Chap. LXVIII.—Of the World, Man, and the Providence of God.

Let us therefore consider what was the plan of making this so great and so immense a work. God made the world, as Plato thought, but he does not show why He made it. Because He is good, he says, and envying no one, He made the things which are good. But we see that there are both good and evil things in the system of nature. Some perverse person may stand forth, such as that atheist Theodorus was, and answer Plato: Nay, because He is evil, He made the things which are evil. How will he refute him? If God made the things which are good, whence have such great evils burst forth, which, for the most part, even prevail over those which are good? They were contained, he says, in the matter. If there were evil, therefore there were also good things; so that either God made nothing, or if He made only good things, the evil things which were not made are more eternal than the good things which had a beginning. Therefore the things which at one time began will have an end, and those which always existed will be permanent. Therefore evils are preferable. But if they cannot be preferable, they cannot indeed be more eternal. Therefore they either always existed, and God has been inactive,1576    Otiosus.   or they both flowed from one source. For it is more in accordance with reason that God made all things, than that He made nothing.  

Therefore, according to the sentiments of Plato, the same God is both good, because He made good things, and evil, because He made evil things. And if this cannot be so, it is evident that the world was not made by God on this account, because He is good. For He comprised all things, both good and evil; nor did He make anything for its own sake, but on account of something else. A house is built not for this purpose only, that there may be a house, but that it may receive and shelter an inhabitant. Likewise a ship is built not for this purpose, that it may appear only to be a ship, but that men may be able to sail in it. Vessels also are made, not only that the vessels may exist, but that they may receive things which are necessary for use. Thus also God must have made the world for some use. The Stoics say that it was made for the sake of men; and rightly so. For men enjoy all these good things which the world contains in itself. But they do not explain why men themselves were made, or what advantage Providence, the Maker of all things, has in them.  

Plato also affirms that souls are immortal, but why, or in what manner, or at what time, or by whose instrumentality they attain to immortality, or what is the nature of that great mystery, why those who are about to become immortal are previously born mortal, and then, having completed the course1577    Decurso…spatio. The expression is borrowed from a chariot race.   of their temporal life, and having laid aside the covering1578    Corporum exuviis.   of their frail bodies, are transferred to that eternal blessedness,—of all this he has no comprehension. Finally, he did not explain the judgment of God, nor the distinction between the just and the unjust, but supposed that the souls which have plunged themselves into crimes are condemned thus far, that they may be reproduced in the lower animals, and thus atone for their offences, until they again return to the forms of men, and that this is always taking place, and that there is no end of this transmigration. In my opinion, he introduces some sport resembling a dream, in which there appears to be neither plan, nor government of God, nor any design.  

CAPUT LXVIII. (Lib. VI div. Inst., cap. 4.) De mundo, homine et Dei providentia.

Consideremus igitur quae ratio fuerit hujus tanti tamque immensi operis fabricandi. Fecit Deus mundum, sicut Plato existimavit: sed cur fecerit, non ostendit. Quia bonus, inquit, et invidens nulli, fecit 1083B quae bona sunt. Atqui videmus in rerum natura, et bona esse et mala. Potest ergo existere perversus aliquis, qualis fuerit ἄθεος ille Theodorus, et Platoni respondere: Imo quia malus est, fecit quae mala sunt. Quomodo illum redarguet? Si quae bona sunt, Deus fecit, unde igitur tanta mala eruperunt, quae plerumque etiam praevalent bonis? In materia, inquit, continebantur. Bona igitur et mala, aut nihil, fecit Deus. Si bona tantum fecit, aeterniora sunt mala, quae facta non sunt, quam bona, quae habuerunt exordium. Finem igitur habebunt, quae aliquando coeperunt, et permanebunt, quae semper fuerunt. 1083C Mala ergo potiora sunt. Si autem potiora esse 1084A non possunt, ne aeterniora quidem possunt. Ergo aut utraque semper fuerunt, et Deus otiosus, aut utraque ex uno fonte fluxerunt. Est enim convenientius, ut Deus omnia fecerit potius quam nihil.

Ergo secundum sententiam Platonis, idem Deus et bonus est, quia bona fecit, et malus, quia mala. Quod si fieri non potest, apparet non ideo factum esse a Deo mundum, quia bonum est mundus. Omnia enim complexus est bona et mala, nec fecit propter se quidquam, sed propter aliud. Domus enim aedificatur, non ad hoc solum ut sit domus, sed ut suscipiat et tueatur habitantem. Item navis fabricatur, non ad hoc ut navis videatur tantum, sed ut in ea possint homines navigare. Vasa item fiunt, non ut vasa sint solum, sed ut capiant quae sunt 1084B usui necessaria. Sic et mundum Deus ad usum aliquem fecerit necesse est. Stoici aiunt causa hominum factum esse, et recte. Homines enim fruuntur his omnibus bonis, quae mundus in se continet. Sed ipsi homines cur facti sint, aut quid in illis utilitatis habeat illa rerum fabricatrix providentia, non explicant.

Immortales esse animas idem Plato affirmat (Plato in Phaed., Phaedon., Gorg., de Leg.): sed cur, aut quomodo, aut quando, aut per quem immortalitatem assequantur, aut quodnam sit omnino tantum illud mysterium; cur ii, qui sunt immortales futuri, prius mortales nascantur, deinde decurso temporalis vitae spatio, atque abjectis fragilium corporum exuviis, 1084C ad aeternam illam beatitudinem transferantur, 1085A non comprehendit. Denique nec judicium Dei, nec discrimen justi et injusti explicavit: sed animas, quae se 1085A sceleribus immerserint, hactenus condemnari putavit, ut in pecudibus renascantur, et ita peccatorum suorum luere poenas, donec rursus ad figuras hominum revertantur; et hoc fieri semper, nec esse finem transmeandi. Ludum mihi nescio quem inducit, somnio similem, cui nec ratio ulla, nec Dei gubernatio, nec consilium aliquod inesse videatur.