But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, as, for instance, in the case of fire, the element itself is one thing in its nature, while the word which denotes it is another (for fire itself possesses the qualities of shining, of burning, of drying and heating, and consuming whatever fuel it lays hold of, but the name is but a brief word of one syllable), on this account speech, which distinguishes the powers and qualities seen in fire, gives each of them a name of its own, as I have said before. And one cannot say that only a name has been given to fire when it is spoken of as bright, or consuming, or anything else that we observe it to be. For such words denote qualities physically inherent in it. So likewise, in the case of heaven and the firmament, though one nature is signified by each of these words, their difference represents one or other of its peculiar characteristics, in looking at which we learn one thing by the appellation “heaven,” and another by “firmament.” For when speech would define the limit of sensible creation, beyond which it is succeeded by the transmundane void apprehended by the mind alone, in contrast with the intangible and incorporeal and invisible, the beginning and the end of all material subsistences is called the firmament. And when we survey the environment of terrestrial things, we call that which encompasses all material nature, and which forms the boundary of all things visible, by the name of heaven. In the same manner with regard to earth and dry land, since all heavy and downward-tending nature was divided into these two elements, earth and water, the appellation “dry” defines to a certain extent its opposite, for earth is called dry in opposition to moist, since having thrown off, by Divine command, the water that overspread it, it appeared in its own character. But the name “earth” does not continue to express the signification of some one only of its qualities, but, by virtue of its meaning, it embraces all that the word connotes, e.g. hardness, density, weight, resistance, capability of supporting animal and vegetable life. Accordingly, the word “dry” was not changed by speech to the last name put upon it (for its new name did not make it cease to be called so), but while both the appellations remained, a peculiar signification attached itself to each, the one distinguishing it in nature and property from its opposite, the other embracing all its attributes collectively. And so in light and day, and again in night and darkness, we do not find a pronunciation of syllables created to suit them by the Maker of all things, but rather through these appellations we note the substance of the things which they signify. At the entrance of light, by the will of God the darkness that prevailed over the earliest creation is scattered. But the earth lying in the midst, and being upheld on all sides by its surrounding of different elements, as Job saith, “He hangeth the earth upon nothing66    Job xxvi. 7.,” it was necessary when light travelled over one side and the earth obstructed it on the opposite by its own bulk, that a side of darkness should be left by the obscuration, and so, as the perpetual motion of the heavens cannot but carry along with it the darkness resulting from the obscuration, God ordained this revolution for a measure of duration of time. And that measure is day and night. For this reason Moses, according to his wisdom, in his historical elucidation of these matters, named the shadow resulting from the earth’s obstruction, a dividing of the light from the darkness, and the constant and measured alternation of light and darkness over the surface of the earth he called day and night. So that what was called light was not named day, but as “there was light,” and not the bare name of light, so the measure of time also was created and the name followed, not created by God in a sound of words, but because the very nature of the thing assumed this vocal notation. And as, if it had been plainly said by the Lawgiver that nothing that is seen or named is of spontaneous generation or unfashioned, but that it has its subsistence from God, we might have concluded of ourselves that God made the world and all its parts, and the order which is seen in them, and the faculty of distinguishing them, so also by what he says he leads us on to understand and believe that nothing which exists is without beginning. And with this view he describes the successive events of Creation in orderly method, enumerating them one after another. But it was impossible to represent them in language, except by expressing their signification by words that should indicate it. Since, then, it is written that God called the light day, it must be understood that God made the day from light, being something different, by the force of the term. For you cannot apply the same definition to “light” and “day,” but light is what we understand by the opposite of darkness, and day is the extent of the measure of the interval of light. In the same way you may regard night and darkness by the same difference of description, defining darkness as the negation of light, and calling night the extent of the encompassing darkness. Thus in every way our argument is confirmed, though not, perhaps, drawn out in strict logical form—showing that God is the Maker of things, not of empty words. For things have their names not for His sake but for ours. For as we cannot always have all things before our eyes, we take knowledge of some of the things that are present with us from time to time, and others we register in our memories. But it would be impossible to keep memory unconfused unless we had the notation of words to distinguish the things that are stored up in our minds from one another. But to God all things are present, nor does He need memory, all things being within the range of His penetrating vision. What need, then, in His case, of parts of speech, when His own wisdom and power embraces and holds the nature of all things distinct and unconfused? Wherefore all things that exist substantially are from God; but, for our guidance, all things that exist are provided with names to indicate them. And if any one say that such names were imposed by the arbitrary usage of mankind, he will be guilty of no offence against the scheme of Divine Providence. For we do not say that the nature of things was of human invention, but only their names. The Hebrew calls Heaven by one name, the Canaanite by another, but both of them understand it alike, being in no way led into error by the difference of the sounds that convey the idea of the object. But the over-cautious and timid will-worship of these clever folk, on whose authority he asserts that, if it were granted that words were given to things by men, men would be of higher authority than God, is proved to be unsubstantial even by the example which we find recorded of Moses. For who gave Moses his name? Was it not Pharaoh’s daughter who named him from what had happened67    Exod. ii. 10.? For water is called Moses in the language of the Egyptians. Since, then, in consequence of the tyrant’s order, his parents had placed the babe in an ark and consigned it to the stream (for so some related concerning him), but by the will of God the ark was floated by the current and carried to the bank, and found by the princess, who happened just then to be taking the refreshment of the bath, as the child had been gained “from the water,” she is said to have given him his name as a memorial of the occurrence,—a name by which God Himself did not disdain to address His servant, nor did He deem it beneath Him to allow the name given by the foreign woman to remain the Prophet’s proper appellation.

ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει θεωρουμένων οὐχ ἁπλῆν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, ὡς ἑνὶ ῥήματι δυνατῶς ἔχειν ἐμπεριληφθῆναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρᾶγμα, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ σημαντικὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὄνομα (τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐκλαμπτικὸν καὶ καυστικὸν ξηρόν τε καὶ θερμαντικὸν καὶ ἀναλωτικὸν τῆς ὕλης ἧς ἂν περιδράξηται, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα φωνή τις βραχεῖα διὰ μιᾶς συλλαβῆς ἐκφωνουμένη), τούτου ἕνεκεν ὁ διαιρῶν λόγος τὰς ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θεωρουμένας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ποιότητας ἑκάστην ἰδίως κατονομάζει, καθὼς φθάσαντες εἴπομεν: καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι ὄνομα μόνον ἐπιβεβλῆσθαι τῷ πυρί, ὅταν τις ἢ φανὸν ἢ ἀναλωτικὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρουμένων κατονομάσῃ: τῶν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ φυσικῶς ἐγκειμένων δυνάμεων σημαντικαί εἰσιν αἱ τοιαῦται φωναί. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ στερεώματος μιᾶς φύσεως ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαινομένης ἴδιόν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ κτίσει ταύτῃ γινωσκομένων ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων παρίστησιν, ὥστε πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλο τι μαθεῖν διὰ τῆς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ προσηγορίας, ἕτερον δὲ διὰ τοῦ στερεώματος. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὸ πέρας τῆς αἰσθητῆς κτίσεως ὑπογράφῃ ὁ λόγος, μεθ' ἣν ἡ νοητή τε καὶ ὑπερκόσμιος διαδέχεται λῆξις, συγκρίσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἀναφὲς καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀνείδεον στερέωμα λέγεται ἡ ἀρχή τε καὶ τὸ πέρας πάσης τῆς ὑλικῆς ὑποστάσεως: ὅταν δὲ τὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων περιοχὴν ἐξετάζωμεν, ᾧ πᾶσα ἡ ὑλικὴ περικρατεῖται φύσις, οὐρανὸν τοῦτον προσαγορεύομεν τὸν τῶν ὁρατῶν πάντων ὅρον γινόμενον. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῆς ξηρᾶς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα « τὰ » στοιχεῖα ἡ κατωφερής τε καὶ βαρεῖα φύσις διεμερίσθη, πρός τε τὴν γῆν φημι καὶ τὰ ὕδατα, ἡ μὲν τῆς ξηρᾶς προσηγορία διασταλτική πως τῆς ἀντιστοιχούσης ποιότητος: τῇ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀντιπαραθέσει ξηρὰ κατωνόμασται, ὅτε ἀποδυσαμένη θείῳ προστάγματι τὸ περικεχυμένον ὕδωρ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐφάνη ποιότητος: τὸ δὲ τῆς γῆς ὄνομα οὐκέτι μιᾶς τινος τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ποιοτήτων τὴν σημασίαν ἐνδείκνυται, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἐμπεριλαμβάνει διὰ τῆς ἐγκειμένης ἐμφάσεως τὸ ἐν τῷ στοιχείῳ νοούμενον, οἷον τὸ ναστόν, τὸ πυκνόν, τὸ ἐμβριθές, τὸ ἀντίτυπον, τὸ πρὸς πᾶσαν καρπῶν τε καὶ ζῴων ἀνατροφὴν ἐπιτήδειον. οὔκουν οὐ μετωνομάσθη παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ἡ ξηρὰ πρὸς τὸ τελευταῖον αὐτῇ ἐπιβληθὲν ὄνομα (οὐ γὰρ ἀπέθετο διὰ τοῦ δευτέρου ὀνόματος τὸ ξηρὰ καὶ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι), ἀλλὰ μενούσης τῆς κλήσεως καὶ ταύτης κἀκείνης ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδία τις ὕπεστι σημασία, ἡ μὲν ἀντιδιαιρετικὴ τῆς ἑτερογενοῦς φύσεως τε καὶ ἰδιότητος, ἡ δὲ περιεκτικὴ πάσης τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρουμένης δυνάμεως. Οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σκότους εὑρίσκομεν οὐ συλλαβῶν ἦχον παρὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων ἐπὶ τούτων δημιουργούμενον, ἀλλὰ πραγμάτων ὑπόστασιν διὰ τῶν προσηγοριῶν τούτων ἐπιγινώσκομεν. λύεται κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ εἰσόδῳ τοῦ φωτὸς τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν σκότος παρὰ τὴν πρώτην κτίσιν: τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ περισχεθείσης καὶ τῇ πανταχόθεν τῶν ἑτεροφυῶν στοιχείων περιβολῇ ἑαυτὴν ἀνεχούσης, καθώς φησιν ὁ Ἰὼβ ὅτι Κρεμάζων γῆν ἐπὶ μηδενός, ἐπάναγκες ἦν καθ' ἓν μέρος τοῦ φωτὸς διοδεύοντος ἀντιφραττούσης κατὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ ὄγκῳ τῆς γῆς ὑπολειφθῆναί τινα διὰ τοῦ ἀποσκιάσματος μοῖραν τοῦ σκότους, τῆς δὲ ἀεικινήτου περιφορᾶς τοῦ πόλου συμπεριαγούσης ἑαυτῇ κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀποσκιάσματος ἐπισυμβαίνοντα ζόφον τὴν ἐγκύκλιον ταύτην περίοδον τάξαι τὸν θεὸν εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι μέτρον τῆς χρονικῆς παρατάσεως: τὸ δὲ μέτρον τοῦτο ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ νύξ. διὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν ἱστορικώτερον τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δογμάτων ὁ Μωϋσῆς ἡμῖν σαφηνίζων τὸν ἐξ ἀντιφράξεως τῆς γῆς ἐπεισιόντα ζόφον χωρισμὸν φωτὸς καὶ σκότους ὠνόμασε καὶ τὴν ἀεὶ γινομένην περὶ τὸν περίγειον χῶρον τοῦ φωτὸς πρὸς τὸ σκότος ἔμμετρον διαδοχὴν ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα προσεῖπεν. ὥστε οὐχὶ ἐπίκλητον τὸ φῶς ἡμέρα προσηγορεύθη, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐγένετο φῶς καὶ οὐχὶ ψιλὴ προσηγορία φωτός, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ μέτρον ἐγένετο, ἐπηκολούθησε δὲ τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ὄνομα, οὐκ ἐν ῥημάτων ψόφῳ παρὰ τοῦ πεποιηκότος γενόμενον, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως ἐπισπασαμένης τὴν διὰ τῆς φωνῆς σημασίαν. καὶ ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦτο σαφῶς εἴρητο παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ ὀνομαζόμενον οὐκ αὐτοφυές ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἀποίητον, ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἂν συνεθήκαμεν τὸ πάντα τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ μέρη καὶ τὴν ἐνθεωρουμένην τάξιν καὶ τὴν γνωριστικὴν τῶν ὄντων δύναμιν τὸν θεὸν πεποιηκέναι, οὕτως καὶ δι' ὧν εἶπε πρὸς ταύτην ἐνάγει ἡμᾶς τὴν διάνοιαν, εἰς τὸ πιστεύειν τὸ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἄναρχον εἶναι. καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων ὁδῷ καὶ τάξει τὰ καθεξῆς διεξέρχεται, τὴν τῶν γεγονότων ἀκολουθίαν ἀπαριθμούμενος. ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἦν ἄλλως παραστήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ, μὴ διὰ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν σημασίαν ποιούμενον. ἐπεὶ οὖν γέγραπται ὅτι Ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, νοητέον ὅτι ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ φωτὸς ἡμέραν ἕτερόν τι οὖσαν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδοίης φωτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας λόγον, ἀλλὰ φῶς μὲν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πρὸς τὸ σκότος νοούμενον, ἡμέρα δὲ τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ διαστήματος μέτρον. ὡσαύτως καὶ νύκτα καὶ σκότος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ λόγου διαίρεσιν κατανοήσεις, σκότος μὲν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου πρὸς τὸ φῶς νοούμενον ὁριζόμενος, νύκτα δὲ τὴν τοσήνδε τοῦ σκότους περιγραφὴν ὀνομάζων. οὐκοῦν ἔρρωται διὰ πάντων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τεχνικῶς κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συνηρώτηται, δεικνὺς ὅτι θεὸς πραγμάτων ἐστὶ δημιουργός, οὐ ῥημάτων ψιλῶν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνου χάριν, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ἕνεκεν ἐπίκειται τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα.
Διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πάντοτε δυνατὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι πάντα ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχειν τὰ ὄντα τὸ μέν τι τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων γινώσκομεν, τὸ δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐναπογράφομεν. ἄλλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσύγχυτον φυλαχθῆναι ἡμῖν τὴν μνήμην, μὴ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων σημασίας διαστελλούσης ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναποκείμενα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράγματα. θεῷ δὲ πάντα πάρεστι καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ μνήμης αὐτῷ, πάντων τῇ διορατικῇ δυνάμει περικρατουμένων τε καὶ θεωρουμένων. τίς οὖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ χρεία ῥήματος ἢ ὀνόματος, αὐτῆς τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ σοφίας τε καὶ δυνάμεως ἀσύγχυτόν τε καὶ διακεκριμένην τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν περιεχούσης; οὐκοῦν παρὰ θεοῦ μὲν τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα πάντα, τῆς δὲ ἡμετέρας ἕνεκεν ὁδηγίας ἔπεστι τοῖς οὖσι τὰ σημειωτικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ὀνόματα. ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀρέσκον ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων συνηθείαις γίνεσθαί τις εἰπὼν οὐδὲν εἰς τὸν τῆς προνοίας πλημμελήσει λόγον. οὐ γὰρ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων γίνεσθαι παρ' ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὀνόματα λέγομεν. ἄλλως ὀνομάζει τὸν οὐρανὸν ὁ Ἑβραῖος καὶ ἑτέρως ὁ Χαναναῖος, νοεῖ δὲ ὡσαύτως ἑκάτερος, οὐδὲν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν φθόγγων περὶ τὴν κατανόησιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου διαμφιβάλλοντες. ἡ δὲ λίαν εὐλαβὴς τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἐθελοθρησκεία, δι' ὧν, εἰ δοθείη παρὰ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι τὰς φωνάς, τὸ « ἀρχηγικωτέρους » εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κατασκευάζει, ἐλέγχεται ματαία τις οὖσα καὶ ἀνυπόστατος καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Μωϋσέα μνημονευθέντος ἡμῖν ὑποδείγματος. αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ Μωϋσῇ τίς ἔθετο τὴν προσηγορίαν; οὐχ ἡ θυγάτηρ τοῦ Φαραὼ ἐκ τοῦ συμβάντος ἐπονομάσασα; Μωϋσῆς γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ λέγεται τῇ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων φωνῇ. ἐπεὶ οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ τυράννου κιβωτῷ τὸ βρέφος ἐνθέντες οἱ γεννησάμενοι τοῖς ῥείθροις ἔδωκαν (οὕτω γάρ τινες τῶν ἱστορικῶν τὰ κατ' αὐτὸν διηγήσαντο), ἡ δὲ κατὰ θεῖον βούλημα ὑπὸ τῆς δίνης τῶν ὑδάτων ἐκκυμανθεῖσα προσηνέχθη τῇ ὄχθῃ καὶ εὕρημα τῆς βασιλίδος κατ' ἐκεῖνο τῷ λουτρῷ τὸ σῶμα φαιδρυνομένης ἐγένετο, ὡς ἐξ ὕδατος αὐτῇ τοῦ παιδὸς κτηθέντος μνημόσυνον τῆς συντυχίας λέγεται τῷ παιδὶ θέσθαι τὸ ὄνομα, ᾧ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ θεράποντος κεχρῆσθαι οὐ παρῃτήσατο, οὐδὲ ἀνάξιον ἔκρινε τὴν τῆς βαρβάρου κλῆσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ προφήτου κυρίαν ἐᾶσαι.