But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are applied to God as expressing production, both words being so applied, as he says, because of an operation, then he will cut short our long discussion of this subject, by thus conceding what it would have required a laborious argument on our part to prove. For if the word Father and the word Creator have the same meaning (for both arise from an operation), one of the things signified is exactly equivalent to the other, since if the signification is the same, the subjects cannot be different. If, then, He is called both Father and Creator because of an operation, it is quite allowable to interchange the names, and to turn one into the other and say that God is Creator of the Son, and Father of a stone, seeing that the term Father is to be devoid of any meaning of essential relation131    τῆς κατα φύσιν σχετικῆς σημασίας.. Well, the monstrous conclusion that is hereby proved cannot remain doubtful to those who reflect. For as it is absurd to deem a stone, or anything else that exists by creation, Divine, it must be agreed that there is no Divinity to be recognized in the Only-begotten either, when that one identical meaning of an operation, by which God is called both Father and Creator, assigns, according to Eunomius, both these terms to Him. But let us hold to the question before us. He abuses our assertion that our knowledge of God is formed by contributions of terms applied to different ideas, and says that the proof of His simplicity is destroyed by us so, since He must partake of the elements signified by each term, and only by virtue of a share in them can completely fill out His essence. Here I write in my own language, curtailing his wearisome prolixity; and in answer to his foolish and nerveless redundancy no sensible person, I think, would make any reply, except as regards his charging us with “senselessness.” Now if anything of that description had been said by us, we ought of course to retract it if it was foolishly worded, or, if there was any doubt as to its meaning, to put an irreproachable interpretation upon it. But we have not said anything of the kind, any more than the consequences of our words lead the mind to any such necessity. Why, then, linger on that to which all assent, and weary the reader by prolonging the argument? Who is really so devoid of reflection as to imagine, when he hears that our orthodox conceptions of the Deity are gathered from various ways of thinking of Him, that the Deity is composed of these various elements, or completes His actual fulness by participating in anything at all? A man, say, has made discoveries in geometry, and this same man, let us suppose, has made discoveries also in astronomy, and in medicine as well, and grammar, and agriculture, and sciences of that kind. Will it follow, because there are these various names of sciences viewed in connection with one single soul, that that single soul is to be considered a composite soul? Yet there is a very great difference in meaning between medicine and astronomy; and grammar means nothing in common with geometry, or seamanship with agriculture. Nevertheless it is within the bounds of possibility that the idea of each of these sciences should be associated with one soul, without that soul thereby becoming composite, or, on the other hand, without all those terms for sciences blending into one meaning. If, then, the human mind, with all such terms applied to it, is not injured as regards its simplicity, how can any one imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, and eternal, and all the other Divine names, must, unless all these names are made to mean one thing, become of many parts, or take a share of all these to make up the perfection of His nature?

εἰ δὲ ἀπολογοῖτο περὶ τῆς ἐναντιότητος ὡς μόνης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προσηγορίας ἐπιγεννηματικῶς τῷ θεῷ προσγενομένης, « διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἐνεργείας », ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει, « ἑκατέρας ἐπιλέγεσθαι τῷ θεῷ τὰς φωνάς », περιγράψει τὴν πολλὴν ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἀσχολίαν, ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ἃ πολλοῖς ἔδει πόνοις παρ' ἡμῶν διελέγχεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ μία τῆς τε τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φωνῆς ἡ σημασία (« ἐξ ἐνεργείας » γὰρ ἑκατέρα), ἰσοδυναμεῖ πάντως ἀλλήλοις καὶ τὰ διὰ τῶν φωνῶν σημαινόμενα: ὧν γὰρ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὸ αὐτό, τούτων οὐδὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πάντως