Chap. XVIII.—Of Some Commands of God, and of Patience.

But let us leave the philosophers, who either know nothing at all, and hold forth this very ignorance as the greatest knowledge; or who, inasmuch as they think they know that of which they are ignorant, are absurdly and arrogantly foolish. Let us therefore (that we may return to our purpose), to whom alone the truth has been revealed by God, and wisdom has been sent from heaven, practice those things which God who enlightens us commands: let us sustain and endure the labours of life, by mutual assistance towards each other; nor, however, if we shall have done any good work, let us aim at glory from it. For God admonishes us that the doer of justice ought not to be boastful, lest he should appear to have discharged the duties of benevolence, not so much from a desire of obeying the divine commands, as of pleasing men, and should already have the reward of glory which he has aimed at, and should not receive the recompense of that heavenly and divine reward. The other things which the worshipper of God ought to observe are easy, when these virtues are comprehended, that no one should ever speak falsely for the sake of deceiving or injuring. For it is unlawful for him who cultivates truth to be deceitful in anything, and to depart from the truth itself which he follows. In this path of justice and all the virtues there is no place for falsehood. Therefore the true and just traveller will not use the saying of Lucilius:1187    [Homini amico ac familiari non est mentiri meum.]  —  

but he will think that it is not his part to speak falsely even to an enemy and a stranger; nor will he at any time so act, that his tongue, which is the interpreter of his mind, should be at variance with his feeling and thought. If he shall have lent any money, he will not receive interest, that the benefit may be unimpaired which succours necessity, and that he may entirely abstain from the property of another. For in this kind of duty he ought to be content with that which is his own; since it is his duty in other respects not to be sparing of his property, in order that he may do good; but to receive more than he has given is unjust. And he who does this lies in wait in some manner, that he may gain booty from the necessity of another.  

But the just man will omit no opportunity of doing anything mercifully: nor will he pollute himself with gain of this kind; but he will so act that without any loss to himself, that which he lends may be reckoned among his good works. He must not receive a gift from a poor man; so that if he himself has afforded anything, it may be good, inasmuch as it is gratuitous. If any one reviles, he must answer him with a blessing;1188    Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 28; Rom. xii. 14.   he himself must never revile, that no evil word may proceed out of the mouth of a man who reverences the good Word.1189    i.e., Jesus Christ the Son of God = the Word of God.   Moreover, he must also diligently take care, lest by any fault of his he should at any time make an enemy; and if any one should be so shameless as to inflict injury on a good and just man, he must bear it with calmness and moderation, and not take upon himself his revenge, but reserve it for the judgment of God.1190    Rom. xii. 19; Heb. x. 30.   He must at all times and in all places guard innocence. And this precept is not limited to this, that he should not himself inflict injury, but that he should not avenge it when inflicted on himself. For there sits on the judgment-seat a very great and impartial Judge, the observer and witness of all. Let him prefer Him to man; let him rather choose that He should pronounce judgment respecting his cause, whose sentence no one can escape, either by the advocacy of any one or by favour. Thus it comes to pass, that a just man is an object of contempt to all; and because it will be thought that he is unable to defend himself, he will be regarded as slothful and inactive; but if any one shall have avenged himself upon his enemy, he is judged a man of spirit and activity—all honour and reverence him. And although the good man has it in his power to profit many, yet they look up to him who is able to injure, rather than to him who is able to profit. But the depravity of men will not be able to corrupt the just man, so that he will not endeavour to obey God; and he would prefer to be despised, provided that he may always discharge the duty of a good man, and never of a bad man. Cicero says in those same books respecting Offices: “But if any one should wish to unravel this indistinct conception of his soul,1191    Animi sui complicitam notionem evolvere.   let him at once teach himself that he is a good man who profits those whom he can, and injures no one1192    [Nisi lacessitus injuria.]   unless provoked by injury.”  

