Chap. XVII.—Of the Equity, Wisdom, and Foolishness of Christians.

I have explained the reason why philosophers were unable either to find or to defend justice. Now I return to that which I had purposed. Carneades, therefore, since the arguments of the philosophers were weak, undertook the bold task of refuting them, because he understood that they were capable of refutation. The substance of his disputation was this: “That men1014    [From the Republic, book iii. cap. 12, sec. 21.]   enacted laws for themselves, with a view to their own advantage, differing indeed according to their characters, and in the case of the same persons often changed according to the times: but that there was no natural law: that all, both men and other animals, were borne by the guidance of nature to their own advantage; therefore that there was no justice, or if any did exist, it was the greatest folly, because it injured itself by promoting the interests of others.” And he brought forward these arguments: “That all nations which flourished with dominion, even the Romans themselves, who were masters of the whole world, if they wish to be just, that is, to restore the possessions of others, must return to cottages, and lie down in want and miseries.” Then, leaving general topics, he came to particulars. “If a good man,” he says, “has a runaway slave, or an unhealthy and infected house, and he alone knows these faults, and on this account offers it for sale, will he give out that the slave is a runaway, and the house which he offers for sale is infected, or will he conceal it from the purchaser? If he shall give it out, he is good indeed, because he will not deceive; but still he will be judged foolish, because he will either sell at a low price or not sell at all. If he shall conceal it, he will be wise indeed, because he will consult his own interest; but he will be also wicked, because he will deceive. Again, if he should find any one who supposes that he is selling copper ore when it is gold, or lead when it is silver, will he be silent, that he may buy it at a small price; or will he give information of it, so that he may buy it at a great price? It evidently appears foolish to prefer to buy it at a great price.” From which he wished it to be understood, both that he who is just and good is foolish, and that he who is wise is wicked; and yet that it may possibly happen without ruin, for men to be contented with poverty. Therefore he passed to greater things, in which no one could be just without danger of his life. For he said: “Certainly it is justice not to put a man to death, not to take the property of another. What, then, will the just man do, if he shall happen to have suffered shipwreck, and some one weaker than himself shall have seized a plank? Will he not thrust him from the plank, that he himself may get upon it, and supported by it may escape, especially since there is no witness in the middle of the sea? If he is wise, he will do so; for he must himself perish unless he shall thus act. But if he choose rather to die than to inflict violence upon another, in this case he is just, but foolish, in not sparing his own life while he spares the life of another. Thus also, if the army of his own people shall have been routed, and the enemy have begun to press upon them, and that just man shall have met with a wounded man on horseback, will he spare him so as to be slain himself, or will he throw him from his horse, that he himself may escape from the enemy? If he shall do this, he will be wise, but also wicked; if he shall not do it, he will be just, but also of necessity foolish.” When, therefore, he had thus divided justice into two parts, saying that the one was civil, the other natural, he subverted both: because the civil part is wisdom, but not justice; but the natural part is justice, but not wisdom. These arguments are altogether subtle and acute,1015    Venenata [See De Finibus, book v. cap. 23.]   and such as Marcus Tullius was unable to refute. For when he represents Lælius as replying to Furius, and speaking in behalf of justice, he passed them by as a pitfall without refuting them; so that the same Lælius appears not to have defended natural justice, which bad fallen under the charge of folly, but that civil justice which Furius had admitted to be wisdom, but unjust.1016    [See p. 150, supra ]    

CAPUT XVII. De Christianorum aequitate, sapientia et stultitia.

Exposui causam cur philosophi nec invenire justitiam, nec defendere potuerunt. Nunc redeo ad id quod intenderam. Carneades ergo, quoniam erant infirma quae a philosophis afferebantur, sumpsit audaciam refellendi, quia refelli posse intellexit. Ejus disputationis summa haec fuit: «Jura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxisse, scilicet varia pro moribus; et apud eosdem pro temporibus saepe mutata: jus autem 0602B naturale esse nullum: Omnes et homines, et alias animantes ad utilitates suas natura ducente ferri; proinde aut nullam esse justitiam, aut si sit aliqua, summam esse stultitiam, quoniam sibi noceret alienis commodis consulens.» Et inferebat haec argumenta: «Omnibus populis qui florerent imperio, et Romanis quoque ipsis, qui totius orbis potirentur, si justi velint esse, hoc est, si aliena restituant, ad casas esse redeundum, et in egestate ac miseriis jacendum.» Tum omissis communibus ad propria veniebat. «Bonus vir, inquit, si habeat servum fugitivum, vel domum insalubrem ac pestilentem, quae vitia solus sciat, et ideo proscribat ut vendat, utrumne profitebitur fugitivum servum ac pestilentem domum se 0602C vendere, an celabit emptorem? Si profitebitur, bonus 0603A quidem, quia non fallet: 0603A sed tamen stultus judicabitur, quia vel parvo vendet, vel omnino non vendet. Si celaverit, erit quidem sapiens, quia rei consulet: sed idem malus, quia fallet. Rursus, si reperiat aliquem, qui aurichalcum se putet vendere, cum sit illud aurum, aut plumbum, cum sit argentum: tacebitne, ut id parvo emat, an indicabit, ut magno? Stultum plane videtur, malle magno.» Unde intelligi volebat, et eum, qui sit justus ac bonus, stultum esse, et eum, qui sapiens, malum. Et tamen sine pernicie fieri posse, ut sint homines paupertate contenti. Transcendebat ergo ad majora, in quibus nemo posset sine periculo vitae justus esse. Dicebat enim: «Nempe justitia est, hominem non occidere, alienum prorsus non attingere. Quid ergo justus faciet, si forte naufragium fecerit, 0603B et aliquis imbecillior viribus tabulam ceperit? Nonne illum tabula deturbabit, ut ipse conscendat, eaque nixus evadat; maxime cum sit nullus medio mari testis? Si sapiens est, faciet; ipsi enim pereundum est, nisi fecerit. Si autem mori maluerit, quam manus inferre alteri, jam justus ille, sed stultus est, qui vitae suae non parcat, dum parcit alienae. Item, si acie suorum fusa, hostes insequi coeperint, et justus ille nactus fuerit aliquem saucium equo insidentem, eine parcet, ut ipse occidatur, an dejiciet ex equo, ut ipse possit hostem effugere? Quod si fecerit sapiens, sed idem malus; si non fecerit, justus, sed idem stultus sit necesse est.» Ita ergo justitiam cum in duas partes divisisset, alteram civilem esse dicens, alteram naturalem, utramque subvertit; quod illa civilis, 0603C sapientia sit quidem, sed justitia non sit, naturalis autem illa, justitia sit quidem, sed non sit sapientia. Arguta haec plane ac venenata sunt, et quae 0604A Marcus Tullius non potuerit refellere. Nam cum faciat Laelium Furio respondentem, pro justitiaque dicentem, irrefutata haec tanquam foveam praetergressus est; ut videatur idem Laelius non naturalem, quae in crimen stultitiae venerat, sed illam civilem defendisse justitiam, quam Furius sapientiam quidem esse concesserat, sed injustam.