence; in whose case, if you wish to oppose195    Contradict.   him, neither consideration nor labour is required: it is only necessary to remind him of his own words. For it will be impossible for Cicero to be more strongly refuted by any one than by Cicero himself. But let us make this concession to the custom and practice of the Academics,196    Alluding to the well-known practise of the Academics, viz., of arguing on both sides of a question.   that men are permitted to speak with great freedom, and to entertain what sentiments they may wish. Let us examine the sentiments themselves. It is not probable, he says, that matter was made by God. By what arguments do you prove this? For you gave no reason for its being improbable. Therefore, on the contrary, it appears to me exceedingly probable; nor does it appear so without reason, when I reflect that there is something more in God, whom you verily reduce to the weakness of man, to whom you allow nothing else but the mere workmanship. In what respect, then, will that divine power differ from man, if God also, as man does, stands in need of the assistance of another? But He does stand in need of it, if He can construct nothing unless He is furnished with materials by another. But if this is the case, it is plain that His power is imperfect, and he who prepared the material197    The founder or preparer of the material.   must be judged more powerful. By what name, therefore, shall he be called who excels God in power?—since it is greater to make that which is one’s own, than to arrange those things which are another’s. But if it is impossible that anything should be more powerful than God, who must necessarily be of perfect strength, power, and intelligence, it follows that He who made the things which are composed of matter, made matter also. For it was neither possible nor befitting that anything should exist without the exercise of God’s power, or against His will. But it is probable, he says, that matter has, and always has had, a force and nature of its own.198    [Quam vim potuit habere nullo dante?]   What force could it have, without any one to give it? what nature, without any one to produce it? If it had force, it took that force from some one. But from whom could it take it, unless it were from God? Moreover, if it had a nature, which plainly is so called from being produced, it must have been produced. But from whom could it have derived its existence, except God? For nature, from which you say that all things had their origin, if it has no understanding, can make nothing. But if it has the power of producing and making, then it has understanding, and must be God. For that force can be called by no other name, in which there is both the foresight199    Providentia.   to plan, and the skill and power to carry into effect. Therefore Seneca, the most intelligent of all the Stoics, says better, who saw “that nature was nothing else but God.” Therefore he says, “Shall we not praise God, who possesses natural excellence?” For He did not learn it from any one. Yes, truly, we will praise Him; for although it is natural to Him, He gave it to Himself,200    Sibi illam dedit. There is another reading, illa sibi illam dedit, but it does not give so good a sense.   since God Himself is nature. When, therefore, you assign the origin of all things to nature, and take it from God, you are in the same difficulty:—  

For while simply changing the name, you clearly admit that it was made by the same person by whom you deny that it was made.  

There follows a most senseless comparison. “As the builder,” he says, “when he is about to erect any building, does not himself make the materials, but uses those which are already prepared, and the statuary also the wax; so that divine providence ought to have had materials at hand, not of its own production, but already prepared for use.” Nay rather it ought not; for God will have less power if He makes from materials already provided, which is the part of man. The builder will erect nothing without wood, for he cannot make the wood itself; and not to be able to do this is the part of human weakness. But God Himself makes the materials for Himself, because He has the power. For to have the power is the property of God; for if He is not able, He is not God. Man produces his works out of that which already exists, because through his mortality he is weak, and through his weakness his power is limited and moderate; but God produces His works out of that which has no existence, because through His eternity He is strong, and through His strength His power is immense, which has no end or limit, like the life of the Maker Himself. What wonder, then, if God, when He was about to make the world, first prepared the material from which to make it, and prepared it out of that which had no existence? Because it is impossible for