Oh how he marred a simple and true sentiment by the addition of two words! For what need was there of adding these words, “unless provoked by injury?” that he might append vice as a most disgraceful tail to a good man and might represent him as without patience, which is the greatest of all the virtues. He said that a good man would inflict injuries if he were provoked: now he must necessarily lose the name of a good man from this very circumstance, if he shall inflict injury. For it is not less the part of a bad man to return an injury than to inflict it. For from what source do contests, from what source do fightings and contentions, arise among men, except that impatience opposed to injustice often excites great tempests? But if you meet injustice with patience, than which virtue nothing can be found more true, nothing more worthy of a man, it will immediately be extinguished, as though you should pour water upon a fire. But if that injustice which provokes opposition has met with impatience equal1193    Comparem. Injustice and impatience are here represented as a pair of gladiators well matched against each other.   to itself, as though overspread with oil, it will excite so great a conflagration, that no stream can extinguish it, but only the shedding of blood. Great, therefore, is the advantage of patience, of which the wise man has deprived the good man. For this alone causes that no evil happens; and if it should be given to all, there will be no wickedness and no fraud in the affairs of men. What, therefore, can be so calamitous to a good man, so opposed to his character, as to let loose the reins to anger, which deprives him not only of the title of a good man, but even of a man; since to injure another, as he himself most truly says, is not in accordance with the nature of man? For if you provoke cattle or horses,1194    Pecudes, including horses and cattle.   they turn against you either with their hoof or their horn; and serpents and wild beasts, unless you pursue them that you may kill them, give no trouble. And to return to examples of men, even the inexperienced and the foolish, if at any time they receive an injury, are led by a blind and irrational fury, and endeavour to retaliate upon those who injure them. In what respect, then, does the wise and good man differ from the evil and foolish, except that he has invincible patience, of which the foolish are destitute; except that he knows how to govern himself, and to mitigate his anger, which those, because they are without virtue, are unable to curb? But this circumstance manifestly deceived him, because, when inquiry is made respecting virtue, he thought that it is the part of virtue to conquer in every kind of contention. Nor was he able in any way to see, that a man who gives way to grief and anger, and who indulges these affections, against which he ought rather to struggle, and who rushes wherever injustice shall have called him, does not fulfil the duty of virtue. For he who endeavours to return an injury, desires to imitate that very person by whom he has been injured. Thus he who imitates a bad man can by no means be good.  

Therefore by two words he has taken away from the good and wise man two of the greatest virtues, innocence and patience. But, as Sallustius relates was said by Appius, because he himself practised that canine1195    Caninam, i.e., resembling a dog, cutting.   eloquence, be wished man also to live after the manner of a dog, so as, when attacked, to bite in return. And to show how pernicious this repayment of insult is, and what carnage it is accustomed to produce, from what can a more befitting example be sought, than from the most melancholy disaster of the teacher himself, who, while he desired to obey these precepts of the philosophers, destroyed himself? For if, when attacked with injury, he had preserved patience—if he had learned that it is the part of a good man to dissemble and to endure insult, and his impatience, vanity, and madness had not poured forth those noble orations, inscribed with a name derived from another source,1196    The allusion is to the Philippics of Cicero, a title borrowed from Demosthenes.   he would never, by his head affixed to them, have polluted the rostra on which he had formerly distinguished himself, nor would that proscription have utterly destroyed the state. Therefore it is not the part of a wise and good man to wish to contend, and to commit himself to danger, since to conquer is not in our power, and every contest is doubtful; but it is the part of a wise and excellent man not to wish to remove his adversary, which cannot be done without guilt and danger, but to put an end to the contest itself, which may be done with advantage and with justice. Therefore patience is to be regarded as a very great virtue; and that the just man might obtain this, God willed, as has been before said, that he should be despised as sluggish. For unless he shall have been insulted, it will not be known what fortitude he has in restraining himself. Now if, when provoked by injury, he has begun to follow up his assailant with violence, he is overcome. But if he shall have repressed that emotion by reasoning, he altogether has command over himself: he is able to rule himself. And this restraining1197    Sustentatio sui.   of oneself is rightly named patience, which single virtue is opposed to all vices and affections. This recalls the disturbed and wavering mind to its tranquillity; this mitigates, this restores a man to himself. Therefore, since it is impossible and useless to resist nature, so that we are not excited at all; before, however, the emotion bursts forth to the infliction of injury, as far1198    Quoad fieri potest. Others read, “quod fieri potest.”   as is possible let it be calmed1199    Maturius sopiatur.   in time. God has enjoined us not to let the sun go down upon our wrath,1200    Eph. iv. 26.   lest he should depart as a witness of our madness. Finally, Marcus Tullius, in opposition to his own precept, concerning which I have lately spoken, gave the greatest praises to the forgetting of injuries. “I entertain hopes,” he says, “O Cæsar, who art accustomed to forget nothing except injuries.”1201    Cicero, Pro Ligar., 12.   But if he thus acted—a man most widely removed not only from heavenly, but also from public and civil justice—how much more ought we to do this, who are, as it were, candidates for immortality?  

CAPUT XVIII. De quibusdam Dei mandatis et patientia.

