10. [IX.]—What Purpose the Law Subserves.
What object, then, can this man gain by accounting the law and the teaching to be the grace whereby we are helped to work righteousness? For, in order that it may help much, it must help us to feel our need of grace. No man, indeed, is able to fulfil the law through the law. “Love is the fulfilling of the law.”17 Rom. xiii. 10. And the love of God is not shed abroad in our hearts by the law, but by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us.18 Rom. v. 5. Grace, therefore, is pointed at by the law, in order that the law may be fulfilled by grace. Now what does it avail for Pelagius, that he declares the self-same thing under different phrases, that he may not be understood to place in law and teaching that grace which, as he avers, assists the “capacity” of our nature? So far, indeed, as I can conjecture, the reason why he fears being so understood is, because he condemned all those who maintain that God’s grace and help are not given for a man’s single actions, but exist rather in his freedom, or in the law and teaching. And yet he supposes that he escapes detection by the shifts he so constantly employs for disguising what he means by his formula of “law and teaching” under so many various phrases.
CAPUT IX.
10. Quid ergo est, quod iste legem atque doctrinam deputat gratiam, qua juvamur ad operandam justitiam, quae ut multum adjuvet, ad hoc adjuvat ut gratia requiratur? Nemo enim potest legem implere per legem. Plenitudo enim legis charitas (Rom. XIII, 10). Charitas autem Dei non per legem diffusa est in cordibus nostris, sed per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis (Id. V, 5). Proinde per legem gratia demonstratur, ut lex per gratiam compleatur. Quid enim juvat Pelagium, quia diversis verbis eamdem rem dicit, ut non intelligatur in lege atque doctrina gratiam constituere, qua possibilitatem naturae asserit adjuvari? Quantum autem existimo, ideo veretur intelligi, quia damnavit eos qui dicunt gratiam Dei et adjutorium non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse, vel in lege atque doctrina: et tamen latere se putat, cum aliis atque aliis locutionibus versat significationem legis atque doctrinae.