God to borrow anything from another source, inasmuch as all things are in Himself and from Himself. For if there is anything before Him, and if anything has been made, but not by Him, He will therefore lose both the power and the name of God. But it may be said matter was never made, like God, who out of matter made this world. In that case, it follows that two eternal principles are established, and those indeed opposed to one another, which cannot happen without discord and destruction. For those things which have a contrary force and method must of necessity come into collision. In this manner it will be impossible that both should be eternal, if they are opposed to one another, because one must overpower the other. Therefore the nature of that which is eternal cannot be otherwise than simple, so that all things descended from that source as from a fountain. Therefore either God proceeded from matter, or matter from God. Which of these is more true, is easily understood. For of these two, one is endued with sensibility, the other is insensible. The power of making anything cannot exist, except in that which has sensibility, intelligence, reflection, and the power of motion. Nor can anything be begun, or made, or completed, unless it shall have been foreseen by reason how it shall be made before it exists, and how it shall endure202    Stand firm and stedfast.   after it has been made. In short, he only makes anything who has the will to make it, and hands to complete that which he has willed. But that which is insensible always lies inactive and torpid; nothing can originate in that source where there is no voluntary motion. For if every animal is possessed of reason, it is certain that it cannot be produced from that which is destitute of reason, nor can that which is not present in the original source203    Which does not exist there, from whence it is sought.   be received from any other quarter. Nor, however, let it disturb any one, that certain animals appear to be born from the earth. For the earth does not give birth to these of itself, but the Spirit of God, without which nothing is produced. Therefore God did not arise from matter, because a being endued with sensibility can never spring from one that is insensible, a wise one from one that is irrational, one that is incapable of suffering from one that can suffer, an incorporeal being from a corporeal one; but matter is rather from God. For whatever consists of a body solid, and capable of being handled, admits of an external force. That which admits of force is capable of dissolution; that which is dissolved perishes; that which perishes must necessarily have had an origin; that which had an origin had a source204    Fountain.   from which it originated, that is, some maker, who is intelligent, foreseeing, and skilled in making. There is one assuredly, and that no other than God. And since He is possessed of sensibility, intelligence, providence, power, and vigour, He is able to create and make both animated and inanimate objects, because He has the means of making everything. But matter cannot always have existed, for if it had existed it would be incapable of change. For that which always was, does not cease always to be; and that which had no beginning must of necessity be without an end. Moreover, it is easier for that which had a beginning to be without an end, than for that which had no beginning, to have an end. Therefore if matter was not made, nothing can be made from it. But if nothing can be made from it, then matter itself can have no existence. For matter is that out of which something is made. But everything out of which anything is made, inasmuch as it has received the hand of the artificer, is destroyed,205    Distruitur, “pulled to pieces.” The word is thus used by Cicero.   and begins to be some other thing. Therefore, since matter had an end, at the time when the world was made out of it, it also had a beginning. For that which is destroyed206    Distruitur, “pulled to pieces.” The word is thus used by Cicero.   was previously built up; that which is loosened was previously bound up; that which is brought to an end was begun. If, then, it is inferred from its change and end, that matter had a beginning, from whom could that beginning have been, except from God? God, therefore, is the only being who was not made; and therefore He can destroy other things, but He Himself cannot be destroyed. That which was in Him will always be permanent, because He has not been produced or sprung from any other source; nor does His birth depend on any other object, which being changed may cause His dissolution. He is of Himself, as we said in the first book;207    Ch. 3 and 7. [See pp. 11, 17, supra.]   and therefore He is such as He willed that He should be, incapable of suffering, unchangeable, incorruptible, blessed, and eternal.  

