I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature; nevertheless, the knowledge that we gather from the terms which piety allows us to apply to it is sufficient for our limited capacity. Now we do not say that all these terms have a uniform significance; for some of them express qualities inherent in God, and others qualities that are not, as when we say that He is just or incorruptible, by the term “just” signifying that justice is found in Him, and by “incorruptible” that corruption is not. Again, by a change of meaning, we may apply terms to God in the way of accommodation, so that what is proper to God may be represented by a term which in no wise belongs to Him, and what is foreign to His nature may be represented by what belongs to Him. For whereas justice is the contradictory of injustice, and everlastingness the contrary of destruction, we may fitly and without impropriety employ contraries in speaking of God, as when we say that He is ever existent, or that He is not unjust, which is equivalent to saying that He is just, and that He admits not of corruption. So, too, we may say that other names of God, by a certain change of signification, may be suitably employed to express either meaning, for example “good,” and “immortal,” and all expressions of like formation; for each of these terms, according as it is taken, is capable of indicating what does or what does not appertain to the Divine nature, so that, notwithstanding the formal change, our orthodox opinion in regard to the object remains immovably fixed. For it amounts to the same, whether we speak of God as unsusceptible of evil, or whether we call Him good; whether we confess that He is immortal, or say that He ever liveth. For we understand no difference in the sense of these terms, but we signify one and the same thing by both, though the one may seem to convey the notion of affirmation, and the other of negation. And so again, when we speak of God as the First Cause of all things, or again, when we speak of Him as without cause, we are guilty of no contradiction in sense, declaring as we do by either name that God is the prime Ruler and First Cause of all. Accordingly when we speak of Him as without cause, and as Lord of all, in the former case we signify what does not attach to Him, in the latter case what does; it being possible, as I have said, by a change of the things signified, to give an opposite sense to the words that express them, and to signify a property by a word which for the time takes a negative form, and vice versa. For it is allowable, instead of saying that He Himself has no primal cause, to describe Him as the First Cause of all, and again, instead of this, to hold that He alone exists ungenerately, so that while the words seem by the formal change to be at variance with each other, the sense remains one and the same. For the object to be aimed at, in questions respecting God, is not to produce a dulcet and melodious harmony of words, but to work out an orthodox formula of thought, whereby a worthy conception of God may be ensured. Since, then, it is only orthodox to infer that He Who is the First Cause of all is Himself without cause, if this opinion is established, what further contention of words remains for men of sense and judgment, when every word whereby such a notion is conveyed to us has the same signification? For whether you say that He is the First Cause and Principle of all, or speak of Him as without origin, whether you speak of Him as of ungenerate or eternal subsistence, as the Cause of all or as alone without cause, all these words are, in a manner, of like force, and equivalent to one another, as far as the meaning of the things signified is concerned; and it is mere folly to contend for this or that vocal intonation, as if orthodoxy were a thing of sounds and syllables rather than of the mind. This view, then, has been carefully enunciated by our great master, whereby all whose eyes are not blindfolded by the veil of heresy may clearly see that, whatever be the nature of God, He is not to be apprehended by sense, and that He transcends reason, though human thought, busying itself with curious inquiry, with such help of reason as it can command, stretches out its hand and just touches His unapproachable and sublime nature, being neither keen-sighted enough to see clearly what is invisible, nor yet so far withheld from approach as to be unable to catch some faint glimpse of what it seeks to know. For such knowledge it attains in part by the touch of reason, in part from its very inability to discern it, finding that it is a sort of knowledge to know that what is sought transcends knowledge (for it has learned what is contrary to the Divine nature, as well as all that may fittingly be conjectured respecting it). Not that it has been able to gain full knowledge of that nature itself about which it reasons, but from the knowledge of those properties which are, or are not, inherent in it, this mind of man sees what alone can be seen, that that which is far removed from all evil, and is understood in all good, is altogether such as I should pronounce ineffable and incomprehensible by human reason.

