Chap. IV.—That All Things Were Created for Some Use, Even Those Things Which Appear Evil; On What Account Man Enjoys Reason in So Frail a Body.

But we have spoken sufficiently on the subject of providence in the first book. For if it has any existence, as appears from the wonderful nature of its works, it must be that the same providence created man and the other animals. Let us therefore see what reason there was for the creation of the human race, since it is evident, as the Stoics say, that the world was made for the sake of men, although they make no slight error in this very matter, in saying it was not made for the sake of man, but of men. For the naming of one individual comprehends the whole human race. But this arises from the fact that they are ignorant that one man only was made by God, and they think that men were produced in all lands and fields like mushrooms. But Hermes was not ignorant that man was both made by God and after the likeness of God. But I return to my subject. There is nothing, as I imagine, which was made on its own account; but whatever is made at all must necessarily be made for some purpose. For who is there either so senseless or so unconcerned as to attempt to do anything at random, from which he expects no utility, no advantage? He who builds a house does not build it merely for this purpose, that it may be a house, but that it may be inhabited. He who builds a ship does not bestow his labour on this account, only that the ship may be visible, but that men may sail in it. Likewise he who designs and forms any vessel does not do it on this account, that he may only appear to have done it, but that the vessel when made may contain something necessary for use. In like manner, other things, whatever are made, are plainly not made superfluously, but for some useful purposes.  

It is plain, therefore, that the world was made by God, not on account of the world itself; for since it is without sensibility, it neither needs the warmth of the sun, or light, or the breath of the winds, or the moisture of showers, or the nourishment of fruits. But it cannot even be said that God made the world for His own sake, since He can exist without the world, as He did before it was made; and God Himself does not make use of all those things which are contained in it, and which are produced. It is evident, therefore, that the world was constructed for the sake of living beings, since living beings enjoy those things of which it consists; and that these may live and exist, all things necessary for them are supplied at fixed times. Again, that the other living beings were made for the sake of man, is plain from this, that they are subservient to man, and were given for his protection and service; since, whether they are of the earth or of the water, they do not perceive the system of the world as man does. We must here reply to the philosophers, and especially to Cicero, who says: “Why should God, when He made all things on our account, make so large a quantity of snakes and vipers? why should He scatter so many pernicious things by land and by sea?” A very wide subject for discussion, but it must be briefly touched upon, as in passing. Since man is formed of different and opposing elements, soul and body, that is, heaven and earth, that which is slight and that which is perceptible to the senses, that which is eternal and that which is temporal, that which has sensibility and that which is senseless, that which is endued with light and that which is dark, reason itself and necessity require that both good and evil things should be set before man—good things which he may use, and evil things which he may guard against and avoid.  

For wisdom has been given to him on this account, that, knowing the nature of good and evil things, he may exercise the force of his reason in seeking the good and avoiding the evil. For because wisdom was not given to the other animals, they were both defended with natural clothing and were armed; but in the place of all these He gave to man that which was most excellent, reason only. Therefore He formed him naked and unarmed, that wisdom might be both his defence and covering. He placed his defence and ornament not without, but within not in the body, but in the heart. Unless, therefore, there were evils which he might guard against, and which he might distinguish from good and useful things, wisdom was not necessary for him. Therefore let Marcus Tullius know that reason was either given to man that he might take fishes on account of his own use, and avoid snakes and vipers for the sake of his own safety; or that good and evil things were set before him on this account, because he had received wisdom, the whole force of which is occupied in distinguishing things good and evil.1291    [The parables of nature are admirably expounded by Jones of Nayland. See his Zoologica Ethica, his Book of Nature, and his Moral Character of the Monkey, vols. iii., xi., and xii., Works, London, 1801.]      Naturalem.   Great, therefore, and right, and admirable is the force, and reason, and power of man, for whose sake God made the world itself and all things, as many as exist, and gave him so much honour that He set him over all things, since he alone could admire the works of God. Most excellently, therefore, does our Asclepiades,1292    Asclepiades was a Christian writer, and contemporary of Lactantius, to whom he wrote a book on the providence of God. [According to Eusebius, a bishop of this name presided at Antioch from a.d. 214 to 220; but this is evidently another.]      Quid sit Deus.   in discussing the providence of the Supreme God in that book which he wrote to me, say: “And on this account any one may with good reason think that the divine providence gave the place nearest to itself to him who was able to understand its arrangement. For that is the sun: who so beholds it as to understand why it is the sun, and what amount of influence it has upon the other parts of the system? this is the heaven, who looks up to it? this is the earth, who inhabits it? this is the sea, who sails upon it? this is fire, who makes use of it?” Therefore the Supreme God did not arrange these things on account of Himself, because He stands in need of nothing, but on account of man, who might fitly make use of them.  

CAPUT IV. Quod omnia in aliquem usum creata sunt, etiam quae mala videntur: quare homo in tam fragili corpore ratione fruatur.