But now the conclusion, with which Tully finished the sentiment, is much more absurd.208    [Multo absurdior.]   “But if matter,” he says, “was not made by God, the earth indeed, and water, and air, and fire, were not made by God.” How skilfully he avoided the danger! For he stated the former point as though it required no proof, whereas it was much more uncertain than that on account of which the statement was made. If matter, he says, was not made by God, the world was not made by God. He preferred to draw a false inference from that which is false, than a true one from that which is true. And though uncertain things ought to be proved from those which are certain, he drew a proof from an uncertainty, to overthrow that which was certain. For, that the world was made by divine providence (not to mention Trismegistus, who proclaims this; not to mention the verses of the Sibyls, who make the same announcement; not to mention the prophets,209    Lactantius seems to refer not to the true prophets, but to those of other nations, such as Orpheus and Zoroaster, or the magi of the Persians, the gymnosophists of the Indians, or the Druids of the Gauls. St. Augustine often makes mention of these. It would seem inconsistent to mention Moses and the prophets of God with the prophets of the heathens. [Compare, however, “Christian analogies,” etc., in Justin. See vol. i. 169; also Ibid., pp. 182, 283–286.]   who with one impulse and with harmonious210    Pari voce.   voice bear witness that the world was made,211    The work of the world, and the workmanship of God.   and that it was the workmanship of God), even the philosophers almost universally agree; for this is the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics, who are the chief of every sect.212    Qui sunt principes omnis disciplinæ. There is another reading: quæ sunt principes omnium disciplinæ, “which are the leading sects of all.”   In short, from those first seven wise men,213    Thales said that the world was the work of God.   even to Socrates and Plato, it was held as an acknowledged and undoubted fact; until many ages afterwards214    This statement is incorrect, as Plato was born b.c. 430, and Epicurus b.c. 337.   the crazy Epicurus lived, who alone ventured to deny that which is most evident, doubtless through the desire of discovering novelties, that he might found a sect in his own name. And because he could find out nothing new, that he might still appear to disagree with the others, he wished to overthrow old opinions. But in this all the philosophers who snarled215    There is probably an allusion to the Cynics.   around him, refuted him. It is more certain, therefore, that the world was arranged by providence, than that matter was collected216    Conglobatam. Another reading is, quàm materiâ providentiam conglobatam.   by providence. Wherefore he ought not to have supposed that the world was not made by divine providence, because its matter was not made by divine providence; but because the world was made by divine providence, he ought to have concluded that matter also was made by the Deity. For it is more credible that matter was made by God, because He is all-powerful, than that the world was not made by God, because nothing can be made without mind, intelligence, and design. But this is not the fault of Cicero, but of the sect. For when he had undertaken a disputation, by which he might take away the nature of the gods, respecting which philosophers prated, in his ignorance of the truth he imagined that the Deity must altogether be taken away. He was able therefore to take away the gods, for they had no existence. But when he attempted to overthrow the divine providence, which is in the one God, because he had begun to strive against the truth, his arguments failed, and he necessarily fell into this pitfall, from which he was unable to withdraw himself. Here, then, I hold him firmly fixed; I hold him fastened to the spot, since Lucilius, who disputed on the other side, was silent. Here, then, is the turning-point;217    Hinge.   on this everything depends. Let Cotta disentangle himself, if he can, from this difficulty;218    Abyss.   let him bring forward arguments by which he may prove that matter has always existed, which no providence made. Let him show how anything ponderous and heavy either could exist without an author or could be changed, and how that which always was ceased to be, so that that which never was might begin to be. And if he shall prove these things, then, and not till then, will I admit that the world itself was not established by divine providence, and yet in making this admission I shall hold him fast by another snare. For he will turn round again to the same point, to which he will be unwilling to return, so as to say that both the matter of which the world consists, and the world which consists of matter, existed by nature; though I contend that nature itself is God. For no one can make wonderful things, that is, things existing with the greatest order, except one who has intelligence, foresight, and power. And thus it will come to be seen that God made all things, and that nothing at all can exist which did not derive its origin from God.  

But the same, as often as he follows the Epicureans,219    As often as he is an Epicurean.   and does not admit that the world was made by God, is wont to inquire by what hands, by what machines, by what levers, by what contrivance, He made this work of such magnitude. He might see, if he could have lived at that time in which God made it. But, that man might not look into the works of God, He was unwilling to bring him into this world until all things were completed. But he could not be brought in: for how could he exist while the heaven above was being built, and the foundations of the earth beneath were being laid; when humid things, perchance, either benumbed with excessive stiffness were becoming congealed, or seethed with fiery heat and rendered solid were growing hard? Or how could he live when the sun was not yet established, and neither corn nor animals were produced? Therefore it was necessary that man should be last made, when the finishing220    The last hand.   hand had now been applied to the world and to all other things. Finally, the sacred writings teach that man was the last work of God, and that he was brought into this world as into a house prepared and made ready; for all things were made on his account. The poets also acknowledge the same. Ovid, having described the completion of the world, and the formation of the other animals, added:221    Metamorph , book i.  —  

So impious must we think it to search into those things which God wished to be kept secret! But his inquiries were not made through a desire of hearing or learning, but of refuting; for he was confident that no one could assert that. As though, in truth, it were to be supposed that these things were not made by God, because it cannot be plainly seen in what manner they were created! If you had been brought up in a well-built and ornamented house, and had never seen a workshop,222    Fabrica. The word is also used to denote the exercise of skill in workmanship.   would you have supposed that that house was not built by man, because you did not know how it was built? You would assuredly ask the same question about the house which you now ask about the world—by what hands, with what implements, man had contrived such great works; and especially if you should see large stones, immense blocks,223    Cæmenta, rough stones from the quarry.   vast columns, the whole work lofty and elevated, would not these things appear to you to exceed the measure of human strength, because you would not know that these things were made not so much by strength as by skill and ingenuity?  

