How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural force, explain to the followers of his error. I would not, however, have mentioned this at all, if it had not placed a necessity upon me of proving our author’s weakness both in thought and expression. As for all the passages from the inspired writings which he drags in, though quite unconnected with his object, formulating thereby a difference of immortality144    But there are two meanings of ἀθάνατος,—and of these perhaps Eunomius was thinking,—i.e. 1. Not dead; 2. Immortal. In Plato’s Phædo there is an argument for the immortality of the soul, certainly not the strongest one, drawn from this. It is assumed there that the thing, whose nature is such that so long as it exists it neither is nor can be dead, can never cease to exist i.e. the soul by virtue of not actually dying, though capable of death, is immortal. Perhaps this accounts for Eunomius saying (lower down) that “the perishable is not opposed to the imperishable.” in angels and in men, I do not know what he has in his eye, or what he hopes to prove by them, and I pass them by. The immortal, as long as it is immortal, admits of no degrees of more and less arising from comparison. For if the one member of the comparison is, by the force of contrast, to suffer a diminution or privation as regards its immortality, it must needs be that such a member is not to be called immortal at all; for how can that be called absolutely immortal in which mortality is detected by this juxtaposition and comparison? And to think of that fine hair-splitting of his, in not allowing the idea of privation to be unvarying and general, but in asserting, on the contrary, that while separation from good things is privation, the absence of bad things is not to be marked by that term! If he is to get his way here, he will take the truth from the Apostle’s words, which say that He “only hath immortality145    1 Tim. vi. 16.,” which He gives to others. What this newly-imported dictum of his has to do with his preceding argument, neither we nor any one else amongst reflecting people are able to understand. Yet because we have not the mental strength to take in these scientific subtleties, he calls us “unscientific both in our judgment as to objects, and in our use of terms”; those are his very words. But all this, as having no power to shake the truth, I pass over without further notice; and also how he misrepresents the view we have expounded of the imperishable, and of the unembodied, namely, that of these terms the latter signifies the undimensional, where the threefold extension belonging to all bodies is not to be found, and the former signifies that which is not receptive of destruction: and also how he says, that “we do not think it right to let the shape of these words be lost by extending them to ideas inapplicable to them, or to imagine that each of them is indicative of something not present or not accruing; but rather we think they are indicative of the actual essence”; all this I deem worthy only of silence and deep oblivion, and leave to the reader to detect for himself their mingled folly and blasphemy. He actually asserts that the perishable is not opposed to the imperishable, and that the privative sign does not mark the absence of the bad, but that the word which is the subject of our inquiry means the essence itself!

τῷ δὲ μὴ ὑφεστηκότι πῶς ἔστι νέμειν τὰς δωρεάς, διδασκέτω τοὺς μαθητὰς τῆς ἀπάτης ὁ προσφυῶς κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀξιῶν καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασιν. τούτων δὲ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπεμνήσθην ὅλως, εἰ μὴ δι' αὐτῶν ἔδει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἀτονίας τοῦ λογογράφου ποιήσασθαι. καὶ ὅσα τῆς θεοπνεύστου γραφῆς ἀναρμόστως καὶ οὐ κατὰ σκοπὸν ἐπισύρεται, διαφορὰν ἀθανασίας ἀγγέλων τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων τεχνολογῶν, οὐκ οἶδα πρὸς ὅ τι βλέπων καὶ τί διὰ τούτου κατασκευάζων, καὶ ταῦτα παρήσω (τὸ γὰρ ἀθάνατον, ἕως ἀθάνατον ᾖ, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον συγκριτικῶς οὐ προσδέχεται: εἰ γὰρ ὑποστολήν τινα κατὰ σύγκρισιν τὸ ἕτερον τῶν παρατεθειμένων μέρος ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀθανασίας ἔχοι λόγῳ, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα μηδὲ ἀθάνατον τὸ τοιοῦτον κατονομάζεσθαι: πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἔτι κυρίως λέγοιτο ἀθάνατον οὗ τὸ θνητὸν ἡ διὰ συγκρίσεως ἀντιπαράθεσις κατηγόρησε;) καὶ τὴν λεπτὴν ἐκείνην ἀκρίβειαν, τὸ « μὴ » κελεύειν « ἀδιάφορον εἶναι καὶ μέσην τὴν τῆς στερήσεως ἔννοιαν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν τῶν κρειττόνων χωρισμὸν στέρησιν λέγειν, τὴν δὲ τῶν χειρόνων ἀπόστασιν μὴ δεῖν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ διασημαίνειν », ὡς, εἰ ταῦτα κρατήσειε, μηκέτι κατ' αὐτὸν τῆς ἀποστολικῆς ἀληθευούσης φωνῆς, ἥ φησι μόνον αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἀθανασίαν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχειν. τί γὰρ ἔχει κοινὸν ἡ ἐπαχθεῖσα ῥῆσις αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν προάγοντα λόγον, οὔτε ἡμῖν οὔτε ἄλλοις τισὶν τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων δυνατὸν ἐννοῆσαι. καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ λεπτὰ κατιδεῖν οὐκ ἰσχύσαμεν, « ἀνεπιστήμονας » ὀνομάζει « καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων κρίσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων χρήσεως », οὑτωσὶ τοῖς ῥήμασι γράφων. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντα κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἰσχὺν παραδραμοῦμαι ἀνεξετάστως, καὶ τὸ διαβάλλειν αὐτὸν τὴν ἐκτεθεῖσαν παρ' ἡμῶν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου τε καὶ ἀσωμάτου διάνοιαν, ὡς ἑκατέρας τῶν προσηγοριῶν τούτων τῆς μὲν τὸ ἀδιάστατον, ᾧ ἡ τριμερὴς τῶν σωμάτων οὐκ ἐνθεωρεῖται διάστασις, τῆς δὲ τὸ φθορᾶς ἀνεπίδεκτον σημαινούσης, καὶ τὸ λέγειν αὐτὸν οὑτωσὶ τοῖς ῥήμασι, ὅτι « οὐ δικαιοῦμεν τὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων τύπον εἰς ἀναρμόστους ἐκπεσεῖν ἐννοίας », καὶ « τὸ μὴ » τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἢ μὴ προσεῖναι σημαντικὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα σιγῆς ἄξια καὶ βαθείας λήθης εἶναι κρίνας παρήσω τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν φωρᾶσαι τὴν μεμιγμένην μετὰ τῆς ἀνοίας ἀσέβειαν: ὃς ἀξιοῖ μὴ ἀντιδιαστέλλεσθαι τὸ φθαρτὸν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ μηδὲ ἀπόστασιν σημαίνειν τοῦ χείρονος τὴν ἀφαιρετικὴν σημασίαν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι διὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σημαίνεσθαι.