QUINTI SEPTIMII FLORENTIS TERTULLIANI ADVERSUS MARCIONEM LIBRI QUINQUE.

 LIBER PRIMUS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 CAPUT XXIX.

 LIBER SECUNDUS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 [CAPUT XVII.]

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 CAPUT XXIX.

 LIBER TERTIUS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 LIBER QUARTUS.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 CAPUT XXIX.

 CAPUT XXX.

 CAPUT XXXI.

 CAPUT XXXII.

 CAPUT XXXIII.

 CAPUT XXXIV.

 CAPUT XXXV.

 CAPUT XXXVI.

 CAPUT XXXVII.

 CAPUT XXXVIII.

 CAPUT XXXIX.

 CAPUT XL.

 CAPUT XLI.

 CAPUT XLII.

 CAPUT XLIII.

 LIBER V.

 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

Chapter XXIV.—Instances of God’s Repentance, and Notably in the Case of the Ninevites, Accounted for and Vindicated.

Furthermore, with respect to the repentance which occurs in His conduct,667    Apud illum. you interpret it with similar perverseness just as if it were with fickleness and improvidence that He repented, or on the recollection of some wrong-doing; because He actually said, “It repenteth me that I have set up Saul to be king,”668    1 Sam. xv. 11. very much as if He meant that His repentance savoured of an acknowledgment of some evil work or error. Well,669    Porro. this is not always implied. For there occurs even in good works a confession of repentance, as a reproach and condemnation of the man who has proved himself unthankful for a benefit. For instance, in this case of Saul, the Creator, who had made no mistake in selecting him for the kingdom, and endowing him with His Holy Spirit, makes a statement respecting the goodliness of his person, how that He had most fitly chosen him as being at that moment the choicest man, so that (as He says) there was not his fellow among the children of Israel.670    1 Sam. ix. 2. Neither was He ignorant how he would afterwards turn out. For no one would bear you out in imputing lack of foresight to that God whom, since you do not deny Him to be divine, you allow to be also foreseeing; for this proper attribute of divinity exists in Him.  However, He did, as I have said, burden671    Onerabat. the guilt of Saul with the confession of His own repentance; but as there is an absence of all error and wrong in His choice of Saul, it follows that this repentance is to be understood as upbraiding another672    Invidiosam. rather than as self-incriminating.673    Criminosam. Look here then, say you: I discover a self-incriminating case in the matter of the Ninevites, when the book of Jonah declares, “And God repented of the evil that He had said that He would do unto them; and He did it not.”674    Jonah iii. 10. In accordance with which Jonah himself says unto the Lord, “Therefore I fled before unto Tarshish; for I knew that Thou art a gracious God and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repentest Thee of the evil.”675    Jonah iv. 2. It is well, therefore, that he premised the attribute676    Titulum. of the most good God as most patient over the wicked, and most abundant in mercy and kindness over such as acknowledged and bewailed their sins, as the Ninevites were then doing. For if He who has this attribute is the Most Good, you will have first to relinquish that position of yours, that the very contact with677    Malitiæ concursum. evil is incompatible with such a Being, that is, with the most good God. And because Marcion, too, maintains that a good tree ought not to produce bad fruit; but yet he has mentioned “evil” (in the passage under discussion), which the most good God is incapable of,678    Non capit. is there forthcoming any explanation of these “evils,” which may render them compatible with even the most Good?  