But if man, in whom nothing is perfect, nevertheless effects more by skill than his feeble strength would permit, what reason is there why it should appear to you incredible, when it is alleged that the world was made by God, in whom, since He is perfect, wisdom can have no limit, and strength no measure? His works are seen by the eyes; but how He made them is not seen even by the mind, because, as Hermes says, the mortal cannot draw nigh to (that is, approach nearer, and follow up with the understanding) the immortal, the temporal224    Pertaining to time, as opposed to eternal.   to the eternal, the corruptible to the incorruptible. And on this account the earthly animal is as yet incapable of perceiving225    Looking into.   heavenly things, because it is shut in and held as it were in custody by the body, so that it cannot discern all things with free and unrestrained perception. Let him know, therefore, how foolishly he acts, who inquires into things which are indescribable. For this is to pass the limits of one’s own condition, and not to understand how far it is permitted man to approach. In short, when God revealed the truth to man, He wished us only to know those things which it concerned man to know for the attainment of life; but as to the things which related to a profane and eager curiosity226    A curious and profane eagerness.   He was silent, that they might be secret. Why, then, do you inquire into things which you cannot know, and if you knew them you would not be happier. It is perfect wisdom in man, if he knows that there is but one God, and that all things were made by Him.  

0293A CAPUT IX. De Diabolo, Mundo, Deo, Providentia, Homine et ejus sapientia.

Exponam igitur omnium istorum rationem, quo facilius res difficiles et obscurae intelligantur, et has omnes simulati numinis praestigias revelabo, 0293A quibus inducti homines, a veritatis via longius recesserunt. Sed repetam longe altius; ut si quis ad legendum veri expers et ignarus accesserit, instruatur, atque intelligat, quod tandem sit Caput horum et causa malorum;0294A et, lumine accepto, suos ac totius generis humani perspiciat errores.

Cum esset Deus ad excogitandum providentis simus, ad faciendum solertissimus, antequam ordiretur hoc opus mundi (quoniam pleni et consummati boni fons in ipso erat, sicut est semper), ut ab eo bonum tamquam rivus oriretur, longeque proflueret, produxit similem sui spiritum, qui esset virtutibus Dei Patris praeditus. Quomodo autem id voluerit, in quarto libro docere conabimur (scilicet cap. 6). Deinde fecit alterum, in quo indoles divinae stirpis non permansit. Itaque suapte invidia tamquam veneno infectus est, et 0295A ex bono ad malum transcendit; suoque arbitrio, quod a Deo illi liberum datum fuerat, 0295A contrarium sibi nomen adscivit. Unde apparet cunctorum malorum fontem esse livorem. Invidit enim illi antecessori suo, qui Deo Patri perseverando, cum probatus, tum etiam charus est. Hunc ergo ex bono per se malum effectum 0296A Graeci διάβολον appelant; nos criminatorem vocamus, quod crimina, in quae ipse illicit, ad Deum deferat. Exorsus igitur Deus fabricam mundi, illum primum et maximum Filium praefecit operi universo, eoque simul et consiliatore usus est, et artifice in excogitandis, ornandis, perficiendisque rebus, quoniam 0297A is et providentia, 0297A et ratione, et potestate perfectus est: de quo nunc parcius, quod alio loco (scilicet lib. IV, cap. 6 et seqq.) et virtus, et nomen ejus, et ratio enarranda nobis erit. Nemo quaerat, ex quibus ista materiis tam magna, tam mirifica opera Deus fecerit; omnia enim fecit ex nihilo.

