Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound thinking is directed as far as it is possible to the knowledge and the contemplation of some reality. But then the whole world of realities is divided into two parts; that is, into the intelligible and the sensible. With regard to sensible phænomena, knowledge, on account of the perception of them being so near at hand, is open for all to acquire; the judgment of the senses gives occasion to no doubt about the subject before them. The differences in colour, and the differences in all the other qualities which we judge of by means of the sense of hearing, or smell, or touch, or taste, can be known and named by all possessing our common humanity; and so it is with all the other things which appear to be more obvious to our apprehension, the things, that is, pertaining to the age in which we live, designed for political and moral ends. But in the contemplation of the intelligible world, on account of that world transcending the grasp of the senses, we move, some in one way, some in another, around the object of our search; and then, according to the idea arising in each of us about it, we announce the result as best we can, striving to get as near as possible to the full meaning of the thing thought about through the medium of expressive phrases. In this, though it is often possible to have achieved the task in both ways, when thought does not fail to hit the mark, and utterance interprets the notion with the appropriate word, yet it may happen that we may fail even in both, or in one, at least, of the two, when either the comprehending faculty or the interpreting capacity is carried beside the proper mark. There being, then, two factors by which every term is made a correct term, the mental exactitude and the verbal utterance, the result which commands approval in both ways, will certainly be the preferable; but it will not be a lesser gain, not to have missed the right conception, even though the word itself may happen to be inadequate to that thought. Whenever then, our thought is intent upon those high and unseen things which sense cannot reach (I mean, upon that divine and unspeakable world with regard to which it is an audacious thing to grasp in thought anything in it at random and more audacious still to trust to any chance word the representing of the conception arising from it), then, I say, turning from the mere sound of phrases, uttered well or ill according to the mental faculty of the speaker, we search for the thought, and that alone, which is found within the phrases, to see whether that itself be sound, or otherwise; and we leave the minutiæ of phrase and name to be dealt with by the artificialities of grammarians. Now, seeing that we mark with an appellation only those things which we know, and those things which are above our knowledge it is not possible to seize by any distinctive terms (for how can one put a mark upon a thing we know nothing about?), therefore, because in such cases there is no appropriate term to be found to mark the subject adequately, we are compelled by many and differing names, as there may be opportunity, to divulge our surmises as they arise within us with regard to the Deity. But, on the other hand, all that actually comes within our comprehension is such that it must be of one of these four kinds: either contemplated as existing in an extension of distance, or suggesting the idea of a capacity in space within which its details are detected, or it comes within our field of vision by being circumscribed by a beginning or an end where the non-existent bounds it in each direction (for everything that has a beginning and an end of its existence, begins from the non-existent, and ends in the non-existent), or, lastly, we grasp the phænomenon by means of an association of qualities wherein dying, and sufferance, and change, and alteration, and such-like are combined. Considering this, in order that the Supreme Being may not appear to have any connection whatever with things below, we use, with regard to His nature, ideas and phrases expressive of separation from all such conditions; we call, for instance, that which is above all times pre-temporal, that which is above beginning unbeginning, that which is not brought to an end unending, that which has a personality removed from body incorporeal, that which is never destroyed imperishable, that which is unreceptive of change, or sufferance, or alteration, passionless, changeless, and unalterable. Such a class of appellations can be reduced to any system that they like by those who wish for one; and they can fix on these actual appellations other appellations “privative,” for instance, or “negative,” or whatever they like. We yield the teaching and the learning of such things to those who are ambitious for it; and we will investigate the thoughts alone, whether they are within or beyond the circle of a religious and adequate conception of the Deity.

