Chap. XVI.—That the Philosophers Who Give Good Instructions Live Badly, by the Testimony of Cicero; Therefore We Should Not So Much Devote Ourselves to the Study of Philosophy as to Wisdom.

But when they give themselves up to perpetual sloth, and undertake no exercise of virtue, and pass their whole life in the practice of speaking, in what light ought they to be regarded rather than as triflers? For wisdom, unless it is engaged on some action on which it may exert its force, is empty and false; and Tullius rightly gives the preference, above teachers of philosophy, to those men employed in civil affairs, who govern the state, who found new cities or maintain with equity those already founded, who preserve the safety and liberty of the citizens either by good laws or wholesome counsels, or by weighty judgments. For it is right to make men good rather than to give precepts about duty to those shut up in corners, which precepts are not observed even by those who speak them; and inasmuch as they have withdrawn themselves from true actions, it is manifest that they invented the system of philosophy itself, for the purpose of exercising the tongue, or for the sake of pleading. But they who merely teach without acting, of themselves detract from the weight of their own precepts; for who would obey, when they who give the precepts themselves teach disobedience? Moreover, it is a good thing to give right and honourable precepts; but unless you also practice them it is a deceit, and it is inconsistent and trifling to have goodness not in the heart, but on the lips.  

It is not therefore utility, but enjoyment, which they seek from philosophy. And this Cicero indeed testified. “Truly,” he says, “all their disputation, although it contains most abundant fountains of virtue and knowledge, yet, when compared with their actions and accomplishments, I fear lest it should seem not to have brought so much advantage to the business of men as enjoyment to their times of relaxation.” He ought not to have feared, since he spoke the truth; but as if he were afraid lest he should be arraigned by the philosophers on a charge of betraying a mystery, he did not venture confidently to pronounce that which was true, that they do not dispute for the purpose of teaching, but for their own enjoyment in their leisure; and since they are the advisers of actions, and do not themselves act at all, they are to be regarded as mere talkers.406    [See p. 83, note 2, and p. 84, note 1.]   But assuredly, because they contributed no advantage to life, they neither obeyed their own decrees, nor has any one been found, through so many ages, who lived in accordance with their laws. Therefore philosophy407    Lactantius must be understood as speaking of that kind of philosophy which teaches errors and deceits, as St. Paul speaks, Col. ii. 8: “Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit.”   must altogether be laid aside, because we are not to devote ourselves to the pursuit of wisdom, for this has no limit or moderation; but we must be wise, and that indeed quickly. For a second life is not granted to us, so that when we seek wisdom in this life we may be wise in that; each result must be brought about in this life. It ought to be quickly found, in order that it may be quickly taken up, lest any part of life should pass away, the end of which is uncertain. Hortensius in Cicero, contending against philosophy, is pressed by a clever argument; inasmuch as, when he said that men ought not to philosophize, he seemed nevertheless to philosophize, since it is the part of the philosophers to discuss what ought and what ought not to be done in life. We are free and exempt from this calumny, who take away philosophy, because it is the invention of human thought; we defend wisdom, because it is a divine tradition, and we testify that it ought to be taken up by all. He, when he took away philosophy without introducing anything better, was supposed to take away wisdom; and on that account was more easily driven from his opinion, because it is agreed upon that man is not born to folly, but to wisdom.  

Moreover, the argument which the same Hortensius employed has great weight also against philosophy,—namely, that it may be understood from this, that philosophy is not wisdom, since its beginning and origin are apparent. When, he says, did philosophers begin to exist? Thales, as I imagine, was the first, and his age was recent. Where, then, among the more ancient men did that love of investigating the truth lie hid? Lucretius also says:408    Lucretius, v. 336.  —  

And Seneca says: “There are not yet a thousand years since the beginnings of wisdom were undertaken.” Therefore mankind for many generations lived without system. In ridicule of which, Persius says:409    Persius, Sat., vi 38.  —  

as though wisdom had been introduced into the city together with savoury merchandise.410    [The force of the poet’s satire is in this petty merchandise.]   For if it is in agreement with the nature of man, it must have had its commencement together with man; but if it is not in agreement with it, human nature would be incapable of receiving it. But, inasmuch as it has received it, it follows that wisdom has existed from the beginning: therefore philosophy, inasmuch as it has not existed from the beginning, is not the same true wisdom. But, in truth, the Greeks, because they had not attained to the sacred letters of truth, did not know how wisdom was corrupted. And, therefore, since they thought that human life was destitute of wisdom, they invented philosophy; that is, they wished by discussion to tear up the truth which was lying hid and unknown to them: and this employment, through ignorance of the truth, they thought to be wisdom.  

0395A CAPUT XVI. Quod recte docentes philosophi male vivant, teste Cicerone; unde non tam philosophiae, quam sapientiae studendum est.