Nec audiendi sunt poetae, qui aiunt chaos in principio fuisse, id est, confusionem rerum, atque elementorum; postea vero Deum diremisse omnem illam congeriem, singulisque rebus ex confuso acervo separatis, in ordinemque descriptis, instruxisse mundum pariter et ornasse. Quibus facile est respondere potestatem Dei non intelligentibus, quem credant nihil efficere posse, nisi ex materia subjacente ac parata; in quo errore etiam philosophi fuerunt. Nam 0297B Cicero de Natura deorum disputans, sic ait: «Primum igitur non est probabile, eam materiam rerum, unde orta sunt omnia, esse divina providentia effectam; sed habere, et habuisse vim et naturam suam. Ut igitur faber, cum quid aedificaturus est, non ipse facit materiam, sed ea utitur quae sit parata, fictorque item cera: sic isti providentiae divinae materiam praesto esse oportuit, non quam ipse faceret, sed quam haberet paratam. Quod si non est a Deo materia facta, ne terra quidem, et aqua, et aer, et ignis a Deo factus est.» O quam multa sunt vitia in his decem versibus! Primum, quod is, qui in aliis disputationibus, et libris fere omnibus providentiae fuerit assertor, et qui acerrimis argumentis impugnaverit eos, qui providentiam non esse dixerunt, idem 0297C nunc quasi proditor aliquis, aut transfuga, providentiam 0298A conatus est tollere: in quo si contradicere velis, nec cogitatione opus est, nec labore; sua illi dicta recitanda sunt. Nec enim ab ullo poterit Cicero, quam a Cicerone vehementius refutari. Sed concedamus hoc mori et instituto Academicorum; ut liceat hominibus valde liberis dicere, ac sentire quae velint. Sententias ipsas consideremus. Non est, inquit, probabile, materiam rerum a Deo factam. Quibus hoc argumentis doces? Nihil enim dixisti, quare hoc non sit probabile. Itaque mihi e contrario vel maxime probabile videtur: nec tamen temere videtur, cogitanti plus esse aliquid in Deo, quem profecto ad imbecillitatem hominis redigis; cui nihil aliud, quam opificium concedis. Quo igitur ab homine divina illa vis differet, si ut homo, sic etiam Deus ope indiget 0298B aliena? Indiget autem, si nihil moliri potest, nisi ab altero illi materia ministretur. Quod si fit, imperfectae utique virtutis est, et erit jam potentior judicandus materiae institutor. Quo igitur nomine appellabitur, qui potentia Deum vincit? Siquidem majus est, propria facere, quam aliena disponere. Si autem fieri non potest, ut sit potentius Deo quidquam, quem necesse est perfectae esse virtutis, potestatis, rationis: idem igitur materiae fictor est, qui et rerum ex materia constantium. Neque enim Deo non faciente, et invito, esse aliquid aut potuit, aut debuit. Sed probabile est, inquit, materiam rerum habere, et habuisse semper vim et naturam suam. Quam vim potuit habere, nullo dante? quam naturam, nullo generante? Si habuit vim, ab aliquo eam sumpsit. A 0298C quo autem sumere, nisi a Deo potuit? Porro si habuit 0299A naturam, quae utique a nascendo dicitur, nata est. A quo autem, nisi a Deo potuit procreari? Natura enim, qua dicitis 0299A orta esse omnia, si consilium non habet, efficere nihil potest. Si autem generandi et faciendi potens est, habet ergo consilium et propterea Deus sit necesse est. Nec alio nomine appellari potest ea vis, in qua inest, et providentia excogitandi, et solertia potestasque faciendi. Melius igitur Seneca omnium stoicorum acutissimus, qui vidit «nil aliud esse naturam, quam Deum. Ergo, inquit, Deum non laudabimus, cui naturalis est virtus?» nec enim illam didicit ex ullo. Immo laudabimus: quamvis enim naturalis illi sit, illa sibi illam dedit; quoniam Deus ipse natura est. Cum igitur ortum rerum tribuis naturae, ac detrahis Deo, in eodem luto haesitas; 0299B versuram solvis, Geta. A quo enim fieri negas, ab eodem plane fieri mutato nomine confiteris.