Οὐκοῦν εἴρηται παρ' ἡμῶν (οἰκειοῦμαι γὰρ τοῦ διδασκάλου τὸν λόγον) ὅτι τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀμυδρὰν μὲν καὶ βραχυτάτην ἔχομεν διὰ τῶν λογισμῶν τὴν ἀντίληψιν, ἀποχρῶσαν δ' ὅμως τῇ βραχύτητι τῆς δυνάμεως ἡμῶν διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν λεγομένων εὐσεβῶς τὴν γνῶσιν ἐρανιζόμεθα. τούτων δέ φαμεν τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ μονοειδῆ πάντων εἶναι τὴν σημασίαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τῶν προσόντων τῷ θεῷ, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἀποπεφυκότων ἔχει τὴν ἔμφασιν, οἷον δίκαιον αὐτὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον λέγομεν, τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ τὸ προσεῖναι δικαιοσύνην, τῷ δὲ ἀφθάρτῳ τὸ μὴ προσεῖναι φθορὰν ἐνδεικνύμενοι. ἔξεστι δὲ πάλιν καὶ ὑπαλλάξαντα τὰς σημασίας κατὰ τὸ ἔμπαλιν προσφυῶς ἐφαρμόσαι τῷ θεῷ τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥστε τῷ μὲν ἀπεμφαίνοντι τὸ οἰκεῖον, τῷ δὲ προσόντι τὸ ἀλλότριον παραστῆσαι. τῇ γὰρ δικαιοσύνῃ τῆς ἀδικίας ἐναντιουμένης, τῇ δὲ φθορᾷ τῆς ἀϊδιότητος ἀντικειμένης, δυνατόν ἐστι χρήσασθαι προσφόρως ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς ἐναντίοις, καὶ μὴ διαμαρτεῖν τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐν τῷ εἰπεῖν ἀεί τε αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄδικον μὴ εἶναι, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ λέγειν δίκαιόν τε εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν μὴ προσδέχεσθαι. οὕτω καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῇ ποιᾷ μεταλήψει τῆς σημασίας πρὸς ἑκατέραν τὴν ἔμφασιν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχειν φαμέν, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον ἐκφερόμενα τύπον. δύναται γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως μεταληφθὲν καὶ τὸ προσὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ προσὸν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας ἐνδείξασθαι φύσεως, ὥστε τοῦ σχήματος τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπαλλασσομένου τὴν εὐσεβῆ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διάνοιαν μένειν ἀκίνητον. ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνεπίδεκτόν τε πονηρίας τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάσαι, καὶ ἀθάνατον ὁμολογῆσαι καὶ ἀεὶ ζῶντα εἰπεῖν: οὐδεμίαν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἓν δι' ἑκατέρων τῶν λόγων ἀποσημαίνομεν, κἂν τὸ μὲν θέσιν τὸ δὲ ἀναίρεσίν τινος ἔχειν δοκῇ. ὡσαύτως καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν λέγοντες τὸν θεὸν καὶ πάλιν ἄναρχον ὀνομάζοντες οὐδὲν κατὰ τὰς ἐννοίας μαχόμεθα, καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν λεγομένων ἀρχηγὸν καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς ἀποφαίνοντες: ὥστε κἂν ἄναρχον εἴπωμεν κἂν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχηγέτην, τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ προσόν, τῷ δευτέρῳ δὲ τὸ προσὸν παρεστήσαμεν, δυνατοῦ ὄντος καθὼς εἴρηται διὰ τῆς τῶν σημαινομένων ὑπαλλαγῆς μεταλλάξαι πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφάσεις καὶ τῷ νῦν ἀπεμφαίνοντι τέως ὀνόματι διά τινος μετασχηματισμοῦ τὸ προσὸν γνωρισθῆναι καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον. ἔξεστι γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν τὸ ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ὁρίσασθαι, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτου πάλιν τὸ μόνον αὐτὸν ἀγεννήτως ὁμολογεῖν ὑφεστάναι: ὥστε τὰ μὲν ῥήματα δοκεῖν τῇ τοῦ σχήματος ἐξαλλαγῇ διαφόρως ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸν δὲ νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν διαμένειν. τὸ γὰρ σπουδαζόμενον ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεοῦ λόγοις ἐστὶν οὐχὶ ῥημάτων εὐφωνίαν εὔκροτόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον ἐπινοῆσαι, ἀλλ' εὐσεβῆ διάνοιαν ἐξευρεῖν δι' ἧς τὸ πρέπον τῇ ὑπολήψει τῇ περὶ θεοῦ φυλαχθήσεται.
Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν εὐσεβές ἐστι λογίζεσθαι τὸν τοῦ παντὸς αἴτιον αὐτὸν αἰτίαν ὑπερκειμένην μὴ ἔχειν, ταύτης ἡμῖν ἐρηρεισμένως τῆς διανοίας μενούσης τίς ἔτι περὶ τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν καταλείπεται μάχη, πάσης φωνῆς, καθ' ἣν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐξαγγέλλεται νόημα, τὸ αὐτὸ παριστώσης; εἴτε γὰρ ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν καὶ αἴτιον τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι λέγοις εἴτε ἄναρχον αὐτὸν ὀνομάζοις εἴτε ἀγεννήτως εἶναι εἴτε ἐξ ἀϊδίου ὑφεστάναι εἴτε τοῦ παντὸς αἴτιον εἴτε ἐξ οὐδενὸς αἰτίου μόνον, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἰσοστάσιά πως ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ ὁμοτίμως ἔχει τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ μάταιος ὁ ζυγομαχῶν περὶ τὸν τοιόνδε τῆς φωνῆς ἦχον, ὡς οὐχὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ταῖς δὲ συλλαβαῖς καὶ τοῖς φθόγγοις ἐγκειμένης τῆς εὐσεβείας. ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς ἐννοίας παρὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου διηρθρωμένης, δι' ἧς ἔνεστι τοὺς μὴ κεκαλυμμένους τῷ αἱρετικῷ προκαλύμματι σαφῶς διϊδεῖν ὅτι τὸ θεῖον, ὅπως ἂν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἔχῃ, ἀνέπαφόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀκατανόητον καὶ πάσης ἀντιλήψεως τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν ὑψηλότερον, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη διάνοια πολυπραγμονοῦσα καὶ διερευνωμένη δι' ὧν ἂν ᾖ δυνατὸν λογισμῶν ἐπορέγεται καὶ θιγγάνει τῆς ἀπροσπελάστου καὶ ὑψηλῆς φύσεως, οὔτε τοσοῦτον ὀξυωποῦσα ὡς ἐναργῶς ἰδεῖν τὸ ἀόρατον οὔτε καθάπαξ ἀπεσχοινισμένη τῆς προσεγγίσεως ὡς μηδεμίαν δύνασθαι τοῦ ζητουμένου λαβεῖν εἰκασίαν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν τι τοῦ ζητουμένου διὰ τῆς τῶν λογισμῶν ἐπαφῆς ἐστοχάσατο, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι κατιδεῖν τρόπον τινὰ κατενόησεν, οἷόν τινα γνῶσιν ἐναργῆ τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν γνῶσιν τὸ ζητούμενον εἶναι ποιησαμένη. τά τε γὰρ ἀπεμφαίνοντα περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἐνόησε καὶ ὅσα πρέπει περὶ αὐτὴν ὑπονοεῖν οὐκ ἠγνόησεν, οὐ μὴν αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ἣν ταῦτα λογίζεται κατιδεῖν ἠδυνήθη, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν προσόντων τε καὶ μὴ προσόντων γνώσεως εἶδεν, ὃ μόνον ὀφθῆναι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ παντὸς μὲν κακοῦ πόρρωθεν ἱδρυμένον, ἐν παντὶ δὲ νοούμενον ἀγαθῷ πάντως τι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον λόγῳ τε ἄρρητον εἶναι καὶ λογισμοῖς ἀνεπίβατον.