Chap. VII.—Of Moral Philosophy, and the Chief Good.

Let us now pass to the other part of philosophy, which they themselves call moral, in which is contained the method of the whole of philosophy, since in natural philosophy there is only delight, in this there is utility also. And since it is more dangerous to commit a fault in arranging the condition of life and in forming the character, greater diligence must be used, that we may know how we ought to live. For in the former subject365    Natural philosophy.   some indulgence may be granted: for whether they say anything, they bestow no advantage; or if they foolishly rave, they do no injury. But in this subject there is no room for difference of opinion, none for error. All must entertain the same sentiments, and philosophy itself must give instructions as it were with one mouth; because if any error shall be committed, life is altogether overthrown. In that former part, as there is less danger, so there is more difficulty; because the obscurity of the subject compels us to entertain different and various opinions. But in this, as there is more danger, so there is less difficulty; because the very use of the subjects and daily experiments are able to teach what is truer and better. Let us see, therefore, whether they agree, or what assistance they give us for the better guidance of life. It is not necessary to enlarge on every point; let us select one, and especially that which is the chief and principal thing, in which the whole of wisdom centres and depends.366    The hinge of wisdom altogether turns.  Epicurus deems that the chief good consists in pleasure of mind, Aristippus in pleasure of the body. Callipho and Dinomachus united virtue with pleasure, Diodorus with the privation of pain, Hieronymus placed the chief good in the absence of pain; the Peripatetics, again, in the goods of the mind, the body, and fortune. The chief good of Herillus is knowledge; that of Zeno, to live agreeably to nature; that of certain Stoics, to follow virtue. Aristotle placed the chief good in integrity and virtue. These are the sentiments of nearly all. In such a difference of opinions, whom do we follow? whom do we believe? All are of equal authority. If we are able to select that which is better, it follows that philosophy is not necessary for us; because we are already wise, inasmuch as we judge respecting the opinions of the wise. But since we come for the sake of learning wisdom, how can we judge, who have not yet begun to be wise? especially when the Academic is close at hand, to draw us back by the cloak, and forbid us to believe any one, without bringing forward that which we may follow.  

CAPUT VII. De philosophia ethica et summo bono.

Transeamus nunc ad alteram philosophiae partem, quam ipsi moralem vocant, in qua totius philosophiae ratio continetur; si quidem in illa physica sola oblectatio est, in hac etiam utilitas. Et quoniam in disponendo vitae statu, formandisque moribus, periculo majori peccatur, majorem diligentiam necesse est 0362C adhiberi, ut sciamus quomodo nos oporteat vivere. Illic enim potest venia concedi; quia sive aliquid 0363A dicunt, nihil prosunt, sive delirant, nihil nocent. Hic vero nullus dissidio, nullus errori est locus. Unum sentire omnes oportet, ipsamque philosophiam uno quasi ore praecipere; quia si quid fuerit erratum, vita omnis evertitur. In illa priori parte ut periculi minus, ita plus difficultatis est; quod obscura rerum ratio cogit diversa et varia sentire. Hic ut periculi plus, ita minus dificultatis; quod ipse usus rerum et quotidiana experimenta possunt docere, quid sit verius, et melius. Videamus ergo, utrumne consentiant, aut quid nobis afferant, quo rectius vita degatur. Non necesse est omnia circuire. unum eligamus, ac potissimum, quod est summum 0363A ac 0364A principale, in quo totius sapentiae cardo versatur. Epicurus summum bonum in voluptate animi esse censet; Aristippus in voluptate corporis; Callipho et Dinomachus honestatem cum voluptate junxerunt; Diodorus cum privatione doloris. Summum bonum posuit Hieronymus in non dolendo; peripatetici autem in bonis animi, et corporis, et fortunae. Herilli summum bonum est scientia; Zenonis, cum natura congruenter vivere: quorumdam stoicorum, virtutem sequi; Aristoteles in honestate ac virtute summum bonum collocavit. Hae sunt fere omnium sententiae. In tanta diversitate, quem sequimur? cui credimus? Par est in omnibus auctoritas. Si eligere possumus 0365A quod est melius, jam non est philosophia nobis necessaria, quia sapientes jam sumus, qui de sapientium sententiis judicemus. Cum vero discendae sapientiae causa veniamus, 0365A qui possumus judicare, qui nondum sapere coeperimus? maxime cum praesto adsit academicus, qui nos pallio retrahat, ac vetet cuiquam credere, nec tamen afferat ipse quod sequamur.