Sequitur ineptissima comparatio. «Ut faber, inquit, cum quid aedificaturus est, non ipse facit materiam, sed utitur ea quae sit parata, fictorque item cera: sic isti providentiae divinae materiam esse praesto oportuit, non quam ipse faceret, sed quam haberet paratam.» Immo vero non oportuit; erit enim Deus minoris potestatis, si ex parato facit, quod est hominis. Faber sine ligno nihil aedificabit, quia lignum ipsum facere non potest; non posse autem, imbecillitatis est humanae: Deus vero facit sibi ipse 0300A materiam, quia potest. Posse enim, Dei est: nam si non potest, Deus non est. Homo facit ex eo, quod est; quia per mortalitatem imbecillis est, per imbecillitatem, definitae ac modicae potestatis: Deus autem facit ex eo, quod non est; quia per aeternitatem fortis est, per fortitudinem, potestatis immensae, quae fine ac modo caret, sicut vita factoris. Quid ergo mirum, si facturus mundum Deus, prius materiam de qua faceret praeparavit, et praeparavit ex eo quod non erat? quia nefas est Deum aliunde aliquid mutuari, cum in ipso vel ex ipso sint omnia. Nam si est aliquid ante illum, et si factum est quidquam non ab ipso, jam et potestatem Dei, et nomen amittet. At enim materia nunquam facta est, sicut Deus, qui ex materia fecit hunc mundum. Duo igitur constituuntur aeterna, et quidem 0300B inter se contraria; quod fieri sine discordia et pernicie non potest. Collidant enim necesse est ea quorum vis et ratio diversa est: sic utraque aeterna esse non poterunt, si repugnant, quia superare alterum necesse est. Ergo fieri non potest, quin aeterni natura sit simplex, ut inde omnia, velut ex fonte, descenderint. Itaque aut Deus ex materia ortus est, aut materia ex Deo. Quid horum sit verius, facile est intelligi. Ex his enim duobus alterum sensibile est, alterum caret sensu. Potestas faciendi aliquid non potest esse, nisi in eo quod sentit, quod sapit, quod cogitat, quod movetur. Nec incipi, aut fieri, aut consummari quidquam 0301A potest, nisi fuerit ratione provisum; 0301A et quemadmodum fiat, antequam est, et quemadmodum constet, postquam fuerit effectum. Denique is facit aliquid, qui habet voluntatem ad faciendum et manus ad id quod voluit implendum. Quod autem insensibile est, iners et torpidum semper jacet, et nihil inde oriri potest, ubi nullus est motus voluntarius. Nam si omne animal ratione constat, certe nasci ex eo non potest, quod ratione praeditum non est; nec aliunde accipi potest id, quod ibi, unde petitur, non est. Nec tamen commoveat aliquem, quod animalia quaedam de terra nasci videntur. Haec enim non terra per se gignit, sed spiritus Dei, sine quo nihil gignitur. Non ergo Deus ex materia, quia sensu praeditum ex insensibili, sapiens ex bruto, impatibile de patibili, 0301B expers corporis de corporali numquam potest oriri: sed materia potius ex Deo est. Quidquid enim est solido et contrectabili corpore, accipit externam vim. Quod accipit vim, dissolubile est. Quod dissolvitur, interit. Quod interit, ortum sit necesse est. Quod ortum est, habuit fontem unde oriretur, id est factorem aliquem sentientem, providum, peritumque faciendi. Is est profecto, nec ullus alius quam Deus. Qui quoniam sensu, ratione, providentia, potestate, virtute praeditus est, et animantia, et inanima creare et efficere potest, quia tenet quomodo quidque sit faciendum. Materia vero semper fuisse non potest, quia mutationem non caperet, si fuisset. Quod enim semper fuit, semper esse non desinit; et unde abfuit principium, abesse hinc etiam finem necesse est. Quin etiam facilius est, ut id quod habuit initium, 0301C fine careat, quam ut habeat finem, quod initio caruit. Materia ergo si facta non est, ne fieri ex ea quidquam potest. Si fieri ex ea non potest, nec materia quidem 0302A erit. Materia enim est, ex qua fit aliquid. Omne autem ex quo fit, quia recepit opificis manum, destruitur, et aliud esse incipit. Ergo quoniam finem habuit materia, tum cum factus est ex ea mundus, et initium quoque habuit. Nam quod destruitur, aedificatum est; quod solvitur, alligatum; quod finitur, incoeptum est. Si ergo ex commutatione ac fine materia colligitur habuisse principium, a quo alio fieri nisi a Deo potuit? Solus igitur Deus, qui factus non est, et idcirco destruere alia potest, ipse destrui non potest. Permanebit semper in eo quod fuit, quia non est aliunde generatus, nec ortus, nec nativitas ejus ex aliqua alia re pendet, quae illum mutata dissolvat. Ex seipso est, ut in primo diximus libro (scilicet, c. 3 et 7); et ideo talis est, qualem se esse voluit, impassibilis, 0302B immutabilis, incorruptus, beatus, aeternus.

