Chap. VI.—Of the Chief Good and Virtue, and or Knowledge and Righteousness.

I have said that which was the first thing, that the knowledge of good is not virtue; and secondly, I have shown what virtue is, and in what it consists. It follows that I should show this also, that the philosophers were ignorant of what is good and evil; and this briefly, because it has been almost1093    Pœne: others read “plenè,” and “planè.” [c. 30, p. 100, supra.]   made plain in the third book, when I was discussing the subject of the chief good. And because they did not know what the chief good was, they necessarily erred in the case of the other goods and evils which are not the chief; for no one can weigh these with a true judgment who does not possess the fountain itself from which they are derived. Now the source of good things is God; but of evils, he who is always the enemy of the divine name, of whom we have often spoken. From these two sources good and evil things have their origin. Those which proceed from God have this object, to procure immortality, which is the greatest good; but those which arise from the other have this office, to call man away from heavenly things and sink him in earthly things, and thus to consign him to the punishment of everlasting death, which is the greatest evil. Is it therefore doubtful but that all those were ignorant of what was good and evil, who neither knew God nor the adversary of God? Therefore they referred the end of good things to the body, and to this short life, which must be dissolved and perish: they did not advance further. But all their precepts, and all the things which they introduce as goods, adhere to the earth, and lie on the ground, since they die with the body, which is earth; for they do not tend to procure life for man, but either to the acquisition or increase of riches, honour, glory, and power, which are altogether mortal things, as much so indeed as he who has laboured to obtain them. Hence is that saying,1094    [The first of the three inutilia of Lucilius, ut supra, thus: (1) “Virtus quærendæ rei finem scire, modumque;” (2) “Virtus divitiis pretium persolvere posse;” (3) “Virtus id dare quod re ipsa debetur honori.” See p. 167, supra.]   “It is virtue to know the end of an object1095    See chap. v. [p. 167, supra.]   to be sought, and the means of procuring it;” for they enjoin by what means and by what practices property is to be sought, for they see that it is often sought unjustly. But virtue of this kind is not proposed to the wise man; for it is not virtue to seek riches, of which neither the finding nor the possession is in our power: therefore they are more easy to be gained and to be retained by the bad than by the good. Virtue, then, cannot consist in the seeking of those things in the despising of which the force and purport of virtue appears; nor will it have recourse to those very things which, with its great and lofty mind, it desires to trample upon and bruise under foot; nor is it lawful for a soul which is earnestly fixed on heavenly goods to be called away from its immortal pursuits, that it may acquire for itself these frail things. But the course1096    Ratio virtutis.   of virtue especially consists in the acquisition of those things which neither any man, nor death itself, can take away from us. Since these things are so, that which follows is true: “It is virtue to be able to assign their value to riches:” which verse is nearly of the same meaning as the first two. But neither he nor any of the philosophers was able to know the price itself, either of what nature or what it is; for the poet, and all those whom he followed, thought that it meant to make a right use of riches,—that is, to be moderate in living, not to make costly entertainments, not to squander carelessly, not to expend property on superfluous or disgraceful objects.1097    [How I love our author for his winning reproof of mere philosophical virtue in contrast with evangelical righteousness!]    

