Chap. XXIX.—Of Fortune Again, and Virtue.

But let us return to the subject which we laid aside. Fortune, therefore, by itself, is nothing; nor must we so regard it as though it had any perception, since fortune is the sudden and unexpected occurrence of accidents. But philosophers, that they may not sometimes fail to err, wish to be wise in a foolish matter; and say that she is not a goddess, as is generally believed, but a god. Sometimes, however, they call this god nature, sometimes fortune, “because he brings about,” says the same Cicero, “many things unexpected by us, on account of our want of intelligence and our ignorance of causes.” Since, therefore, they are ignorant of the causes on account of which anything is done, they must also be ignorant of him who does them. The same writer, in a work of great seriousness, in which he was giving to his son precepts of life drawn from philosophy, says, “Who can be ignorant that the power of fortune is great on either side? For both when we meet with a prosperous breeze from her we gain the issues which we desire, and when she has breathed contrary to us we are dashed on the rocks.”468    Cicero, De Offic., ii. 6. The expressions are borrowed from the figure of a ship at sea.   First of all, he who says that nothing can be known, spoke this as though he himself and all men had knowledge. Then he who endeavours to render doubtful even the things which are plain, thought that this was plain, which ought to have been to him especially doubtful; for to a wise man it is altogether false. Who, he says, knows not? I indeed know not. Let him teach me, if he can, what that power is, what that breeze, and what the contrary breath.  

It is disgraceful, therefore, for a man of talent to say that, which if you were to deny it, he would be unable to prove. Lastly, he who says that the assent must be withheld because it is the part of a foolish man rashly to assent to things which are unknown to him, he, I say, altogether believed the opinions of the vulgar and uninstructed, who think that it is fortune which gives to men good and evil things. For they represent her image with the horn of plenty and with a rudder, as though she both gave wealth and had the government of human affairs. And to this opinion Virgil469    Æn., viii. 33.   assented, who calls fortune omnipotent; and the historian470    Sallust, Cat., viii.   who says, But assuredly fortune bears sway in everything. What place, then, remains for the other gods? Why is she not said to reign by herself, if she has more power than others; or why is she not alone worshipped, if she has power in all things? Or if she inflicts evils only, let them bring forward some cause why, if she is a goddess, she envies men, and desires their destruction, though she is religiously worshipped by them; why she is more favourable to the wicked and more unfavourable to the good; why she plots, afflicts, deceives, exterminates; who appointed her as the perpetual harasser of the race of men; why, in short, she has obtained so mischievous a power, that she renders all things illustrious or obscure according to her caprice rather than in accordance with the truth. Philosophers, I say, ought rather to have inquired into these things, than rashly to have accused fortune, who is innocent: for although she has some existence, yet no reason can be brought forward by them why she should be as hostile to men as she is supposed to be. Therefore all those speeches in which they rail at the injustice of fortune, and in opposition to fortune arrogantly boast of their own virtues, are nothing else but the ravings of thoughtless levity.  

Wherefore let them not envy us, to whom God has revealed the truth: who, as we know that fortune is nothing, so also know that there is a wicked and crafty spirit who is unfriendly to the good, and the enemy of righteousness, who acts in opposition to God; the cause of whose enmity we have explained in the second book.471    Chapter xvi.   He therefore lays plots against all; but those who are ignorant of God he hinders by error, he overwhelms with folly, he overspreads with darkness, that no one may be able to attain to the knowledge of the divine name, in which alone are contained both wisdom and everlasting life. Those, on the other hand, who know God, he assails with wiles and craft, that he may ensnare them with desire and lust, and when they are corrupted by the blandishments of sin, may impel them to death; or, if he shall have not succeeded by stratagem, he attempts to cast them down by force and violence. For on this account he was not at once thrust down by God to punishment at the original transgression, that by his malice he may exercise man to virtue: for unless this is in constant agitation, unless it is strengthened by continual harassing, it cannot be perfect, inasmuch as virtue is dauntless and unconquered patience in enduring evils. From which it comes to pass that there is no virtue if an adversary is wanting. When, therefore, they perceived the force of this perverse power opposed to virtue, and were ignorant of its name, they invented for themselves the senseless name of fortune; and how far this is removed from wisdom, Juvenal declares in these verses:472    Satire x. 365: Nullum numen abest. Others read, Nullum numen habes. You have no divine power, O Fortune, if there is prudence, etc.  —  

It was folly, therefore, and error, and blindness, and, as Cicero says,473    Acad., i. 7. [Let our sophists feel this rebuke of Tully.]   ignorance of facts and causes, which introduced the names of Nature and Fortune. But as they are ignorant of their adversary, so also they do not indeed know virtue the knowledge of which is derived from the idea of an adversary. And if this is joined with wisdom, or, as they say, is itself also wisdom, they must be ignorant in what subjects it is contained. For no one can possibly be furnished with true arms if he is ignorant of the enemy against whom he must be armed; nor can he overcome his adversary, who in fighting does not attack his real enemy, but a shadow. For he will be overthrown, who, having his attention fixed on another object, shall not previously have foreseen or guarded against the blow aimed at his vitals.  

CAPUT XXIX. De fortuna iterum et virtute.