Sed omittamus philosophos, qui aut omnino nihil sciunt, idque ipsum pro summa scientia praeferunt; aut qui non perspiciunt etiam quae sciunt; aut qui, quoniam se putant scire quae nesciunt, inepte arroganterque desipiunt. Nos ergo (ut ad propositum revertamur) quibus solis a Deo veritas revelata, et coelitus missa sapientia est, faciamus quae jubet illuminator noster Deus: sustineamus invicem, et labores hujus vitae mutuis adjumentis perferamus: nec tamen, 0698B si quid boni operis fecerimus, gloriam captemus ex eo. Monet enim Deus, operatorem justitiae non oportere esse jactantem; ne non tam mandatis coelestibus obsequendi, quam studio placendi, humanitatis officio functus esse videatur; habeatque jam pretium gloriae, quod captavit; nec praemium coelestis illius ac divinae mercedis accipiat. Caetera, quae observare cultor Dei debet, facilia sunt, illis virtutibus comprehensis; ut non mentiatur unquam decipiendi aut nocendi causa. Est enim nefas, eum, qui veritati studeat, in aliqua re esse fallacem; atque ab ipsa, quam sequitur, veritate discedere. In hâc justitiae virtutumque omnium via, nullus mendacio locus est. Itaque viator ille verus ac justus non dicet illus Lucilianum: Homini amico ac familiari non est mentiri meum,0698C sed etiam inimico atque ignoto existimabit non esse mentiri suum; nec aliquando committet, ut lingua, interpres animi, a sensu et cogitatione discordet. Pecuniam si quam crediderit, non accipiet usuram, 0699A ut et beneficium sit incolume, quod succurrit 0699A necessitati, et abstineat se prorsus alieno. In hoc enim genere officii debet suo esse contentus, quem oporteat alias ne proprio quidem parcere, ut bonum faciat; plus autem accipere, quam dederit, injustum est. Quod qui facit, insidiatur quodammodo, ut ex alterius necessitate praedetur.

At justus nunquam praetermittet quominus aliquid misericorditer faciat; nec inquinabit se hujusmodi quaestu: sed efficiet, ut sine ullo suo damno, id ipsum, quod commodat, inter bona opera numeretur. Munus non accipiat a paupere; ut si quid ipse praestiterit, eo bonum sit, quo fuerit gratuitum. Maledicenti benedicto respondeat: numquam ipse maledicat; ne verbum malum procedat ex ore hominis, 0699B qui colit Verbum bonum. Quin etiam caveat diligenter, ne quando inimicum sua culpa faciat; et si quis extiterit tam protervus, qui bono et justo faciat injuriam, clementer ac moderate ferat, et ultionem suam sibi non assumat, sed judici Deo reservet. Innocentiam semper et ubique custodiat. Quod praeceptum non ad hoc tantum valet, ut ipse injuriam non inferat: sed ut illatam sibi non vindicet. Sedet enim maximus et aequissimus judex, speculator ac testis omnium. Hunc homini praeferat; hunc malit de causa sua pronuntiare, cujus sententiam nemo effugere potest, nec defensione cujusquam, nec gratia. Ita fit, ut homo justus contemptui sit omnibus; et 0700A quia putabitur semetipsum defendere non posse, habebitur pro segni et inerte. Qui autem fuerit ultus inimicum, hic fortis, hic strenuus judicatur: hunc colunt, hunc omnes verentur. Bonus vero ille tametsi prodesse pluribus possit, illum tamen suspiciunt, qui nocere, quam qui prodesse possit. Sed justum pravitas hominum depravare non poterit, quominus Deo studeat obtemperare; malitque contemni, dummodo semper boni fungatur officio, mali nunquam. Cicero in iisdem illis Officialibus: «At vero si quis voluerit, inquit, animi sui complicitam notionem evolvere, jam se ipse doceat, eum virum bonum esse, qui prosit quibus possit, noceat nemini, nisi lacessitus injuria.»