Some one will perhaps say, What do you say? Do you deny that this is virtue? I do not deny it indeed; for if I should deny it, I should appear to prove the opposite. But I deny that it is true virtue; because it is not that heavenly principle, but is altogether of the earth, since it produces no effect but that which remains on the earth.1098    [See the Quis Dives Salvetur of Clement, vol. ii. p. 591, this series.]   But what it is to make a right use of wealth, and what advantage is to be sought from riches, I will declare more openly when I shall begin to speak of the duty of piety. Now the other things which follow are by no means true; for to proclaim enmity against the wicked, or to undertake the defence of the good, may be common to it with the evil. For some, by a pretence of goodness, prepare the way for themselves to power, and do many things which the good are accustomed to do, and that the more readily because they do them for the sake of deceiving; and I wish that it were as easy to carry out goodness in action as it is to pretend to it. But when they have begun to attain to their purpose and their wish in reaching the highest step of power, then, truly laying aside pretence, these men discover their character; they seize upon everything, and offer violence, and lay waste; and they press upon the good themselves, whose cause they had undertaken; and they cut away the steps by which they mounted, that no one may be able to imitate them against themselves. But, however, let us suppose that this duty of defending the good belongs only to the good man. Yet to undertake it is easy, to fulfil it is difficult; because when you have committed yourself to a contest and an encounter, the victory is placed at the disposal of God, not in your own power. And for the most part the wicked are more powerful both in number and in combination than the good, so that it is not so much virtue which is necessary to overcome them as good fortune. Is any one ignorant how often the better and the juster side has been overcome? From this cause harsh tyrannies have always broken out against the citizens. All history is full of examples, but we will be content with one. Cnœus Pompeius wished to be the defender of the good, since he took up arms in defence of the commonwealth, in defence of the senate, and in defence of liberty; and yet the same man, being conquered, perished together with liberty itself,1099    [Haggai. ii. 7. “La journée de Pharsale fut la dernière heure de la liberté. Le sénat, les lois, le peuple, les mœurs, le mond romain étaient anéantis avec Pompée.”—Lamartine.]   and being mutilated by Egyptian eunuchs, was cast forth unburied.1100    [See, on Pharsalia, etc., Lamartine’s eloquent remarks, Vie des Grands Hommes (César), vol. v. pp. 276–277, ed. Paris, 1856.]    

It is not virtue, therefore, either to be the enemy of the bad or the defender of the good, because virtue cannot be subject to uncertain chances.  

When the agreement of men is taken away, virtue has no existence at all; for what are the interests of our country, but the inconveniences of another state or nation?—that is, to extend the boundaries which are violently taken from others, to increase the power of the state, to improve the revenues,—all which things are not virtues, but the overthrowing of virtues: for, in the first place, the union of human society is taken away, innocence is taken away, the abstaining from the property of another is taken away; lastly, justice itself is taken away, which is unable to bear the tearing asunder of the human race, and wherever arms have glittered, must be banished and exterminated from thence. This saying of Cicero1101    De Offic., iii. 6.   is true: “But they who say that regard is to be had to citizens, but that it is not to be had to foreigners, these destroy the common society of the human race; and when this is removed, beneficence, liberality, kindness, and justice are entirely1102    Funditus, “from the very foundation.”   taken away.” For how can a man be just who injures, who hates, who despoils, who puts to death? And they who strive to be serviceable to their country do all these things: for they are ignorant of what this being serviceable is, who think nothing useful, nothing advantageous, but that which can be held by the hand; and this alone cannot be held, because it may be snatched away.  

Whoever, then, has gained for his country these goods—as they themselves call them—that is, who by the overthrow of cities and the destruction of nations has filled the treasury with money, has taken lands and enriched his country-men—he is extolled with praises to the heaven: in him there is said to be the greatest and perfect virtue. And this is the error not only of the people and the ignorant, but also of philosophers, who even give precepts for injustice, lest folly and wickedness should be wanting in discipline and authority. Therefore, when they are speaking of the duties relating to warfare, all that discourse is accommodated neither to justice nor to true virtue, but to this life and to civil institutions;1103    Moremque civilem.   and that this is not justice the matter itself declares, and Cicero has testified.1104    De Offic., iii. 17.   “But we,” he says, “are not in possession of the real and life-like figure of true law and genuine justice, we have nothing but delineations and sketches;1105    Umbrâ et imaginibus. The figure is borrowed partly from sculpture and partly from painting. “Effigies” is the moulded form, as opposed to the mere outline, “umbra” and “imago.”   and I wish that we followed even these, for they are taken from the excellent copies made by nature and truth.” It is then a delineation and a sketch which they thought to be justice. But what of wisdom? does not the same man confess that it has no existence in philosophers? “Nor,” he says,1106    De Offic., iii. 4. The words, “aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut,” have not been translated, because they refer to the “Decii” and the “Scipiones,” who are mentioned by Cicero as examples of bravery, but are omitted by Lactantius.   “when Fabricius or Aristides is called just, is an example of justice sought from these as from a wise man; for none of these is wise in the sense in which we wish the truly wise to be understood. Nor were they who are esteemed and called wise, Marcus Cato and Caius Lælius, actually wise, nor those well-known seven;1107    [See p. 101, supra]   but from their constant practice of the ‘middle duties,’1108    [Ex mediorum officiorum frequentia, etc.]   they bore a certain likeness and appearance1109    [Rom. i. 22.]   of wise men.” If therefore wisdom is taken away from the philosophers by their own confession, and justice is taken away from those who are regarded as just, it follows that all those descriptions of virtue must be false, because no one can know what true virtue is but he who is just and wise. But no one is just and wise but he whom God has instructed with heavenly precepts.  