There is. We say, in short, that evil in the present case679    Nunc. means, not what may be attributed to the Creator’s nature as an evil being, but what may be attributed to His power as a judge.  In accordance with which He declared, “I create evil,”680    Isa. xlv. 7. and, “I frame evil against you;”681    Jer. xviii. 11. meaning not to sinful evils, but avenging ones.  What sort of stigma682    Infamiam. pertains to these, congruous as they are with God’s judicial character, we have sufficiently explained.683    See above, chap. xiv. [p. 308, supra.] Now although these are called “evils,” they are yet not reprehensible in a judge; nor because of this their name do they show that the judge is evil: so in like manner will this particular evil684    Malitia, i.e., “the evil” mentioned in the cited Jonah iii. 10. be understood to be one of this class of judiciary evils, and along with them to be compatible with (God as) a judge.  The Greeks also sometimes685    Thus, according to St. Jerome, in Matt. vi. 34, κακία means κάκωσις. “Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof”—the occurent adversities. use the word “evils” for troubles and injuries (not malignant ones), as in this passage of yours686    In isto articulo. is also meant. Therefore, if the Creator repented of such evil as this, as showing that the creature deserve decondemnation, and ought to be punished for his sin, then, in687    Atqui hic. the present instance no fault of a criminating nature will be imputed to the Creator, for having deservedly and worthily decreed the destruction of a city so full of iniquity. What therefore He had justly decreed, having no evil purpose in His decree, He decreed from the principle of justice,688    Or, “in his capacity as Judge,” ex justitia. not from malevolence. Yet He gave it the name of “evil,” because of the evil and desert involved in the very suffering itself. Then, you will say, if you excuse the evil under name of justice, on the ground that He had justly determined destruction against the people of Nineveh, He must even on this argument be blameworthy, for having repented of an act of justice, which surely should not be repented of. Certainly not,689    Immo. my reply is; God will never repent of an act of justice. And it now remains that we should understand what God’s repentance means. For although man repents most frequently on the recollection of a sin, and occasionally even from the unpleasantness690    Ingratia. of some good action, this is never the case with God. For, inasmuch as God neither commits sin nor condemns a good action, in so far is there no room in Him for repentance of either a good or an evil deed. Now this point is determined for you even in the scripture which we have quoted. Samuel says to Saul, “The Lord hath rent the kingdom of Israel from thee this day, and hath given it to a neighbour of thine that is better than thou;”691    1 Sam. xv. 28. and into two parts shall Israel be divided:  “for He will not turn Himself, nor repent; for He does not repent as a man does.”692    Ver. 29, but inexactly quoted. According, therefore, to this definition, the divine repentance takes in all cases a different form from that of man, in that it is never regarded as the result of improvidence or of fickleness, or of any condemnation of a good or an evil work.  What, then, will be the mode of God’s repentance? It is already quite clear,693    Relucet. if you avoid referring it to human conditions.  For it will have no other meaning than a simple change of a prior purpose; and this is admissible without any blame even in a man, much more694    Nedum. in God, whose every purpose is faultless.  Now in Greek the word for repentance (μετάνοια) is formed, not from the confession of a sin, but from a change of mind, which in God we have shown to be regulated by the occurrence of varying circumstances.