Verum cum 0395A se perpetuae desidiae tradant, nullamque virtutem capessant, et omnem suam vitam nihil aliud quam in eloquendo peragant, quid aliud quam inertes putari debent? Sapientia enim, nisi in aliquo actu fuerit quo vim suam exerceat, inanis et falsa est; recteque Tullius civiles viros, qui rempublicam gubernent, qui urbes aut novas constituant, aut constitutas aequitate tueantur, qui salutem libertatemque civium vel bonis legibus, vel salubribus consiliis, vel judiciis gravibus conservent, philosophiae doctoribus praefert. Bonos enim facere oportet potius 0395B quam inclusos in angulis facienda praecipere, quae ne ipsi quidem faciunt, qui loquuntur; et quoniam se a veris actibus removerunt, apparet eos exercendae linguae causa, vel advocandi gratia artem ipsam philosophiae reperisse. Qui autem docent tantum, nec faciunt, ipsi praeceptis suis detrahunt pondus; quis enim obtemperet, cum ipsi praeceptores doceant non obtemperare? Bonum est autem recta et honesta praecipere: sed nisi et facias, mendacium est; et est incongruens atque ineptum, non in pectore, sed in labris habere bonitatem.

Non ergo utilitatem ex philosophia, sed oblectationem petunt. Quod quidem Cicero testatus est: «Profecto, inquit, omnis istorum disputatio, quanquam uberrimos fontes virtutis et scientiae contineat, 0395C tamen collata cum horum actis perfectisque rebus, vereor ne non tantum videatur attulisse negotiis hominum utilitatis, quantam oblectationem otiis.» Vereri quidem non debuit, cum verum diceret: sed 0396A quasi timeret, ne proditi mysterii reus a philosophis citaretur, non est ausus confidenter pronuntiare, quod fuit verum, illos non ideo disputare, ut doceant, sed ut se oblectent in otio: qui quoniam auctores sunt rerum gerendarum, nec ipsi quidquam gerunt, pro loquacibus sunt habendi. Sed profecto, quia nihil boni ad vitam afferebant, nec ipsi decretis suis obtemperaverunt; nec quisquam per tot saecula inventus est, qui eorum legibus viveret. Abjicienda est igitur omnis philosophia, quia non studendum est sapientiae, quod fine ac modo caret: sed sapiendum est, et quidem mature. Non enim nobis altera via conceditur, ut, cum in hac sapientiam quaeramus, in illa sapere possimus: in hac utrumque fieri necesse est. Cito inveniri debet, ut cito suscipi possit, ne 0396B quid pereat ex vita cujus finis incertus est. Ciceronis Hortensius contra philosophiam disserens, circumvenitur arguta conclusione; quod cum diceret philosophandum non esse, nihilominus philosophari videbatur, quoniam philosophi est, quid in vita faciendum, vel non faciendum sit, disputare. Nos ab hac calumnia immunes ac liberi sumus, qui philosophiam tollimus, quia humanae cogitationis inventio est; sophiam defendimus, quia divina traditio est, eamque ab omnibus suscipi oportere testamur. Ille, cum philosophiam tolleret, nec melius aliquid afferret, sapientiam tollere putabatur, eoque facilius de sententia pulsus est: quia constat hominem non ad stultitiam, sed ad sapientiam nasci.

Praeterea illud quoque argumentum contra philosophiam 0396C valet plurimum, quo idem est usus Hortensius; ex eo posse intelligi, philosophiam non esse sapientiam, quod principium et origo ejus appareat. Quando, inquit, philosophi esse coeperunt? Thales 0397A (ut opinor) primus, recens haec quidem aetas; 0397A ubi ergo apud antiquiores latuit amor iste investigandae veritatis? Item Lucretius ait: Denique natura haec rerum, ratioque reperta est Nuper; et hanc primus cum primis ipse repertus Nunc ego sum, in patrias qui possum vertere voces.Et Seneca: «Nondum sunt, inquit, mille anni, ex quo initia sapientiae mota sunt.» Multis ergo saeculis humanum genus sine ratione vixit. Quod irridens Persius: Postquam (inquit) sapere urbi Cum pipere et palmis venit;tanquam sapientia cum saporis mercibus fuerit invecta: quae si secundum hominis naturam est, cum homine ipso coeperit necesse est; si vero non est, nec capere quidem illam posset humana natura. Sed quia recepit, igitur a principio fuisse sapientiam necesse 0397B est; ergo philosophia, quia non a principio fuit, non est eadem vera sapientia. Sed videlicet Graeci, quia sacras veritatis litteras non attigerant, quemadmodum depravata esset sapientia, nesciverunt. Et ideo cum vacare sapientia humanam vitam putarent, philosophiam commenti sunt; id est, latentem atque ignotam sibi veritatem disserendo eruere voluerunt, quod studium, per ignorantiam veri, sapientiam putaverunt.