CAPUT VI. De summo bono et virtute; deque scientia ac justitia.

Dixi, quod erat primum, scientiam boni non esse virtutem; deinde quid sit virtus, et in quo sit. Sequitur, ut id quoque ipsum, quid sit bonum et malum 0652C nescisse philosophos, breviter ostendam, quia pene declaratum est libro tertio, cum de Summo Bono disputarem. 0653A Quia autem 0653A quid esset summum nescierunt, et in caeteris bonis malisve, quae summa non sunt, erraverint necesse est; quae non potest vero judicio examinare, qui fontem ipsum non tenet, unde illa descendunt. Fons autem bonorum Deus est, malorum vero ille, scilicet divini nominis semper inimicus, de quo saepe diximus. Ab his duobus principiis bona malaque oriuntur. Quae veniunt a Deo, hanc habent rationem, ut immortalitatem parent, quod est Summum Bonum: quae autem ab illo altero, id habent officium, ut a coelestibus avocatum, terrenisque demersum, ad poenam interficiant sempiternam, quod est summum malum. Num igitur dubium est, quin illi omnes quid esset bonum et malum ignoraverint, qui nec Deum, nec adversarium Dei scierint? Itaque finem 0653B bonorum ad corpus, et ad hanc brevem vitam retulerunt, quam scilicet solvi et occidere necesse est: non sunt progressi ulterius. Sed omnia eorum praecepta, et omnia quae inducunt bona, terrae inhaerent, et humi jacent, quoniam simul cum corpore, quod est terra, moriuntur; pertinent enim non ad vitam homini comparandam, sed ad quaerendas vel augendas opes, honores, gloriam, potentiam; quae sunt universa mortalia, tam scilicet, quam ille qui, ut ea sibi contingerent, laboravit. Hinc est illud: Virtus, quaerendae finem rei scire modumque.Praecipiunt enim quibus modis, et quibus artibus res familiaris quaerenda sit, quia vident male quaeri solere: sed hujusmodi virtus non est proposita sapienti. Nec enim virtus est, opes quaerere, quarum 0653C neque inventio, neque possessio in nostra potestate est. Itaque et quaestu, et obtentu faciliores sunt malis, quam bonis. Non potest ergo virtus esse in iis rebus quaerendis, in quarum contemptu vis ac ratio virtutis apparet; nec ad ea ipsa transfugiet, quae magno 0654A ac excelso animo calcare ac proterere gestit: neque fas est, animam coelestibus intentam bonis, ut haec fragilia sibi comparet, ab immortalibus suis operibus avocari. Sed potissimum in iis rebus comparandis virtutis ratio consistit, quas nobis nec homo ullus, nec mors ipsa possit auferre. Cum haec ita se habeant, illud quod sequitur verum est: Virtus, divitiis pretium persolvere posse.Qui versus idem fere significat, quod primi duo. Sed neque ipse, neque quisquam philosophorum scire potuit pretium ipsum, vel quale, vel quod sit. Id enim poeta, et illi omnes, quos secutus est, putaverunt, recte opibus uti, hoc est, frugi esse; non instruere convivia sumptuose; nec largiri temere; non effundere in res supervacuas, aut turpes, rem familiarem.