Sed de providentia satis in primo libro diximus. Quia et si est, ut apparet ex mirabilitate operum suorum, necesse est etiam hominem, caeterasque 0746B animantes, eadem providentia creaverit. Videamus ergo, quae ratio fuerit fingendi generis humani; quoniam constat, id quod Stoici dicunt, hominum causa mundum esse fabricatum: quanquam in hoc ipso non mediocriter peccent, quod non hominis causa dicunt, sed hominum. Unius enim singularis appellatio totum comprehendit humanum genus. Sed hoc ideo, quia ignorant unum hominem a Deo esse formatum, putantque homines in omnibus terris et agris tanquam fungos esse generatos. At Hermes non ignoravit hominem, et a Deo, et ad Dei similitudinem fictum. Sed redeo ad propositum. Nihil est (ut opinor) quod sit propter seipsum factum: sed quidquid omnino fit, ad usum aliquem fieri necesse est. Quis est enim vel tam ineptus, vel tam otiosus, ut 0746C aggrediatur aliquid facere frustra, ex quo nullam utilitatem, nullum commodum speret? Qui domum aedificat, non idcirco aedificat, ut tantummodo domus sit: sed ut in ea possit habitari. Qui navem fabricat, non ideo insumit operam, ut tantum navis appareat: 0747A sed ut in ea navigetur. Item qui vas aliquod instituit 0747A ac format, non propterea id facit, ut tantum fecisse videatur: sed ut vas illud effectum capiat aliquid necessarium. Similiter caetera, quaecumque fiunt, non utique in supervacuum, sed ad usus aliquos utiles laborantur.

Mundus igitur a Deo factus est, non utique propter ipsum mundum; neque enim aut calore solis, aut lumine, aut aspiratione ventorum, aut humore imbrium, aut alimonia frugum, cum sensu careat, indiget. Sed ne illud quidem dici potest, quod Deus propter seipsum fecerit mundum; quoniam potest esse sine mundo, sicut fuit antea, et iis omnibus quae in eo sunt, quaeque generantur, Deus ipse non utitur. Apparet ergo animantium causa mundum esse 0747B constructum; quoniam rebus iis, quibus constat, animantes fruuntur: quae ut vivere, ut constare possint, omnia his necessaria temporibus certis subministrantur. Rursum caeteras animantes hominis causa esse fictas, ex eo clarum est, quod homini serviunt, et tutelae ejus atque usibus datae sunt; quoniam sive terrenae sunt, sive aquatiles, non sentiunt mundi rationem, sicut homo. Respondendum est hoc loco philosophis, maximeque Ciceroni, qui ait: «Cur Deus omnia nostri causa cum faceret, tantam vim natricum viperarumque fecerit? cur tam multa pestifera terra marique disperserit?» Ingens ad disputandum locus: sed ut in transcursu breviter stringendus est. Quoniam homo ex rebus diversis ac repugnantibus 0747C configuratus est, anima et corpore, id est, coelo atque 0748A terra, tenui et comprehensibili, aeterno ac temporali, sensibili atque bruto, luce praedito atque tenebroso: ipsa ratio ac necessitas exigebat, et bona homini proponi et mala; bona, quibus utatur, mala, quae vitet et caveat.

Idcirco enim data est illi sapientia, ut cognita bonorum malorumque natura, et in appetendis bonis, et malis declinandis, vim suae rationis exerceat. Nam caeteris animalibus quia sapientia non data est, et munita indumentis naturalibus, et armata sunt: homini autem pro his omnibus, quod erat praecipuum, rationem solam dedit. Itaque nudum formavit et inermem, ut eum sapientia et muniret, et tegeret. Munimenta et ornatum ejus non foris, sed intus, non in corpore, sed in corde constituit. Nisi ergo essent 0748B mala quae caveret, quae a bonis utilibusque distingueret, non esset ei sapientia necessaria. Sciat ergo Marcus Tullius, aut ideo homini datam esse rationem, ut et pisces caperet usus sui gratia, et natrices viperasque vitaret salutis suae causa: aut idcirco ei bona malaque proposita, quia sapientiam acceperat, cujus vis omnis in discernendis bonis malisque versatur. Magna igitur, et recta, et admirabilis est vis, et ratio, et potestas hominis, propter quem mundum ipsum, et universa quaecumque sunt, Deus fecit; tantumque honoris illi habuit, ut eum praeficeret universis, quoniam solus poterat Dei opera mirari. Optime igitur Asclepiades noster de providentia summi Dei disserens, in eo libro quem scripsit ad 0748C me: «Atque ideo, inquit, merito quis arbitretur, 0749A proximum sibi locum divinam providentiam dedisse ei, qui poterat intelligere 0749A ordinationem suam. Nam sol iste est; quis eum videt ita, ut intelligat quia sol est, et quantum gratiae afferat caeteris institutis? hoc coelum est; quis id suspicit? terra haec; quis eam colit? hoc pelagus; quis in eo navigat? hic ignis est; quis eo utitur?» Instituit ergo summus Deus non propter se, quia nihilo indiget, sed propter hominem, qui his congruenter uteretur.