Jam vero illa conclusio, qua sententiam terminavit Tullius, multo absurdior. «Quod si materia, inquit, a Deo non est facta, nec terra quidem, et aqua, et aer, et ignis a Deo factus est.» Quam callide periculum praetervolavit. Sic enim superius illud assumpsit, tanquam probatione non indigeret; cum id multo esset incertius quam illud propter quod assumptum est. Si non est, inquit, a Deo facta materia, nec mundus a Deo factus est. Ex falso maluit colligere, quod falsum est, quam ex vero, quod verum. Et cum debeant incerta de certis probari, hic probationem sumpsit ex incerto, ad evertendum quod erat certum. Nam divina Providentia effectum esse mundum (ut taceam de Trismegisto, qui hoc praedicat, taceam de carminibus Sibyllarum, quae idem nuntiant; taceam de prophetis, 0302C qui opus mundi, ac opificium Dei uno spiritu ac pari voce testantur) etiam inter philosophos pene universos convenit; id enim Pythagoraei, Stoici, Peripatetici, 0303A qui sunt principes omnis disciplinae. 0301A Denique a primis illis septem sapientibus ad Socratem usque ac Platonem pro confesso et indubitato habitum est, donec unus multis post saeculis extitit delirus Epicurus, qui auderet negare id quod est evidentissimum, studio scilicet inveniendi nova, ut nomine suo constitueret disciplinam. Et quia nihil novi potuit reperire: ut tamen dissentire a caeteris videretur, vetera voluit evertere. In quo illum circumlatrantes philosophi omnes coarguerunt. Certius est igitur mundum providentia instructum, quam materia providentiam conglobatam. Quare non oportuit putare, idcirco mundum non esse divina providentia factum, quia materia ejus divina providentia facta non sit: sed quia mundus divina providentia sit effectus, et 0303B materiam esse factam divinitus. Credibilius est enim materiam potius a Deo factam, quia Deus omnia potest, quam mundum a Deo non esse factum, quia sine mente, ratione, consilio nihil fieri potest. Verum haec non Ciceronis est culpa, sed sectae. Cum enim suscepisset disputationem, qua deorum naturam tolleret, de qua philosophi garriebant, omnem divinitatem ignorantia veri putavit esse tollendam. Itaque deos potuit tollere, quia non erant. Cum autem providentiam divinam, quae est in uno Deo, conaretur evertere, quia contra veritatem niti coeperat, deficientibus 0304A argumentis, in hanc foveam necessario decidit, unde se extricare non posset. Hic ergo illum teneo haerentem, teneo defixum, quo Lucilius, qui contra disserebat, obmutuit. Hic est ergo cardo rerum; hic vertuntur omnia. Explicet se Cotta, si potest, ex hac voragine; proferat argumenta, quibus doceat semper fuisse materiam, quam nulla providentia effecerit. Ostendat, quomodo quidquam ponderosum et grave, aut esse potuerit sine auctore, aut immutari valuerit, ac desierit esse, quod semper fuit, ut inciperet esse, quod numquam fuit. Quae si docuerit, tum demum assentiar, ne mundum quidem divina providentia constitutum; et tamen sic assentiar, ut aliis illum laqueis teneam. Eodem enim, quo nolet revolvetur, ut dicat, et materiam de qua mundus est, et mundum 0304B qui de materia est, natura extitisse: cum ego ipsam naturam Deum esse contendam. Nec enim potest facere mirabilia, id est maxima ratione constantia, nisi qui habet mentem, providentiam, potestatem. Ita fiet, ut Deus fecerit omnia, nec quidquam esse possit omnino, quod non originem a Deo traxerit.