διάφορον. « εἰ οὖν ἐξ ἐνεργείας » καὶ πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργὸς ὀνομάζεται, ἔξεστι πάντως καὶ ὑπαλλάξαντι κατὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφον τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρήσασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ δημιουργὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ λίθου ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἄμοιρόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὄνομα τῆς κατὰ φύσιν σχετικῆς σημασίας. τὸ δὲ διὰ τούτου κατασκευαζόμενον οὐκέτ' ἀμφίβολον ἔχει τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν. ὡς γὰρ ἄτοπόν ἐστι λίθον ἡγεῖσθαι θεὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν διὰ κτίσεως ὑποστάντων, οὕτως ὁμολογηθήσεται μηδὲ τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ δεῖν προσμαρτυρεῖν τὴν θεότητα, μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν σημασίας ἀμφοτέρας τῷ θεῷ τὰς κλήσεις κατὰ τὸν Εὐνομίου λόγον προσμαρτυρούσης, καθ' ἣν καὶ πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργὸς ὀνομάζεται. Ἀλλὰ τῶν προκειμένων ἐχώμεθα. διαβάλλων γὰρ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον τὸν κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς λέγοντα τὴν περὶ θεοῦ γνῶσιν ἡμῖν συναγείρεσθαι φησὶ « μηκέτ' αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμῶν ἁπλοῦν εἶναι κατασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μεταλαμβάνοντα τῶν νοημάτων τῶν δι' ἑκάστης προσηγορίας σημαινομένων καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων μετουσίας συμπληροῦντα ἑαυτῷ τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τελείωσιν ». ταῦτα διὰ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ λέξεως γράφω συντέμνων αὐτοῦ τὴν μακρὰν ἀδολεσχίαν. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ματαίαν ταύτην οἶμαι καὶ ἄτονον περιττολογίαν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀντίρρησιν ἄν τινα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἔξω τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν κατηγορίας ποιήσασθαι. εἰ μὲν γάρ τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένοις ἦν, ἔδει πάντως ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀνατίθεσθαι τὰ κακῶς εἰρημένα ἢ τὸ ἀμφίβολον τῆς διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἀνεύθυνον τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἄγειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε εἴρηται παρ' ἡμῶν τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἡ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀκολουθία πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνάγκην ἐξωθεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν, τί δεῖ τοῖς ὁμολογουμένοις ἐνδιατρίβοντα ἀποκναίειν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τῇ παρατάσει τοῦ λόγου; τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἔξω διανοίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἀκούσας διὰ πολλῶν ἡμῖν νοημάτων τὰς εὐσεβεῖς περὶ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεις ἀθροίζεσθαι σύνθετον ἐκ διαφόρων τὸ θεῖον οἴεσθαι ἢ ἐκ μεταλήψεώς τινων ἑαυτῷ συναγείρειν τὴν τελειότητα; εὕρατό τις καθ' ὑπόθεσιν γεωμετρίαν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς οὗτος ὑπειλήφθω καὶ ἀστρονομίας εὑρετὴς εἶναι ἰατρικῆς τε πάλιν καὶ γραμματικῆς καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐπιτηδευμάτων τινῶν: ἆρ' ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων περὶ τὴν μίαν θεωρεῖται ψυχήν, σύνθετος διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχὴ νομισθήσεται; καίτοιγε πλεῖστον διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σημαινόμενον τῆς ἀστρονομικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἡ γραμματικὴ πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ἡ ναυτιλία καὶ ἡ γεωπονία: ἀλλὰ μὴν περὶ τὴν μίαν ψυχὴν ἑκάστου τούτων τὸν λόγον δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀθροισθῆναι, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο πολυσύνθετος ἡ ψυχὴ γίνεται οὐδὲ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων πρὸς ἓν σημαινόμενον ἀνακίρναται. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς διὰ τοσούτων ὀνομάτων τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λεγομένων οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ἁπλότητα βλάπτεται, πῶς ἄν τις οἰηθείη τὸν θεόν, εἰ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ πάντα τὰ θεοπρεπῆ καλοῖτο ὀνόματα, εἰ μὴ μία πᾶσι νομισθείη τοῖς ὀνόμασι σημασία, ἢ πολυμερῆ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ μετουσίας τούτων τὸ τέλειον ἑαυτῷ συναγείρειν τῆς φύσεως;