3. [III.]—Grace According to the Pelagians.

But why should we wonder at this? For the same Pelagius, who in the Proceedings of the episcopal synod unhesitatingly condemned those who say “that God’s grace and assistance are not given for single acts, but consist in free will, or in law and teaching,”3    See De Gestis Pelagii, c. 30. upon which points we were apt to think that he had expended all his subterfuges; and who also condemned such as affirm that the grace of God is bestowed in proportion to our merits:—is proved, notwithstanding, to hold, in the books which he has published on the freedom of the will, and which he mentions in the letter he sent to Rome, no other sentiments than those which he seemingly condemned. For that grace and help of God, by which we are assisted in avoiding sin, he places either in nature and free will, or else in the gift of the law and teaching; the result of which of course is this, that whenever God helps a man, He must be supposed to help him to turn away from evil and do good, by revealing to him and teaching him what he ought to do,4    We have in these two clauses an explanation of the terms “law” and “teaching,” which Pelagius uses almost technically. but not with the additional assistance of His co-operation and inspiration of love, that he may accomplish that which he had discovered it to be his duty to do.

CAPUT III.

3. Sed quid mirum? Quandoquidem ipse Pelagius cum episcopalibus gestis sine ulla recusatione damnaverit eos, qui dicunt gratiam Dei et adjutorium non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse, vel in lege atque doctrina; ubi putabamus ejus de hac re omnes tergiversationes esse consumptas; damnaverit etiam eos, qui docent gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari: tamen in libris quos edidit pro libero arbitrio, quorum mentionem facit in epistola quam Romam misit, nihil aliud sentire monstratur, quam id quod damnasse videbatur. Nam gratiam Dei et adjutorium, quo adjuvamur ad non peccandum, aut in natura et libero ponit arbitrio, aut in lege atque doctrina: ut videlicet, cum adjuvat Deus hominem, ut declinet a malo et faciat bonum, revelando et ostendendo quid fieri debeat, adjuvare credatur; non etiam cooperando et dilectionem inspirando, ut id quod faciendum esse cognoverit faciat.