Chap. III.—Of Nature, and of the World; And a Censure of the Stoics and Epicureans.

And since we are speaking of the errors of philosophers, the Stoics divide nature into two parts—the one which effects, the other which affords itself tractable for action. They say that in the former is contained all the power of perception, in the latter the material, and that the one cannot act without the other. How can that which handles and that which is handled be one and the same thing? If any one should say that the potter is the same as the clay, or that the clay is the same as the potter, would he not plainly appear to be mad? But these men comprehend under the one name of nature two things which are most widely different, God and the world, the Maker and the work; and say that the one can do nothing without the other, as though God were mixed up in nature with the world. For sometimes they so mix them together, that God Himself is the mind of the world, and that the world is the body of God; as though the world and God began to exist at the same time, and God did not Himself make the world. And they themselves also confess this at other times, when they say that it was made for the sake of men, and that God could, if He willed it, exist without the world, inasmuch as God is the divine and eternal mind, separate and free from a body. And since they were unable to understand His power and majesty, they mixed Him1277    Eum. Others read “eam,” referring it to “majestatem.”      Quoniam. This word appears to be out of place, as its proper meaning is “since.” Either it must be taken as above, or, with some editors, the last clause of this chapter may be taken as the beginning of the next chapter—“Since there is a providence,” etc.   with the world, that is, with His own work. Whence is that saying of Virgil:1278    Æneid, vi. 726.  —  

What, then, becomes of their own saying, that the world was both made and is governed by the divine providence? For if He made the world, it follows that He existed without the world; if He governs it, it is plain that it is not as the mind governs the body, but as a master rules the house, as a pilot the ship, as a charioteer the chariot. Nor, however, are they mixed with those things which they govern. For if all these things which we see are members of God, then God is rendered insensible by them, since the members are without sensibility, and mortal, since we see that the members are mortal.  

I can enumerate how often lands shaken by sudden motions1279    i.e., earthquakes.   have either opened or sunk down precipitously; how often cities and islands have been overwhelmed by waves, and gone into the deep; marshes have inundated fruitful plains, rivers and pools have been dried up;1280    Siccaverunt: rarely used in a neuter sense.   mountains also have either fallen precipitously, or have been levelled with plains. Many districts, and the foundations of many mountains, are laid waste by latent and internal fire. And this is not enough, if God does not spare His own members, unless it is permitted man also to have some power over the body of God. Seas are built up, mountains are cut down, and the innermost bowels of the earth are dug out to draw forth riches. Why, should I say that we cannot even plough without lacerating the divine body? So that we are at once wicked and impious in doing violence to the members of God. Does God, then, suffer His body to be harassed, and endure to weaken Himself, or permit this to be done by man? Unless by chance that divine intelligence which is mixed with the world, and with all parts of the world, abandoned the first outer aspect1281    Primam terræ faciem: as opposed to the inner depths.   of the earth, and plunged itself into the lowest depths, that it might be sensible of no pain from continual laceration. But if this is trifling and absurd, then they themselves were as devoid of intelligence as those are who have not perceived that the divine spirit is everywhere diffused, and that all things are held together by it, not however in such a manner that God, who is incorruptible, should Himself be mixed with heavy and corruptible elements. Therefore that is more correct which they derived from Plato, that the world was made by God, and is also governed by His providence. It was therefore befitting that Plato, and those who held the same opinion, should teach and explain what was the cause, what the reason, for the contriving of so great a work; why or for the sake of whom He made it.  

But the Stoics also say the world was made for the sake of men. I hear. But Epicurus is ignorant on what account or who made men themselves. For Lucretius, when he said that the world was not made by the gods, thus spoke:1282    De Rer. Nat., v. 157–166.    

then he introduced:—  

And with good reason. For they brought forward no reason why the human race was created or established by God. It is our business to set forth the mystery of the world and man, of which they, being destitute, were able neither to reach nor see the shrine of truth. Therefore, as I said a little before, when they had assumed that which was true, that is, that the world was made by God, and was made for the sake of men, yet, since their argument failed them in the consequences, they were unable to defend that which they had assumed. In fine, Plato, that he might not make the work of God weak and subject to ruin, said that it would remain for ever. If it was made for the sake of men, and so made as to be eternal, why then are not they on whose account it was made eternal? If they are mortal on account of whom it was made, it must also itself be mortal and subject to dissolution, for it is not of more value than those for whose sake it was made. But if his argument1283    Quòd si ratio ei quadraret.   were consistent, he would understand that it must perish because it was made, and that nothing can remain for ever except that which cannot be touched.  