0654B Dicet aliquis fortasse: Quid tu? negas ne hanc esse virtutem? Non equidem nego; contraria enim videar probare, si negem. Sed veram nego; quia non sit illa coelestis, sed tota terrena, quandoquidem nihil efficit, nisi quod remaneat in terra. Quid sit autem recte opibus uti, et qui sit ex divitiis fructus petendus, declarabo apertius, cum de pietatis officio loqui coepero. Jam caetera, quae sequuntur, nullo modo vera sunt. Nam improbis inimicitias aut indicere, bonorum defensionem suscipere, potest cum malis esse commune. Quidam enim probitate ficta viam sibi ad potentiam muniunt, faciuntque multa, quae boni solent, eo quidem promptius, quod fallendi gratia faciunt. Utinamque tam facile esset praestare, quam facile est simulare bonitatem. Sed ii, cum esse coeperint 0654C propositi ac voti sui compotes, et summum potentiae gradum ceperint, tum vero simulatione deposita, mores suos detegunt: rapiunt omnia, et violant, et vexant; eosque ipsos bonos, quorum causam susceperant, insequuntur, et gradus per quos ascenderunt 0655A amputant, ne quis illos contra ipsos possit imitari. Verumtamen putemus, hoc officium non nisi boni esse, ut bonos defendat. At id suscipere, facile est, implere, difficile; quia cum te certamini congressionique commiseris, in arbitrio Dei, non tuo, posita victoria est. Et plerumque improbi, et numero, et conspiratione sunt potentiores, quam boni; ut ad eos superandos, non tam virtus sit, quam felicitas necessaria. An aliquis ignorat, quoties melior 0655A justiorque pars victa sit? Hinc semper dominationes acerbae in cives extiterunt. Plena est exemplis omnis historia: sed nos contenti erimus uno. Cneius Pompeius bonorum voluit esse defensor; siquidem pro republica, pro Senatu, pro libertate arma suscepit. Idem tamen victus cum ipsa libertate occidit, et a 0655B spadonibus Aegyptiis detruncatus, insepultus abjectus est.

Non est igitur virtus, aut hostem malorum esse, aut defensorem bonorum, quia virtus incertis casibus non potest esse subjecta. Commoda praeterea patriae sibi prima putare.Sublata hominum concordia, virtus nulla est omnino. Quae sunt enim patriae commoda, nisi alterius civitatis, aut gentis incommoda? Id est, fines propagare aliis violenter ereptos, augere imperium, vectigalia facere majora. Quae omnia non utique virtutes, sed virtutum sunt eversiones. In primis enim tollitur humanae societatis conjunctio, tollitur innocentia, tollitur 0655C alieni abstinentia, tollitur denique ipsa justitia, 0656A quae dissidium generis humani ferre non potest, et ubicumque arma fulserint, hinc eam fugari et exterminari necesse est. Verum est enim Ciceronis illud: Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, dirimunt hi communem generis humani societatem: qua sublata, beneficentia, liberalitas, bonitas, justitia funditus tollitur. Nam quomodo potest justus esse, qui nocet, qui odit, qui spoliat, qui occidit? Quae omnia faciunt, qui patriae prodesse nituntur. Id enim ipsum prodesse, quid sit, ignorant, qui nihil putant utile, nihil commodum, nisi quod teneri manu potest, quod solum teneri non potest, quia eripi potest.

Haec itaque (ut ipsi appellant) bona quisquis patriae acquisierit, hoc est, qui eversis civitatibus, gentibusque 0656B deletis, aerarium pecunia referserit, agros ceperit, cives suos locupletiores fecerit; hic laudibus fertur in coelum, in hoc putatur summa et perfecta esse virtus. Qui error non modo populi et imperitorum, sed etiam philosophorum est; qui praecepta quoque dant ad injustitiam, ne stultitiae ac malitiae disciplinae auctoritas desit. Itaque cum de officiis ad rem militarem pertinentibus disputant, neque ad justitiam, neque ad veram virtutem accommodatur illa omnis oratio, sed ad hanc vitam moremque civilem, quem non esse justitiam, et res indicat, et ipse Cicero testatus est. «Sed nos, inquit, veri juris, germanaequae justitiae, solidam et expressam effigiem nullam 0656C tenemus. Umbra et imaginibus utimur; easque ipsas 0657A utinam sequeremur! Feruntur enim ab optimis naturae ac veritatis exemplis.» 0657A Umbra est igitur et imago justitiae, quam illi justitiam putaverunt. Quid sapientiam? nonne idem confitetur in phisosophis esse nullam? «Aut cum Fabricius, inquit, aut Aristides justus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his justitiae petitur tanquam a sapiente exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem volumus intelligi. Nec ii qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem: sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quamdam gerebant speciemque sapientium.» Si ergo et philosophis ipsorum confessione adempta sapientia est, et iis qui justi habiti sunt, adempta justitia est, omnes igitur illae virtutis descriptiones 0657B falsae sint necesse est; quia quae sit virtus vera, scire non potest, nisi justus ac sapiens. Justus autem ac sapiens nemo est, nisi quem Deus praeceptis coelestibus erudivit.