At idem quoties Epicureus est, et non vult a Deo factum esse mundum, quaerere solet quibus manibus, quibus machinis, quibus vectibus, qua molitione hoc tantum opus fecerit. Videret fortasse, si eo tempore potuisset esse, quo fecit. Sed ne perspiceret 0305A homo Dei opera, 0305A noluit eum inducere in hunc mundum, nisi perfectis omnibus. Sed ne induci quidem poterat: quomodo enim subsisteret, cum fabricaretur desuper coelum, terraque subter fundaretur; cum fortasse humida, vel nimiis rigoribus torporata concrescerent, vel igneis caloribus incocta et solidata durescerent? Aut quomodo viveret, sole nondum instituto, nec frugibus, nec animalibus natis? Itaque necesse fuit hominem postremo fieri, cum jam mundo caeterisque rebus manus summa esset imposita. Denique sanctae litterae docent hominem fuisse ultimum Dei opus, et sic inductum fuisse in hunc mundum, quasi in domum jam paratam et instructam: illius enim causa facta sunt omnia. Idem etiam poetae fatentur. Ovidius (principio Metam.) perfecto 0305B jam mundo, et universis animalibus figuratis, hoc addidit: Sanctius his animal, mentisque capacius altae Deerat adhuc, et quod dominari in caetera posset; Natus homo est.Adeo nefas existimandum est ea scrutari, quae Deus voluit esse celata! Verum ille non audiendi aut discendi studio requirebat, sed refellendi; quia confidebat neminem id posse dicere. Quasi vero ex hoc putandum sit, non esse haec divinitus facta, quia quomodo facta sint, non potest pervideri. An tu, si educatus in domo fabrefacta et ornata, nullam umquam fabricam vidisses, domum illam putasses non ab homine esse aedificatam; quia, quomodo aedificetur, ignorares? Idem profecto de domo quaereres, quod nunc de mundo requiris; quibus manibus, quibus 0305C ferramentis homo tanta esset opera molitus; maxime si saxa ingentia, immensa caementa, vastas columnas, 0306A opus totum sublime et excelsum videres, nonne haec tibi humanarum virium modum viderentur excedere, quia illa non tam viribus quam ratione atque artificio facta esse nescires?

Quod si homo, in quo nihil perfectum est, tamen plus efficit ratione, quam vires ejus exiguae patiantur, quid est cur incredibile tibi esse videatur, cum mundus dicitur factus a Deo, in quo, quia perfectus est, nec sapientia potest habere terminum, nec fortitudo mensuram? Opera ipsius videntur oculis. Quomodo autem illa fecerit, ne mente quidem videtur: quia, ut Hermes ait, mortale immortali, temporale perpetuo, corruptibile incorrupto propinquare non potest, id est propius accedere et intelligentia subsequi. Et ideo terrenum adhuc animal rerum coelestium 0306B perspectionem non capit, quia corpore quasi custodia septum tenetur, quominus soluto ac libero sensu cernat omnia. Sciat igitur quam inepte faciat, qui res inenarrabiles quaerit. Hoc est enim modum conditionis suae transgredi, nec intelligere, quousque homini liceat accedere. Denique cum aperiret homini veritatem Deus, ea sola scire nos voluit, quae interfuit hominem scire ad vitam consequendam: quae vero ad curiosam et profanam cupiditatem pertinebant, reticuit, ut arcana essent. Quid ergo quaeris, quae nec potes scire, nec si scias, beatior fias? Perfecta est in homine sapientia, si et Deum esse unum, et ab ipso esse facta universa cognoscat.