But he who says that it was not made for the sake of men has no argument. For if he says that the Creator contrived these works of such magnitude on His own account, why then were we produced? Why do we enjoy the world itself? what means the creation of the human race, and of the other living creatures? why do we intercept the advantages of others? why, in short, do we grow, decrease, and perish? What reason is implied in our production itself? what in our perpetual succession? Doubtless God wished us to be seen, and to frame, as it were, impressions1284    Little images, sigilla.   with various representations of Himself, with which He might delight Himself. Nevertheless, if it were so, He would esteem living creatures as His care, and especially man, to whose command He made all things subject. But with regard to those who say that the world always existed: I omit that point, that itself cannot exist without some beginning, from which they are unable to extricate themselves; but I say this, if the world always existed, it can have no systematic arrangement.1285    Rationem.   For what could arrangement have effected in that which never had a beginning? For before anything is done or arranged, there is need of counsel that it may be determined how it should be done; nor can anything be done without the foresight of a settled plan. Therefore the plan precedes every work. Therefore that which has not been made has no plan. But the world has a plan by which it both exists and is governed; therefore also it was made: if it was made, it will also be destroyed. Let them therefore assign a reason, if they can, why it was either made in the beginning or will hereafter be destroyed.  

And because Epicurus or Democritus was unable to teach this, he said that it was produced of its own accord, the seeds1286    i.e., atoms.   coming together in all directions; and that when these are again resolved, discord and destruction will follow. Therefore he perverted1287    Corrupit.   that which he had correctly seen, and by his ignorance of system entirely overthrew the whole system, and reduced the world, and all things which are done in it, to the likeness of a most trifling dream, if no plan exists in human affairs. But since the world and all its parts, as we see, are governed by a wonderful plan; since the framing of the heaven, and the course of the stars and of the heavenly bodies, which is harmonious1288    Æqualis.   even in variety itself, the constant and wonderful arrangement of the seasons, the varied fruitfulness of the lands, the level plains, the defences and heapings up of mountains, the verdure and productiveness of the woods, the most salubrious bursting forth of fountains, the seasonable overflowings of rivers, the rich and abundant flowing1289    Interfusio.   in of the sea, the opposite and useful breathing1290    Aspiratio.   of the winds, and all things, are fixed with the greatest regularity: who is so blind as to think that they were made without a cause, in which a wonderful disposition of most provident arrangement shines forth? If, therefore, nothing at all exists nor is done without a cause; if the providence of the Supreme God is manifest from the disposition of things, His excellency from their greatness, and His power from their government: therefore they are dull and mad who have said that there is no providence. I should not disapprove if they denied the existence of gods with this object, that they might affirm the existence of one; but when they did it with this intent, that they might say that there is none, he who does not think that they were senseless is himself senseless.  

CAPUT III. De natura et de mundo; atque reprehensio Stoicorum et Epicureorum.

Et quoniam de philosophorum erroribus loquimur, 0741A Stoici naturam 0741A in duas partes dividunt: unam, quae efficiat; alteram, quae se ad faciendum tractabilem praebeat. In illa prima esse vim sentiendi; in hac, materiam; nec alterum sine altero posse. Quomodo potest idem esse quod tractat, et quod tractatur? Si quis dicat idem esse figulum quod lutum, aut lutum idem esse quod figulum, nonne aperte insanire videatur? At isti uno naturae nomine duas res diversissimas comprehendunt, Deum et mundum, artificem et opus; dicuntque alterum sine altero nihil posse, tanquam natura sit Deus mundo permixtus. Nam interdum sic confundunt, ut sit Deus ipse mens mundi et mundus sit corpus Dei. Quasi vero simul esse coeperint mundus, et Deus; ac non ipse mundum fecerit: quod et ipsi fatentur alias, cum hominum causa 0741B praedicant esse fabricatum, et sine mundo esse, si velit, possit; siquidem Deus est divina et aeterna mens a corpore soluta et libera. Cujus vim majestatemque quoniam intelligere non poterant, miscuerunt 0742A eum mundo, id est, operi suo. Unde est illud Virgilianum: Totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.Ubi est ergo illud, quod iidem ipsi aiunt, et factum esse divina providentia, et regi? Si enim fecit mundum, fuit ergo sine mundo. Si regit, non utique sicut mens corpus regit, sed tanquam dominus domum, navim gubernator, auriga currum. Nec tamen mixti sunt iis rebus, quas regunt. Nam si haec omnia, quae videmus, Dei membra sunt, jam insensibilis ab his constituitur Deus, quoniam membra sensu carent, et mortalis, quoniam videmus membra esse mortalia.

Possum enumerare, quoties repentinis quassatae 0742B motibus vel hiaverint terrae, vel desederint in abruptum; quoties demersae fluctibus, et urbes, et insulae abierint in profundum; frugiferos campos paludes inundaverint; flumina et stagna siccaverint; montes 0743A etiam 0743A vel deciderint abrupti, vel planis fuerint adaequati. Plurimas regiones, et multorum fundamenta montium latens et internus ignis absumit. Et hoc parum est, si membris suis non parcit Deus, nisi etiam homini liceat aliquid in Dei corpus: maria extruuntur; montes exciduntur, et ad eruendas opes interiora terrae viscera effodiuntur. Quid quod ne arari quidem sine laceratione divini corporis potest? ut jam scelerati et impii simus, qui Dei membra violemus. Patiturne ergo vexari corpus suum Deus, et debilem se vel ipse facere, vel ab homine fieri sinit? nisi forte divinus ille sensus, qui mundo et omnibus mundi partibus permixtus est, primam terrae faciem reliquit, ac se in ima demersit, ne quid doloris de assidua laceratione sentiret. Quod si hoc vanum et absurdum 0743B est, tam igitur ipsi eguerunt, quam haec indigent sensu, qui non perspexerunt divinum quidem spiritum esse ubique diffusum, eoque omnia contineri, non tamen ita, ut Deus ipse, qui est incorruptus, gravibus et corruptibilibus elementis misceatur. Illud ergo rectius, quod a Platone (in Timaeo) sumpserunt, a Deo factum esse mundum, et ejusdem providentia gubernari. Oportebat igitur et Platonem, et eos qui idem senserunt, docere atque explicare, quae causa, quae ratio fuerit tanti operis fabricandi; quare hoc, aut cujus gratia fecerit.