Πᾶς λόγος ὅ γε ἀληθῶς λόγος σημαντική τίς ἐστι τῶν κατ' ἔννοιαν κινημάτων φωνή. πᾶσα δὲ τῆς ὑγιοῦς διανοίας ἐνέργειά τε καὶ κίνησις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσίν τε καὶ θεωρίαν, ὡς ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, βλέπει. διχῆ δὲ μεμέρισται τῶν ὄντων ἡ φύσις εἴς τε τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν διαιρουμένη: ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατ' αἴσθησιν φαινομένων διὰ τὸ πρόχειρον τῆς κατανοήσεως κοινὴ πρόκειται πᾶσιν ἡ γνῶσις, οὐδεμίαν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφιβολίαν ἐμποιούσης τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἐπικρίσεως. τάς τε γὰρ τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ποιοτήτων διαφοράς, ὅσα δι' ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἢ τὴν γεῦσιν αἰσθήσεως ἐπικρίνομεν, ὁμοφώνως πάντες οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνοῦντες φύσεως γινώσκομέν τε καὶ ὀνομάζομεν, καὶ ὅσα τῶν λοιπῶν τὴν κατάληψιν ἐπιπολαιοτέραν ἔχειν δοκεῖ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναστρεφομένων πραγμάτων, ἃ πρός τε τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἠθικὸν τοῦ βίου σκοπὸν καταγίνεται. ἐν δὲ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως διὰ τὸ ὑπερκεῖσθαι αὐτὴν τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καταλήψεως στοχαστικῶς τῆς διανοίας ἐπορεγομένης τῶν ἐκφευγόντων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἄλλοι ἄλλως κινούμεθά τε περὶ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐγγινομένην ἑκάστῳ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διάνοιαν, ὅπως ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, τὸ νοηθὲν ἐξαγγέλλομεν, ἐγγίζοντες ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα τῇ δυνάμει τῶν νοηθέντων διὰ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐμφάσεως. ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστι μὲν πολλάκις καὶ δι' ἀμφοτέρων κατορθωθῆναι τὸ σπουδαζόμενον, τῆς τε διανοίας οὐχ ἁμαρτούσης τοῦ ζητουμένου καὶ τῆς φωνῆς εὐθυβόλως τὸ νοηθὲν διὰ τῆς προσφυοῦς ἑρμηνείας ἐξαγγελλούσης: ἔστι δὲ τυχὸν καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου γε τούτων ἀποτυχεῖν, ἢ τῆς καταληπτικῆς διανοίας ἢ τῆς ἑρμηνευτικῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ προσήκοντος παρενεχθείσης. δύο τοίνυν ὄντων δι' ὧν ἅπας εὐθύνεται λόγος, τῆς τε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς ἐν ῥήμασι προφορᾶς, κρεῖττον μὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ δι' ἀμφοτέρων εὐδόκιμον, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ ἀγαθὸν τῆς προσηκούσης μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ὑπολήψεως, κἂν ὁ λόγος ἐλάττων τῆς διανοίας τύχῃ. ὅταν τοίνυν περὶ τῶν ὑψηλῶν καὶ ἀθεάτων ἡ διάνοια τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχῃ, ὧν οὐκ ἐφικνεῖται ἡ αἴσθησις (λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀφράστου φύσεως, ἐν οἷς τολμηρὸν μὲν καὶ τὸ προχείρως τι τῇ διανοίᾳ λαβεῖν, τολμηρότερον δὲ τὸ ταῖς ἐπιτυχούσαις ἐπιτρέπειν φωναῖς τὴν τῆς ἐγγινομένης ἡμῖν ὑπολήψεως ἑρμηνείαν) τότε χαίρειν ἐάσαντες τὸν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἦχον, οὕτως ἢ ἑτέρως κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φθεγγομένων ἐξαγγελλόμενον, μόνην ἐξετάζομεν τὴν διάνοιαν τὴν ἐμφαινομένην τοῖς ῥήμασιν, εἴτε ὑγιῶς εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, τὰς ῥηματικὰς ταύτας ἢ ὀνοματικὰς ἀκριβολογίας γραμματιστῶν τέχναις παραχωρήσαντες. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν μόνα τὰ γινωσκόμενα διὰ τῆς ὀνοματικῆς σημειούμεθα κλήσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν γνῶσιν ὄντα σημειωτικαῖς τισι προσηγορίαις διαλαμβάνειν οὐχ οἷόν τε (πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ ἀγνοούμενον σημειώσαιτο;) διὰ τοῦτο οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπ' αὐτῶν προσφυοῦς εὑρισκομένης προσηγορίας, ἣ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἱκανῶς παραστήσει, πολλοῖς καὶ διαφόροις ὀνόμασιν, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ δυνατόν, ἀνακαλύψαι βιαζόμεθα τὴν ἐγγενομένην ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ θείου ὑπόνοιαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ ὑπὸ κατάληψιν ἡμετέραν ἐρχόμενα τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ὥστε πάντως ἢ ἐν διαστηματικῇ τινι παρατάσει θεωρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἢ τοπικοῦ χωρήματος παρέχειν τὴν ἔννοιαν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶναι καταλαμβάνεται, ἢ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος περιγραφῇ ἐντὸς γίνεται τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἐπίσης καθ' ἑκάτερον πέρας τῷ μὴ ὄντι περιγραφόμενα (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχον τοῦ εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἄρχεται καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν καταλήγει), ἢ τὸ πάντων ἔσχατον διὰ τῆς σωματικῆς τῶν ποιοτήτων συνθήκης καταλαμβάνομεν τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾗ φθορὰ καὶ πάθος καὶ τροπὴ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα συνέζευκται. διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἂν μηδεμίαν οἰκειότητα πρὸς τὰ κάτω πράγματα ἡ ὑπερκειμένη φύσις ἔχειν δοκοίη, τοῖς ἀποχωριστικοῖς τῶν τοιούτων νοήμασί τε καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας κεχρήμεθα φύσεως, τὸ ὑπεράνω τῶν αἰώνων προαιώνιον λέγοντες καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἀρχὴν ἄναρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ τελειούμενον ἀτελεύτητον ἀσώματόν τε τὸ χωρὶς σώματος τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον καὶ τὸ μὴ φθειρόμενον ἄφθαρτον καὶ τὸ τροπῆς ἢ πάθους ἢ ἀλλοιώσεως ἀνεπίδεκτον ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων τεχνολογούντων μὲν ὡς ἂν ᾖ φίλον αὐτοῖς οἱ βουλόμενοι καὶ ὀνόματα ἄλλα τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις ἐφαρμοζόντων, « στερητικὰ ἢ ἀφαιρετικὰ » ἢ ὅ τι φίλον αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζοντες, ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ διδάσκειν ἢ μανθάνειν τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς φιλοτίμοις παραχωρήσαντες μόνον τὸν νοῦν ἐξετάσωμεν, εἰ τῆς εὐσεβοῦς τε καὶ θεοπρεποῦς ὑπολήψεως ἐντός ἐστιν ἢ κεχώρισται.