O quam simplicem veramque sententiam duorum verborum adjectione corrupit! Quid enim opus fuerat 0700B adjungere, nisi lacessitus injuria? ut vitium bono viro quasi caudam turpissimam apponeret; patientiaeque, quae omnium virtutum maxima est, faceret expertem. Nociturum esse dixit bonum virum, si fuerit lacessitus: jam ex hoc ipso boni viri nomen amittat necesse est, si nocebit. Non minus enim mali est, referre injuriam, quam inferre. Nam unde certamina inter homines, unde pugnae contentionesque nascuntur, nisi quod improbitati opposita impatientia magnas saepe concitat tempestates? Quod si patientiam, qua virtute nihil verius, nihil homine dignius inveniri potest, improbitati opposueris, extinguetur protinus, tanquam igni aquam superfuderis. 0701A Sin autem provocatrix illa improbitas impatientiam sibi comparem 0701A nacta est, tanquam perfusa oleo, tantum excitabit incendium, ut id non flumen aliquod, sed effusio cruoris extinguat. Magna itaque patientiae ratio est, quam sapiens homo ademit bono viro. Ut enim nihil malorum fiat, haec sola efficit: quae si detur omnibus, nullum scelus, nulla fraus in rebus humanis erit. Quid igitur bono viro potest esse tam calamitosum, tamque contrarium, quam irae fraena permittere; quae illum non modo boni, sed etiam hominis appellatione dispoliet? Siquidem nocere alteri, ut ipse verissime ait, non est secundum hominis naturam. Nam et pecudes si lacessas, aut calce aut cornu repugnant; et serpentes ac ferae, nisi persequaris ut occidas, negotium non exhibent; et (ut ad hominum 0701B exempla redeamus) imperiti quoque et insipientes, si quando accipiunt injuriam, caeco et irrationabili furore ducuntur, et iis, qui sibi nocent, vicem retribuere conantur. In quo igitur sapiens ac bonus vir a malis et insipientibus differt; nisi quod habet invictam patientiam, qua stulti carent; nisi quod regere se ac mitigare iram suam novit, quam illi, quia virtute indigent, refraenare non possunt? Sed videlicet haec illum res fefellit, quod cum de virtute loqueretur, in quacumque contentione vinceret, putavit esse virtutis; nec videre ullo modo potuit hominem dolori et irae succumbentem, et iis affectibus indulgentem, quibus debet potius reluctari, et ruentem quacumque improbitas provocarit, virtutis officium non tenere. Qui enim referre injuriam nititur, eum ipsum, 0701C a quo laesus est, gestit imitari. Ita qui malum imitatur, bonus esse nullo pacto potest.

Duobus igitur verbis duas virtutes maximas bono et sapienti viro, innocentiam patientiamque detraxit. Sed quia ipse caninam illam facundiam (sicut Sallustius 0702A ab Appio dictum refert) exercuit, voluit quoque hominem canino modo vivere, ut remordeat lacessitus. Quae retributio contumeliae quam perniciosa sit et quas edere soleat strages, unde opportunius petetur exemplum, quam ex ipsius praeceptoris tristissimo casu; qui dum his philosophorum praeceptis obtemperare gestit, ipse se perdidit? Quod si lacessitus injuria patientiam tenuisset; si dissimulare, si ferre contumeliam boni viri esse didicisset; nec illas nobiles orationes alieno titulo inscriptas, impatientia, et levitas, et insania profudisset: nunquam capite suo rostra, in quibus ante floruerat, cruentasset; nec rempublicam funditus proscriptio illa delesset. Sapientis ergo ac boni viri non est velle certare, ac se periculo committere: quoniam et vincere non est in 0702B nostra potestate, et est anceps omne certamen: sed est sapientis atque optimi viri, non adversarium velle tollere; quod fieri sine scelere ac periculo non potest: sed certamen ipsum, quod fieri et utiliter, et juste potest. Summa igitur virtus habenda patientia est: quam ut caperet homo justus, voluit illum Deus (ut supra dictum est) pro inerte contemni. Nisi enim contumeliis fuerit affectus, quantum habeat fortitudinis in seipso cohibendo, ignorabitur. Si autem lacessitus injuria laedentem persequi coeperit, victus est. Si vero motum illum ratione compresserit, hic plane imperat sibi; hic regere se potest. Quae sustentatio sui, recte patientia nominatur: quae una virtus omnibus est opposita vitiis et affectibus. Haec perturbatum ac fluctuantem animum ad tranquillitatem suam 0702C revocat: haec mitigat, haec hominem sibi reddit.

Ergo quoniam naturae repugnare impossibile est et inutile, ut non commoveamur omnino; prius tamen, quam commotio illa prosiliat ad nocendum, quoad fieri potest, maturius sopiatur. Praecepit Deus 0703A non occidere Solem super iram nostram, ne furoris nostri testis abscedat. Denique Marcus Tullius contra suum praeceptum, de quo paulo ante dixi, oblivionem injuriarum in magnis laudibus posuit. «Spero, inquit, Caesar, qui oblivisci nihil soles, nisi injurias.» Quod si hoc ille faciebat, homo non a coelesti tantum, sed a publica quoque civilique justitia remotissimus; quanto magis id nos facere debemus, qui immortalitatis velut candidati sumus? 0703A