Chap. XIV.—Of the Affections, and the Opinion of the Stoics Respecting Them; And of Virtue, the Vices, and Mercy.

If, therefore, mercy is a distinguished and excellent gift in man, and that is judged to be very good by the consent both of the good and the evil, it appears that philosophers were far distant from the good of man, who neither enjoined nor practised anything of this kind, but always esteemed as a vice that virtue which almost holds the first place in man. It pleases me here to bring forward one subject of philosophy, that we may more fully refute the errors of those who call mercy, desire, and fear, diseases of the soul. They indeed attempt to distinguish virtues from vices, which is truly a very easy matter. For who cannot distinguish a liberal man from one who is prodigal (as they do), or a frugal man from one who is mean, or a calm man from one who is slothful, or a cautious man from one who is timid? Because these things which are good have their limits, and if they shall exceed these limits, fall into vices; so that constancy, unless it is undertaken for the truth, becomes shamelessness. In like manner, bravery, if it shall undergo certain danger, without the compulsion of any necessity, or not for an honourable cause, is changed into rashness. Freedom of speech also, if it attack others rather than oppose those who attack it, is obstinacy. Severity also, unless it restrain itself within the befitting punishments of the guilty, becomes savage cruelty.  

Therefore they say, that those who appear evil do not sin of their own accord, or choose evils by preference, but that, erring1172    Lapsos. [All this shows the need of an Augustine.]   through the appearance of good, they fall into evils, while they are ignorant of the distinction between good things and evil. These things are not indeed false, but they are all referred to the body. For to be frugal, or constant, or cautious, or calm, or grave, or severe, are virtues indeed, but virtues which relate to this short1173    Temporariæ. [Admirable so far as our author goes.]   life. But we who despise this life have other virtues set before us, respecting which philosophers could not by any means even conjecture. Therefore they regarded certain virtues as vices, and certain vices as virtues. For the Stoics take away from man all the affections, by the impulse of which the soul is moved—desire, joy, fear, sorrow: the two former of which arise from good things, either future or present; the latter from evil things. In the same manner, they call these four (as I said) diseases, not so much inserted in us by nature as undertaken through a perverted opinion; and therefore they think that these can be eradicated, if the false notion of good and evil things is taken away. For if the wise man thinks nothing good or evil, he will neither be inflamed with desire, nor be transported with joy, nor be alarmed with fear, nor suffer his spirits to droop1174    Contrahetur.   through sadness. We shall presently see whether they effect that which they wish, or what it is which they do effect: in the meantime their purpose is arrogant and almost mad, who think that they apply a remedy, and that they are able to strive in opposition to the force and system of nature.  

CAPUT XIV. De affectibus, ac de iis Stoicorum sententia, et de virtute, vitiis et misericordia.

Si ergo in homine praeclarum et excellens est bonum misericordia, idque divinis testimoniis, et bonorum malorumque consensu optimum judicatur: 0687A apparet philosophos longe abfuisse ab humano bono 0687A qui neque praeceperunt ejusmodi quidquam, neque fecerunt; sed virtutem, quae in homine propemodum singularis est, pro vitio semper habuerunt. Libet hic interponere unum de philosophia locum, ut illorum plenius coarguamus errores, qui misericordiam, cupiditatem, metum, morbos animi appellant. Conantur illi quidem virtutes a vitiis distinguere, quod est sane facillimum. Quis enim non possit liberalem a prodigo separare (ut illi faciunt) aut parcum a sordido, aut quietum ab inerti, aut cautum a timido? quod haec, quae sunt bona, fines suos habeant; quos si excesserint, in vitia labuntur: ita ut constantia, nisi pro veritate suscepta sit, fit impudentia; item fortitudo, si nulla necessitate cogente, aut non pro causa honesta 0687B certum periculum subierit, in temeritatem convertitur. Libertas quoque, si alios insectetur, potius quam insectantibus resistat, contumacia est. Severitas etiam, nisi se intra congruentes nocentium poenas coerceat, fit saeva crudelitas.

Itaque dicunt, eos, qui mali videantur, non sua sponte peccare, nec mala potius eligere: sed bonorum specie lapsos, incidere in mala, dum bonorum ac malorum discrimen ignorant. Haec quidem falsa non sunt: sed ad corpus cuncta referuntur. Nam parcum esse, aut constantem, aut cautum, aut quietum, aut fortem, aut severum, virtutes sunt quidem, sed hujus temporariae vitae. Nos autem, qui hanc vitam contemnimus, alias nobis virtutes propositas habemus, de quibus philosophi ne suspicari quidem 0687C ulla ratione potuerunt. Itaque et virtutes quasdam 0688A pro vitiis, et vitia quaedam pro virtutibus habuerunt. Nam Stoici affectus omnes, quorum impulsu animus commovetur, ex homine tollunt; cupiditatem, laetitiam, metum, moestitiam, quorum duo priora ex bonis sunt aut futuris, aut praesentibus, posteriora ex malis. Eodem modo haec quatuor, morbos (ut dixi) vocant, non tam natura insitos, quam prava opinione susceptos. Et idcirco eos censent extirpari posse radicitus, si bonorum malorumque opinio falsa tollatur. Si enim nihil censeat sapiens bonum, nihil malum; nec cupiditate ardescet, nec laetitia gestiet, nec metu terrebitur, nec aegritudine contrahetur. Mox videbimus, an efficiant, quod velint, aut quid efficiant: interim propositum arrogans, ac pene furiosum, qui se putent mederi, et eniti posse contra vim 0688B rationemque naturae.