QUINTI SEPTIMII FLORENTIS TERTULLIANI ADVERSUS MARCIONEM LIBRI QUINQUE.

 LIBER PRIMUS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 CAPUT XXIX.

 LIBER SECUNDUS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 [CAPUT XVII.]

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 CAPUT XXIX.

 LIBER TERTIUS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 LIBER QUARTUS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 CAPUT XXIX.

 CAPUT XXX.

 CAPUT XXXI.

 CAPUT XXXII.

 CAPUT XXXIII.

 CAPUT XXXIV.

 CAPUT XXXV.

 CAPUT XXXVI.

 CAPUT XXXVII.

 CAPUT XXXVIII.

 CAPUT XXXIX.

 CAPUT XL.

 CAPUT XLI.

 CAPUT XLII.

 CAPUT XLIII.

 LIBER V.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

Chapter IV.—Defence of the Divine Unity Against Objection. No Analogy Between Human Powers and God’s Sovereignty. The Objection Otherwise Untenable, for Why Stop at Two Gods?

But some one may contend that two great Supremes may exist, distinct and separate in their own departments; and may even adduce, as an example, the kingdoms of the world, which, though they are so many in number, are yet supreme in their several regions. Such a man will suppose that human circumstances are always comparable with divine ones. Now, if this mode of reasoning be at all tolerable, what is to prevent our introducing, I will not say a third god or a fourth, but as many as there are kings of the earth? Now it is God that is in question, whose main property it is to admit of no comparison with Himself. Nature itself, therefore, if not an Isaiah, or rather God speaking by Isaiah, will deprecatingly ask, “To whom will ye liken me?”50    Isa. xl. 18, 25.    Rev. xxii. 15. Human circumstances may perhaps be compared with divine ones, but they may not be with God.  God is one thing, and what belongs to God is another thing. Once more:51    Denique.    Articulo. you who apply the example of a king, as a great supreme, take care that you can use it properly. For although a king is supreme on his throne next to God, he is still inferior to God; and when he is compared with God, he will be dislodged52    Excidet.    John x. 25. from that great supremacy which is transferred to God. Now, this being the case, how will you employ in a comparison with God an object as your example, which fails53    Amittitur. “Tertullian” (who thinks lightly of the analogy of earthly monarchs) “ought rather to have contended that the illustration strengthened his argument.  In each kingdom there is only one supreme power; but the universe is God’s kingdom: there is therefore only one supreme power in the universe.”— Bp. Kaye, On the Writings of Tertullian, Third edition, p. 453, note 2.    He refers to Hermogenes; see Adv. Hermog. chap. xxxii. in all the purposes which belong to a comparison? Why, when supreme power among kings cannot evidently be multifarious, but only unique and singular, is an exception made in the case of Him (of all others)54    Scilicet.    Vel…vel. who is King of kings, and (from the exceeding greatness of His power, and the subjection of all other ranks55    Graduum.    Quanquam. to Him) the very summit,56    Culmen.    As the Marcionites alleged. as it were, of dominion? But even in the case of rulers of that other form of government, where they one by one preside in a union of authority, if with their petty57    Minutalibus regnis.    Signatus est. prerogatives of royalty, so to say, they be brought on all points58    Undique.    Animæ. into such a comparison with one another as shall make it clear which of them is superior in the essential features59    Substantiis.    Nec alias nisi. and powers of royalty, it must needs follow that the supreme majesty will redound60    Eliquetur. to one alone,—all the others being gradually, by the issue of the comparison, removed and excluded from the supreme authority. Thus, although, when spread out in several hands, supreme authority seems to be multifarious, yet in its own powers, nature, and condition, it is unique. It follows, then, that if two gods are compared, as two kings and two supreme authorities, the concentration of authority must necessarily, according to the meaning of the comparison, be conceded to one of the two; because it is clear from his own superiority that he is the supreme, his rival being now vanquished, and proved to be not the greater, however great. Now, from this failure of his rival, the other is unique in power, possessing a certain solitude, as it were, in his singular pre-eminence. The inevitable conclusion at which we arrive, then, on this point is this: either we must deny that God is the great Supreme, which no wise man will allow himself to do; or say that God has no one else with whom to share His power.

CAPUT IV.

Sed argumentabitur quilibet, posse et duo summa magna consistere distincta atque disjuncta in suis finibus, et utique advocabit exemplum: Regna terrarum tanta numero, et tamen summa magna in suis quibusque regionibus, et putabit utique humana divinis conferenda. Jam ergo, si huic argumentationi 0250C locus dabitur, quid prohibet, non dico et tertium et quartum deum inducere, verum tot jam numero quot et gentium reges? De Deo agitur, cujus hoc principaliter proprium est, nullius exempli capere comparationem. Hoc natura ipsa, si non aliquis Isaias, vel ipse per Isaiam Deus concionabitur: Cui me similabitis (Is. XL, 25)? Divinis forsitan comparabuntur humana? Deo non ita : aliud enim Deus, aliud quae Dei. Denique, qui exemplo uteris regis, quasi summi magni, vide ne jam non possis eo uti. Rex enim, etsi summum 0251A magnum est in suo solio usque ad Deum, tamen infra Deum: comparatus autem ad Deum, excidet jam de summo magno translato in Deum. Hoc si ita, quomodo uteris ejus rei exemplo ad Dei comparationem, quae, dum ad comparationem accedit, amittitur? Quid nunc, si nec inter reges plurifarium videri potest summum magnum, sed unicum et singulare; apud eum scilicet qui rex regum ob summitatem magnitudinis et subjectionem caeterorum graduum, quasi culmen dominationis excipitur? Sed etiam alterius formae reges, qui singulares in unione imperii praesunt, si minutalibus, ut ita dixerim, regnis undique conferantur in examinationem, qua constet quis eorum praecellat in substantiis et viribus regni, in unum necesse est summitas magnitudinis 0251B eliquetur, omnibus gradatim per comparationis exitum de magnitudinis summa expressis et exclusis. Adeo etsi in disperso multifariam videtur summum magnum, suis viribus et sua natura et suo statu unicum est. Proinde, cum duo dii conferantur, ut duo reges et duo summa magna, in alterum concedat necesse est unio summi magni, ex sententia comparationis, qua summum ex victoria sua constat, superato aemulo alio magno, non tamen summo; atque ex defectione aemuli, solitudinem quamdam de singularitate praestantiae suae possidens, unicum est. Ineluctabilis iste complexus in hoc sententiam constringit, aut negandum Deum esse summum magnum, quod nemo patietur sapiens, aut nulli alii communicandum.