Chap. XXXI.—Of Knowledge and Supposition.

Moreover, there are two things which appear to fall under the subject of philosophy—knowledge and supposition; and if these are taken away, philosophy altogether falls to the ground. But the chief of the philosophers themselves have taken away both from philosophy. Socrates took away knowledge, Zeno supposition. Let us see whether they were right in doing so. Wisdom is, as Cicero defined it,1473    De Offic., ii. 2.   the knowledge of divine and human things. Now if this definition is true, wisdom does not come within the power of man. For who of mortals can assume this to himself, to profess that he knows divine and human things? I say nothing of human affairs; for although they are connected with divine, yet, since they belong to man, let us grant that it is possible for man to know them. Certainly he cannot know divine things by himself, since he is a man; whereas he who knows them must be divine, and therefore God. But man is neither divine nor God. Man, therefore, cannot thoroughly know divine things by himself. No one, therefore, is wise but God, or certainly that man whom God has taught. But they, because they are neither gods, nor taught by God, cannot be wise, that is, acquainted with divine and human things. Knowledge, therefore, is rightly taken away by Socrates and the Academics. Supposition also does not agree with the wise man. For every one supposes that of which he is ignorant. Now, to suppose that you know that of which you are ignorant, is rashness and folly. Supposition, therefore, was rightly taken away by Zeno. If, therefore, there is no knowledge in man, and there ought to be no supposition, philosophy is cut up by the roots.  

CAPUT XXXI. (Div. Inst. lib. III, c. 3 et 4.) De scientia et opinatione.

Praeterea duo sunt, quae cadere in philosophiam 1039B videntur, scientia et opinatio; quae si auferantur, tota philosophia corruit. Atqui utrumque philosophiae ipsi philosophorum principes ademerunt. Scientiam Socrates, opinationem sustulit Zeno. Videamus an recte sapientia est, ut Cicero definivit, divinarum et humanarum rerum scientia. Quae definitio si vera est, non cadit in hominem sapientia. Quis enim mortalium hoc sibi possit assumere, ut divina et humana scire se profiteatur? Humana omitto; quae quamquam cum divinis connexa sunt, tamen quia sunt hominis, concedamus ut homo illa scire possit. Divina certe per se scire non potest, quia homo est: qui autem scit illa, divinus sit necesse est, ac propterea Deus. Homo autem nec divinus, nec Deus est. Non potest igitur perscire 1039C homo divina. Nemo ergo sapiens, nisi Deus, aut certe is homo, quem Deus docuit. Illi autem, quia nec dii sunt, nec a Deo docti, sapientes ergo, id est, divinarum et humanarum rerum scientes esse non possunt. Recte igitur a Socrate atque Academicis scientia sublata est. Opinatio quoque non congruit sapienti. Id enim quisque opinatur, quod ignorat. Opinari autem scire te, quod ignores, temeritas ac stultitia est. Recte igitur opinatio a Zenone sublata est. Si ergo scientia in homine nulla est, et opinatio esse non debet, philosophia radicitus amputatur.