CAPUT XXIV.

Sic et poenitentiam apud illum prave interpretaris, quasi proinde mobilitate vel improvidentia, imo jam ex delicti recordatione poeniteat: 0312A quoniam quidem dixerit (I Reg. XV, 11): Poenituit quod regem fecerim Saul; praescribens scilicet, poenitentiam confessionem sapere mali operis alicujus vel erroris. Porro non semper. Evenit enim in bonis factis poenitentiae confessio, ad invidiam et exprobrationem ejus qui beneficii ingratus exstiterit, sicut et tunc circa personam Saulis honorandam annuntiatur a Creatore, qui non deliquerat, cum Saulem assumit in regnum, et Sancto Spiritu auget; optimum enim adhuc: qualis, inquit, non erat in filiis Israelis, dignissime allegerat, sed nec ignoraverat ita eventurum, nemo enim te sustinebit improvidentiam adscribentem Deo ei, quem Deum non negans, confiteris et providum. Haec enim illi propria divinitas constat, sed malum factum Saulis (ut dixi) onerabat poenitentiae 0312B suae professione; quam, vacante delicto circa Saulis allectionem, consequens est invidiosam potius intelligi, non criminosam. Ecce, inquis, criminosam eam animadverto circa Ninivitas, dicente scriptura Jonae (Joan. III, 10): Et poenituit Dominum de malitia quam dixerat facturum se illis, nec fecit. Sicut et ipse Jonas ad Dominum : Propterea praeveni profugere in Tharsos, quia cognoveram te esse misericordem et miserescentem, patientem, et plurimum misericordiae, poenitentem malitiarum (Joan. IV, 2). Bene igitur quod praemisit optimi Dei titulum, patientissimi scilicet super malos, et abundantissimi misericordiae et miserationis super agnocentes et deplangentes delicta sua, quales tunc Ninivitae. Si enim optimus qui talis, de isto prius cessisse debebis, non competere 0312C in talem, id est optimum, etiam malitiae concursum. Et quia Marcion defendit arborem bonam malos quoque fructus non licere producere (Matth. VII, 48), sed malitiam tamen nominavit, quod optimus non capit, numquid aliqua interpretatio subest etiam earum malitiarum intelligendarum, quae possint et in optimum decucurrisse? Subest autem. Dicimus denique malitiam nunc significari, non quae ad naturam redigatur Creatoris quasi mali, sed quae ad potestatem 0313A quasi judicis, secundum quam enuntiarit (Is. XLV, 7): Ego sum qui condo mala, et: Ecce ego emitto in vos mala (Jerem. XVIII, II), non peccatoria, sed ultoria; quorum satis diluimus infamiam, ut congruentium judici. Sicut autem, licet mala dicantur, non reprehendentur in judice, nec hoc nomine suo malum judicem ostendunt; ita et malitia haec erit intelligenda nunc, quae ex illis malis judicariis deputata, cum ipsis competat judici. Nam et apud Graecos interdum malitiae pro vexationibus et laesuris, non pro malignitatibus ponuntur , sicut et in isto articulo; atque adeo, si ejus malitiae poenituit Creatorem, quasi creaturae reprobandae scilicet, et deletui vindicandae. Atqui nec ullum admissum criminosum reputabitur Creatori, qui iniquissimam civitatem digne meritoque 0313B decreverat abolendam. Ita, quod juste destinaverat, non male destinans, ex justitia non ex malitia destinarat; sed poenam ipsam malitiam nominavit, ex malo et merito passionis ipsius. Ergo, dices, si malitiam justitiae nomine excusas, quia juste exitium destinarat in Ninivitas, sic quoque culpandus est, qui justitiae, utique non poenitendae, poenitentiam gessit. Imo nec justitiae, inquam , poenitebit Deum, et superest jam agnoscere quid sit poenitentia Dei. Non enim, si hominem ex recordatione plurimum delicti, interdum et ex alicujus boni operis ingratia poenitet, ideo et Deum proinde. In quantum enim Deus nec malum admittit, nec bonum damnat, in tantum nec poenitentiae boni aut mali apud eum locus est. Nam et hoc tibi eadem scriptura 0313C determinat, dicente Samuele Sauli (I Reg. XV, 28): Discidit Dominus regnum Israel de manu tua hodie, et dabit illud proximo tuo, optimo super te; et scindetur Israel in duas partes, et non convertetur, neque paenitentiam aget, quia non sicut homo est ad paenitendum. Haec itaque definitio in omnibus aliam formam divinae poenitentiae statuit, quae neque ex improvidentia, neque ex ulla boni aut mali operis damnatione reputetur, sicut humana. Quis ergo erit mos poenitentiae divinae? Jam relucet, si non ad humanas conditiones eam referas. Nihil enim aliud intelligetur, quam simplex conversio sententiae prioris, quae etiam sine reprehensione ejus possit admitti, etiam in homine, 0314A nedum in Deo, cujus omnis sententia caret culpa. Nam et in graeco sono, poenitentiae nomen non ex delicti confessione, sed ex animi demutatione compositum est, quam apud Deum pro rerum variantium sese occursu fieri ostendimus.