But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he, is dissolved, and passes away with its utterance. But what is there that is uttered but is so dissolved? For we do not keep undissolved, like those who make pots or bricks, what we utter with our voice in the mould of the speech which we form once for all with our lips, but as soon as one speech has been sent forth by our voice, what we have said ceases to exist. For the breath of our voice being dispersed again into the air, no trace of our words is impressed upon the spot in which such dispersion of our voice has taken place: so that if he makes this the distinguishing characteristic of a term that expresses a mere conception, that it does not remain, but vanishes with the voice that gives it utterance, he may as well at once call every term a mere conception, inasmuch as no substance remains in any term subsequent to its utterance. No, nor will he be able to show that ungeneracy itself, which he excepts from the products of conception, is indissoluble and fixed when it has been uttered, for this expression of the voice through the lips does not abide in the air. And from this we may see the unsubstantial character of his assertions; because, even if without speech we describe in writing our mental conceptions, it is not as though the substantial objects of our thoughts will acquire their significance from the letters, while the non-substantial will have no part in what the letters express. For whatever comes into our mind, whether intellectually existing, or otherwise, it is possible for us at our discretion to store away in writing. And the voice and letters are of equal value for the expression of thought, for we communicate what we think by the latter as well as by the former. What he sees, then, to justify his making the mental conception perish with the voice only, I fail to comprehend. For in the case of all speech uttered by means of sound, the passage of the breath indeed which conveys the voice is towards its kindred element, but the sense of the words spoken is engraved by hearing on the memory of the hearer’s soul, whether it be true or false. Is not this, then, a weak interpretation of this “conception” of his that our writer offers, when he characterizes and defines it by the dissolution of the voice? And for this reason the understanding hearer, as saith Isaiah, objects to this inconceivable account of mental conception, showing it, to use the man’s own words, to be a veritably dissoluble and unsubstantial one, and he discusses scientifically the force inherent in the term, advancing his argument by familiar examples to the contemplation of doctrine. Against whom Eunomius exalting himself with this pompous writing, endeavours to overthrow the true account of mental conception, after this manner.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν σιωπᾷ, λέγει δὲ « μὴ δεῖν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἐπιφημίζεσθαι τῷ θεῷ τὸ ἀγέννητον. τὰ γὰρ οὕτω λελεγμένα ταῖς φωναῖς », φησί, « συνδιαλύεσθαι πέφυκε ». τί δὲ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ὁμοῦ τῷ λεχθῆναι καὶ διαλύεται; οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ κεραμεύοντες ἢ πλινθευόμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἅπαξ γενομένην ἐν τῷ στόματι τοῦ λόγου τύπωσιν ἀδιάλυτα φυλάσσομεν τὰ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς προφερόμενα, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ τε προενήνεκται διὰ τοῦ φθόγγου ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ ῥηθὲν οὐκ ἔστι. πάλιν γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα τοῦ τῆς φωνῆς πνεύματος ἀναχεθέντος, οὐδὲν ἴχνος τῶν εἰρημένων ἐνετυπώθη τῷ τόπῳ, ἐν ᾧ γέγονε τῆς φωνῆς ἡ ἀνάχυσις: ὥστε εἰ τούτῳ τὸν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν λόγον χαρακτηρίζει, τῷ μὴ μένειν λόγον ἀλλὰ τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ φθεγγομένου συναφανίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι πάντα λόγον ὀνομάζων ἐπίνοιαν, μηδεμιᾶς ὑποστάσεως ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ μετὰ τὴν προφορὰν διαμενούσης. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀγεννησίαν, ἣν ἐξαιρεῖ τῆς ἐπινοίας, ἀδιάλυτον καὶ παγίαν μετὰ τὸ προενεχθῆναι δεῖξαι δυνήσεται, τῆς προενεχθείσης διὰ τοῦ φθόγγου ῥήσεως ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ἐν τῷ ἀέρι μὴ συμμενούσης. καὶ οὕτω δ' ἄν τις μάθοι τὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀσύστατον, ὅτι κἂν σιωπῶντες τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐννοίας ἀπογραφώμεθα, οὐ τὰ μὲν ὑφεστῶτα τῶν νοημάτων τὴν διὰ τῶν γραμμάτων σημείωσιν δέξεται, τὸ δὲ ἀσύστατον ἀμοιρήσει τῆς ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι σημειώσεως: ἔξεστι γὰρ πᾶν, ὅτιπερ ἂν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἔλθῃ, κἂν ὑφεστήκῃ κατὰ τὴν σύνεσιν κἂν ὡς ἑτέρως ἔχῃ, κατ' ἐξουσίαν ἐναποθέσθαι τῷ γράμματι, ταὐτὸν δὲ εἰς φανέρωσιν διανοίας ὁ φθόγγος ἐστὶ τῷ γράμματι: ἐπίσης γὰρ δι' ἑκατέρων τὸ νοηθὲν ἐξαγγέλλομεν. πρὸς τί τοίνυν ὁρῶν μόνῃ συνδιαλύει τῇ φωνῇ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, συνιδεῖν οὐκ ἔχω. παντὸς γὰρ λόγου τοῦ διά τινος ἤχου προφερομένου τοῦ μὲν πνεύματος τοῦ τὴν φωνὴν διαπορθμεύσαντος πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ἡ μεταχώρησις γίνεται, ὁ δὲ τῶν ῥηθέντων νοῦς διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῷ μνημονικῷ τῆς τοῦ ἀκούοντος ψυχῆς ἐγχαράσσεται, εἴτε ἀληθὴς εἴτε διεσφαλμένος τύχοι. οὐκοῦν ψυχρὰν τῆς ἐπινοίας ταύτης ὁ λογογράφος ἡμῖν τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ταύτην προτείνεται, τῇ διαλύσει τῆς φωνῆς χαρακτηρίζων καὶ ὁριζόμενος. καὶ τούτου χάριν ὁ συνετὸς ἀκροατὴς ἐκεῖνος, καθώς φησιν Ἡσαΐας, παραγράφεται μὲν τὴν ἀδιανόητον ταύτην τῆς ἐπινοίας φυσιολογίαν, ὄντως διαλυτὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀνυπόστατον ἀποδείξας κατὰ τὸν τούτου λόγον, τεχνολογεῖ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῇ λέξει δυνάμεως, διὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ὑποδειγμάτων τῇ περὶ τῶν δογμάτων θεωρίᾳ προσβιβάζων τὸν λόγον. πρὸς ὃν ὁ Εὐνόμιος διὰ τῆς σεμνῆς ταύτης λογογραφίας ἑαυτὸν ἀντεπαίρων ἀναλύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐπινοίας διηρθρωμένα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.