Sed repetamus id quod omisimus. Fortuna ergo per se nihil est; nec sic habendum est, tamquam sit in aliquo sensu. Siquidem fortuna est accidentium rerum subitus atque inopinatus eventus. Verum philosophi, ne aliquando non errent, in re stulta volunt esse sapientes; qui fortunae sexum mutant, eamque non deam, sicut vulgus, sed deum esse dicunt. 0441A Eumdem tamen interdum naturam, 0441A interdum fortunam vocant; «quod multa, inquit idem Cicero, efficiat inopinata nobis, propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.» Cum igitur causas ignorent, propter quas fiat aliquid, et ipsum qui faciat ignorent, necesse est. Idem in opere valde serio, in quo praecepta vitae deprompta ex philosophia filio dabat: «Magnam, inquit, esse fortunae vim in utramque partem, quis nesciat? Nam et, cum prospero flatu ejus utimur, ad exitus pervenimus optatos; et, cum reflaverit, affligimur.» Primum, qui negat sciri posse quidquam, sic hoc dixit, tamquam et ipse, et omnes sciant. Deinde, qui, etiam quae clara sunt, dubia conatur efficere, hoc putavit esse clarum, quod illi esse debuit vel maxime dubium; nam sapienti omnino 0441B falsum est. Quis, inquit, nescit? Ego vero nescio. Doceat me, si potest, quae sit illa vis, qui flatus iste, et qui reflatus.

Turpe igitur est, hominem ingeniosum dicere id, quod, si neges, probare non possit. Postremo, quod is, qui dicit assensus esse retinendos, quod stulti sit hominis, rebus incognitis temere assentiri, is plane 0442A vulgi et imperitorum opinionibus credidit, qui fortunam putant esse, quae hominibus tribuat bona et mala. Nam simulacrum ejus cum copia et gubernaculo fingunt, tamquam haec et opes tribuat, et humanarum rerum regimen obtineat. Cui opinioni et Virgilius assentit, qui fortunam omnipotentem vocat; et historicus, qui ait: Sed profecto fortuna in omni re dominatur. Quid ergo caeteris diis loci superest? Cur non aut ipsa regnare dicitur, si plus potest; aut sola colitur, si omnia? Vel, si tantum mala immittit, aliquid causae proferant, cur, si dea sit, hominibus invideat, eosque perditos cupiat, cum ab his religiose colatur: cur aequior sit malis, iniquior autem bonis: cur insidietur, affligat, decipiat et exterminet: quis illam generi hominum vexatricem perpetuam constituerit: 0442B cur denique tam malam sortita sit potestatem, ut res cunctas ex libidine magis, quam ex vero celebret, obscuretque? Haec, inquam, philosophos inquirere oportuit potius, quam temere innocentem accusare fortunam: quae etiamsi sit aliqua, nihil tamen afferri ab his potest, cur hominibus tam inimica sit, quam putatur. Itaque illae omnes orationes, quibus iniquitatem 0443A fortunae lacerant, se suasque virtutes 0443A contra fortunam superbissime jactant, nihil aliud sunt, quam deliramenta inconsideratae levitatis.

Quare non invideant nobis quibus aperuit veritatem Deus: qui sicut scimus, nihil esse fortunam; ita scimus esse pravum ac subdolum spiritum, qui sit inimicus bonis, hostisque justitiae; qui contraria faciat, quam Deus, cujus invidiae causam in secundo libro (Cap. 13) explicavimus. Hic ergo insidiatur universis; sed eos, qui nesciunt Deum, errore impedit, stultitia obruit, tenebris circumfundit, ne quis possit ad divini nominis pervenire notitiam, in quo uno et sapientia continetur, et vita perpetua. Eos autem, qui Deum sciunt, dolis et astu aggreditur, ut cupiditate ac libidine irretiat, ac peccatis blandientibus depravatos 0443B impellat ad mortem; vel, si dolo nihil profecerit, vi et violentia dejicere conatur. Idcirco enim in primordiis transgressionis non statim ad poenam detrusus a Deo est, ut hominem malitia sua exerceat ad virtutem: quae nisi agitetur, ni assidua vexatione roboretur, non potest esse perfecta; siquidem virtus est perferendorum malorum fortis ac invicta patientia. Ex quo fit, ut virtus nulla sit, si adversarius desit. Hujus itaque perversae potestatis cum vim sentirent virtuti repugnantem, nomenque ignorarent, fortunae vocabulum sibi inane finxerunt. Quod quam longe a sapientia sit remotum, declarat Juvenalis his versibus: Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia: sed nos Te facimus, Fortuna, deam, coeloque locamus.Stultitia igitur, et error, et caecitas, et, ut Cicero ait, 0444A ignoratio rerum atque causarum, Naturae ac Fortunae nomina induxit. Sed ut adversarium suum nesciunt: sic nec virtutem quidem sciunt, cujus scientia ab adversarii notione descendit. Quae si conjuncta est cum sapientia, vel, ut ipsi dicunt, eadem ipsa sapientia est, ignorent necesse est in quibus rebus sita sit. Nemo enim potest veris armis instrui, si hostem contra quem fuerit armandus, ignorat; nec adversarium vincere, qui in dimicando non hostem verum, sed umbram petit. Prosternetur enim, qui alio intentus, venientem vitalibus suis ictum nec praeviderit ante, nec caverit.