At iidem Stoici, hominum, inquiunt, causa mundus effectus est. Audio. Sed Epicurus ignorat, ipsos homines quare, aut quis effecerit. Nam Lucretius, cum diceret mundum non esse a diis constitutum, sic 0743C ait (lib. V de Natura rerum): Dicere porro hominum causa voluisse parare; Praeclaram mundi naturam0744A Deinde intulit: Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis Gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti, Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere aggrediantur?

Et merito. Illi enim nullam rationem afferebant, cur humanum genus vel creatum, vel constitutum esset a Deo. Nostrum hoc officium est, sacramentum mundi et hominis exponere, cujus illi expertes, sacrarium veritatis nec attingere, nec videre potuerunt. ergo (ut paulo ante dicebam) cum assumpsissent id quod erat verum, id est, mundum a Deo factum, et hominum causa esse factum; tamen, quoniam eos in consequentibus ratio defecit, non potuerunt defendere id quod assumpserant. Denique Plato, ne Dei opus imbecillum et ruinosum faceret, in aeternum 0744B dixit esse mansurum. Si hominum causa factus est, et ita factus est ut esset aeternus, cur ergo ipsi quorum causa factus est, non sunt sempiterni? Si mortales, propter quos factus est, ergo et ipse mortalis atque solubilis. Neque enim pluris est ipse, quam ii, quorum gratia factus est. Quod si ei ratio quadraret, intelligeret periturum esse, quia factus est; nec posse in aeternum manere, nisi quod tangi non potest.

Qui autem negat hominum causa factum, hic nullam rationem tenet. Si enim dicit, ipsum fabricatorem sua causa tanta haec opera esse molitum, cur ergo nos nati sumus? cur mundo ipso fruimur? Quid sibi vult humani generis caeterorumque animantium fictio? Cur aliena commoda intercipimus? Cur denique augemur, minuimur, interimus? Quid habet rationis 0744C ipsa generatio? quid perpetua successio? Nimirum videri nos Deus voluit, et suis variis imaginibus tanquam sigilla confingere, quibus se oblectaret; et 0745A nihilominus tamen, si ita esset, curae haberet animantes, praecipueque hominem, cujus imperio cuncta subjecit. Qui autem dicunt semper fuisse mundum, omitto illud, quod esse ipse 0745A sine aliquo principio non potest, unde extricare se nequeunt; sed hoc dico: si mundus semper fuit, nullam potest habere rationem. Quid enim potuit in eo ratio moliri, quod nunquam sumpsit exordium? Nam prius quam fiat aliquid, aut struatur, opus est consilio, ut disponi possit quemadmodum fiat, nec incipi quidquam potest sine provisione rationis. Itaque omne opus ratio praecedit. Non habet ergo rationem, quod factum non est. Atqui mundus rationem habet, qua et constat, et regitur; ergo et factus est: si factus est, et resolvetur. Reddant ergo isti rationem, si possunt, cur aut factus in 0745B principio sit, aut postea resolvatur.

Quod quia docere non poterat Epicurus, sive Democritus, sua sponte natum esse dixit, seminibus inter se passim coeuntibus, quibus iterum resolutis, dissidium atque interitum secuturum. Corrupit ergo quod recte viderat, et totam rationem penitus ignorantia rationis evertit; redegitque mundum, et omnia quae in eo geruntur, ad similitudinem cujusdam vanissimi somnii, siquidem rebus humanis ratio nulla subsistat. Cum vero mundum, omnesque partes ejus, ut videmus, mirabilis ratio gubernet; cum coeli temperatio, et aequalis in ipsa varietate cursus astrorum luminumque coelestium, temporum constans ac mira descriptio, terrarum varia foecunditas, plana camporum munimenta, et aggeres montium, viriditas ubertasque 0745C silvarum, fontium saluberrima eruptio, fluminum opportuna inundatio, maris opulenta et copiosa interfusio, ventorum diversa et utilis aspiratio, caeteraque omnia ratione summa constent: quis tam caecus est, ut existimet sine causa esse facta, in quibus mira dispositio providentissimae rationis elucet? 0746A Si ergo sine causa nec est, nec fit omnino quidquam: si et providentia summi Dei ex dispositione rerum, et virtus ex magnitudine, et potestas ex gubernatione manifesta est: hebetes ergo et insani, qui providentiam non esse dixerunt. Non improbarem; si deos idcirco non esse dicerent, ut unum dicerent: cum autem ideo ut nullum, qui eos delirasse non putat, ipse delirat.