But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certain words and syllables, labelling, as it were, our mental processes with verbal formulæ to serve as characteristic notes and indications, with the object of giving a clear and simple declaration of our mental processes by means of words attached to, and expressive of, our ideas. Why, then, does he find fault with our contention that the term ungeneracy was devised to indicate the existence of God without origin or beginning, and that, independently of all exercise of speech, or silence, or thought, and before the very idea of creation, God was and remains ungenerate? If, indeed, any one should argue that God was not ungenerate till the name ungeneracy had been found, the man might be pardonable for writing as he has written, in contravention of such an absurdity. But if no one denies that He existed before speech and reason, whereas, while the form of words by which the meaning is expressed is said by us to have been devised by mental conception, the end and aim of his controversy with us is to show that the name is not of man’s device, but that it existed before our creation, though by whom it was spoken I do not know34    Oehler’s reading and stopping are both faulty here, viz., οὐκ οἶδα περὶ τίνος λεγόμενον τί κοινὸν ἔχει κ.τ.λ. Manifestly the stop should be at λεγόμενον, and the reading of the editt. παρὰ τίνος is right., what has the assertion that God existed ungenerately before all things, and the contention that35    It is not necessary to change the τὸ here to τῷ as Oehler suggests. The Munich Cod. omits it altogether. But he has done good service to the text, by supplying from his Codices all that follows, down to “the same sort of argument” (except that the first διαγωνίζεσθαι is probably a gloss). mental conception is posterior to God, got to do with this aim of his? For that God is not a conception has been fully demonstrated, so that we may press him with the same sort of argument, and reply, so to say, in his own words, e.g. “It is utter folly to regard understanding as of earlier birth than those who exercise it”; or again, as he proceeds a little below, “Nor as though we intended this, i.e. to make men, the latest of God’s works of creation, anterior to the conceptions of their own understanding.” Great indeed would be the force of the argument, if any one of us, out of sheer folly and madness, should argue that God was a conception of the mind. But if this is not so, nor ever has been, (for who would go to such a pitch of folly as to assert that He Who alone is, and Who brought all else whatsoever into being, has no substantial existence of His own, and to make Him out to be a mere conception of a name?) why does he fight with shadows, contending with imaginary propositions? Is not the cause of this unreasonable litigiousness clear, that, feeling ashamed of the fallacy respecting ungeneracy with which his dupes have been deluded (since it has been proved that the word is very far removed from the Divine essence), he is deliberately shuffling up his arguments, shifting the controversy from words to things, so that by throwing all into confusion the unwary may more easily be seduced, by imagining that God has been described by us either as a conception, or as posterior in existence to the invention of human terminology; and thus, leaving our argument unrefuted, he is shifting his position to another quarter of the field? For our conclusion was, as I have said, that the term ungeneracy does not indicate the Divine nature, but is applicable to it as the result of a conception by which the fact that God subsists without prior cause is pointed at. But what they were for establishing was this: that the word was indicative of the Divine essence itself. Yet how has it been established that the word has this force? I suppose the handling of this question is in reserve in some other of his writings. But here he makes it his main object to show that God exists ungenerately, just as though some one were simply questioning him on such points as these—what view he held as to the term ungenerate, whether he thought it invented to show that the First Cause was without beginning and origin, or as declaring the Divine essence itself; and he, with much assumption of gravity and wisdom, were replying that he, for his part, had no doubt that God was the Maker of heaven and earth. How widely this method of proceeding differs from, and is unconnected with, his first contention, you may see, in the same way as you may see how little his fine description of his controversy with us is connected with the question at issue. For let us look at the matter in this wise.

ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς τινα τῶν εὐσεβῶς περὶ αὐτὸν νοουμένων κατάληψιν σχοίημεν, ῥήμασί τισι καὶ συλλαβαῖς τὰς τῶν νοημάτων διαφορὰς ἐτυπώσαμεν, οἷόν τινα σήμαντρα καὶ χαρακτῆρας τὰς διὰ τοῦ λόγου τυπώσεις τοῖς τῆς διανοίας κινήμασιν ἐπιγράψαντες, ὥστε τῶν ἐγγινομένων τῇ ψυχῇ κινημάτων τρανὴν καὶ ἀσύγχυτον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν δήλωσιν διὰ τῶν ἐφηρμοσμένων τοῖς νοήμασι φθόγγων. τί τοίνυν ἐλέγχει τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον, καθ' ὅν φαμεν ἐπινενοῆσθαι τὸ τῆς « ἀγεννησίας » ὄνομα πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τοῦ ἀνάρχως τὸν θεὸν ὑφεστάναι, τῷ λέγειν ὅτι ὁ θεὸς καὶ λαλούντων καὶ σιωπώντων καὶ διανοουμένων καὶ πρὸ τῆς τῶν γενομένων ἐπινοίας ἦν τε καὶ ἔστιν ἀγέννητος; εἰ μὲν γάρ τις ἦν ὁ κατασκευάζων μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀγέννητον εἶναι πρὶν ἢ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐξευρεθῆναι τὸ ὄνομα, συγγνωστὸς ἂν ἦν πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀτοπίαν ἐκεῖνα γράφων. εἰ δὲ τὸ προϋφεστάναι καὶ λόγου καὶ διανοίας αὐτὸν παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις, καθ' ἣν ὁ νοῦς ἐξαγγέλλεται, δι' ἐπινοίας παρ' ἡμῶν ἐξευρῆσθαι λέγεται, ὁ δὲ σκοπὸς αὐτῷ τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐστι μάχης τὸ δεῖξαι μὴ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ἐπινενοῆσθαι τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλ' εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας συστάσεως, οὐκ οἶδα περὶ τίνος λεγόμενον τί κοινὸν ἔχει πρὸς τὴν προκειμένην αὐτῷ σπουδὴν τὸ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων ὑφεστάναι τὸν θεὸν ἀγεννήτως λέγειν καὶ τὸ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι μεταγενεστέραν εἶναι διαγωνίζεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν. μὴ γὰρ ἐπίνοιάν τις εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν λόγων διαγωνίζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ἃ εἴρηκεν, ὅτι « μαινομένων ἐστὶ τὸ πρεσβυτέραν τῶν ἐπινοούντων ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν », καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ὅσα ὑποβὰς διεξέρχεται: « ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο φρονούντων, τὸ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καίπερ ὅντας ὑστάτους τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργημάτων, προτάττειν τῆς σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐπινοίας. » μεγάλην γὰρ « ἂν » τῷ ὄντι τὴν ἰσχὺν ὁ λόγος εἶχεν, εἴπερ τις ἐκ μανίας ἢ παραφροσύνης ἐπίνοιαν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἀπεφαίνετο. εἰ δὲ οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε μὴν γεγένηται (τίς γὰρ ἂν εἰς τοῦτο παραπληξίας ἐλάσειεν, ὥστε τὸν ὄντως ὄντα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἔστιν εἰς γένεσιν ἀγαγόντα, τοῦτον μὴ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐπίνοιαν ὀνόματος αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι;) τί μάτην σκιαμαχεῖ τοῖς οὐ τεθεῖσι μαχόμενος; ἢ πρόδηλος ἡ αἰτία τῆς ἀδιανοήτου ταύτης φιλονεικίας, ὅτι τοὺς ἐξαπατηθέντας διὰ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀγεννησίαν σοφίσματος αἰσχυνόμενος, ἐπειδὴ διηλέγχθη πάμπολυ τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν σημασίας κεχωρισμένον τὸ ὄνομα, ἑκὼν ποιεῖται τῶν λεγομένων τὴν σύγχυσιν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα μεταβιβάζων τὴν μάχην, ὡς τοὺς ἀνεπιστάτους εὐκόλως διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης παρακρουσθῆναι συγχύσεως, νομίζοντας ἢ ἐπίνοιαν τὸν θεὸν παρ' ἡμῶν εἰρῆσθαι ἢ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὀνομάτων εὑρέσεως δεύτερον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καταλιπὼν ἀνέλεγκτον τὸ ἡμέτερον πρὸς ἕτερα μεταφέρει τὴν μάχην; τὸ γὰρ παρ' ἡμῶν ἦν, καθὼς εἴρηται, τὸ τῆς « ἀγεννησίας » ὄνομα μὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐπινοίας ἐφαρμόζειν τῇ φύσει, δι' ἧς τὸ ἄνευ αἰτίας αὐτὸν ὑφεστάναι σημαίνεται. τὸ δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν κατασκευαζόμενον ἦν αὐτῆς εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας ἐνδεικτικὴν τὴν φωνήν. ποῦ τοίνυν κατεσκευάσθη τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμιν; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἑτέροις που πάντως τεταμίευται λόγοις, ὁ δὲ πᾶς αὐτῷ πόνος εἰς τὸ ὑφεστάναι τὸν θεὸν ἀγεννήτως ἠσχόληται: ὅμοιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις σαφῶς αὐτὸν περὶ τούτων ἤρετο, τίνα περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἀγεννησίας ἔχοι διάνοιαν, εἴτε ὡς ἐπινοουμένου πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τοῦ ἀνάρχως εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον εἴτε καὶ ὡς αὐτῆς δηλωτικοῦ τῆς οὐσίας, ὁ δὲ μάλα σεμνῶς καὶ ἐπιστατικῶς ἀπεκρίνατο τὸ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν εἶναι μὴ ἀμφιβάλλειν. ὡς τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀπᾴδει τοῦ προταθέντος καὶ οὐ συνήρτηται, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εὕροις ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καλλιγραφηθείσης αὐτῷ καθ' ἡμῶν μάχης τὸ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν ἀσυνάρτητον. οὑτωσὶ δὲ σκοπήσωμεν.