Chap. XVI.—Of the Affections, and the Refutation of the Opinion of the Peripatetics Concerning Them; What is the Proper Use of the Affections, and What is a Bad Use of Them.

But I think that the Peripatetics did not even approach the truth, who allow that they are vices, but regulate them with moderation. For we must be free even from moderate vices; yea, rather, it ought to have been at first effected that there should be no vices. For nothing can be born vicious;1181    [See Augustine against Pelagius: another view.]   but if we make a bad use of the affections they become vices, if we use them well they become virtues. Then it must be shown that the causes of the affections, and not the affections themselves, must be moderated. We must not, they say, rejoice with excessive joy, but moderately and temperately. This is as though they should say that we must not run swiftly, but walk quietly. But it is possible that he who walks may err, and that he who runs may keep the right path. What if I show that there is a case in which it is vicious not only to rejoice moderately, but even in the smallest degree; and that there is another case, on the contrary, in which even to exult with transports of joy is by no means faulty? What then, I pray, will this mediocrity profit us? I ask whether they think that a wise man ought to rejoice if he sees any evil happening to his enemy; or whether he ought to curb his joy, if by the conquest of enemies, or the overthrow of a tyrant, liberty and safety have been acquired by his countrymen.1182    [Again this love of liberty, but loosely said.]    

No one doubts but that in the former case to rejoice a little, and in the latter to rejoice too little, is a very great crime. We may say the same respecting the other affections. But, as I have said, the object of wisdom does not consist in the regulation of these, but of their causes, since they are acted upon from without; nor was it befitting that these themselves should be restrained; since they may exist in a small degree with the greatest criminality, and in the greatest degree without any criminality. But they ought to have been assigned to fixed times, and circumstances, and places, that they may not be vices, when it is permitted us to make a right use of them. For as to walk in the right course is good, but to wander from it is evil, so to be moved by the affections to that which is right is good, but to that which is corrupt is evil. For sensual desire, if it does not wander from its lawful object, although it be ardent, yet is without fault. But if it desires an unlawful object, although it be moderate, yet it is a great vice. Therefore it is not a disease to be angry, nor to desire, nor to be excited by lust; but to be passionate, to be covetous or licentious, is a disease. For he who is passionate is angry even with him with whom he ought not to be angry or at times when he ought not. He who is covetous desires even that which is unnecessary. He who is licentious pursues even that which is forbidden by the laws. The whole matter ought to have turned on this, that since the impetuosity of these things cannot be restrained, nor is it right that it should be, because it is necessarily implanted for maintaining the duties of life, it might rather be directed into the right way, where it may be possible even to run without stumbling and danger.  

CAPUT XVI. De affectibus, ac de iis Peripateticorum eversa sententia: quis sit verus affectuum, quique eorum malus usus.

At ego ne Peripateticos quidem accessisse ad veritatem puto, qui vitia esse concedunt, sed ea mediocriter temperant. Carendum est enim vitiis etiam mediocribus: quin potius efficiendum fuit primum, ne vitia essent. Nec enim quidquam vitiosum nasci potest: sed vitia fieri, si male utamur affectibus; si bene, virtutes. Deinde monstrandum est, non ipsos affectus, sed eorum causas esse moderandas. Non est, 0692B inquiunt, laetitia nimia gestiendum; sed modice, ac moderate. Hoc vero tale est, quale si dicerent, non esse currendum concitate, sed gradiendum quiete. At potest et qui graditur, errare; et qui currit, rectam viam tenere. Quid si ostendo esse aliquid, ubi non tantum modicum, sed vel punctum gaudere, vitiosum sit; et aliud contra, in quo vel exultare laetitia minime criminosum? Quid tandem nobis ista mediocritas proderit? Quaero utrumne sapienti laetandum putent, si quid inimico suo mali videat accidere; aut utrumne laetitiam fraenare debeat, si victis hostibus, aut oppresso tyranno, libertas et salus civibus parta sit?

Nemo dubitat quin et in illo exiguum laetari, et in hoc parum laetari sit maximum crimen. Eadem de caeteris affectibus dicere licet. Sed, ut dixi, non in 0692C his moderandis sapientiae ratio versatur, sed in causis eorum: quoniam extrinsecus commoventur; nec 0693A ipsis potissimum fraenos imponi 0693A oportuit, quoniam et exigui possunt esse in maximo crimine, et maximi possunt esse sine crimine. Sed assignandi fuerunt certis temporibus, et rebus, et locis; ne vitia sint, quibus uti recte licet. Sicut enim recte ambulare bonum est, errare autem malum: sic moveri affectibus in rectum, bonum est; in pravum, malum. Nam libido, si extra legitimum torum non evagetur, licet sit vehemens, tamen culpa caret. Sin vero appetit alienum, licet sit mediocris, vitium tamen maximum est. Non est itaque morbus irasci, nec cupere, nec libidine commoveri: sed iracundum esse, morbus est, cupidum, libidinosum. Qui enim iracundus est, etiam cui non debet, aut cum non oportet, irascitur. Qui cupidus, etiam quod non opus est, concupiscit. Qui libidinosus, etiam quod legibus vetatur, affectat. Omnis 0693B igitur ratio in eo versari debuit, ut quoniam earum rerum impetus inhiberi non potest, nec debet, quia necessario est insitus ad tuenda officia vitae, dirigeretur potius in viam rectam, ubi etiam cursus offensione ac periculo careat.