But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I seem to myself to be wearing out the patience of my audience before we come to the brunt of the battle. These points, then, I will leave it to my more learned hearers to dispose of, and proceed with my task. Nor will I now notice a thing he has said, which, however, is closely connected with our inquiry; viz. that these things have been so arranged that human thought and conception can claim no authority over names. But who is there that maintains that what is not seen in its own subsistence has authority over anything? For only those creatures that are governed by their own deliberate will are capable of acting with authority. But thought and conception are an operation of the mind, which depends on the deliberate choice of those who speak, having no independent subsistence, but subsisting only in the force of the things said. But this, he says, belongs to God, the Creator of all things, who, by limitations and rules of relation, operation, and proportion, applies suitable appellations to each of the things named. But this either is sheer nonsense, or contradicts his previous assertions. For if he now professes that God affixes names suitable to their subjects, why does he argue, as we have seen that God bestows lofty names on things without honour, not allowing them a share in the dignity which their names indicate, and again, that He degrades things of a lofty nature by names without honour, their nature not being affected by the meanness of their appellations? But perhaps we are unfair to him in subjecting his senseless collocation of phrases to such accusations as these. For they are altogether alien to any sense (I do not mean only to a sense in keeping with reverence), and they will be found to be utterly devoid of reason by all who understand how to form an accurate judgment in such matters. Since, then, like the fish called the sea-lung, what we see appears to have bulk and volume, which turns out, however, to be only viscous matter disgusting to look at, and still more disgusting to handle, I shall pass over his remarks in silence, deeming that the best answer to his idle effusions. For it would be better that we should not inquire what law governs “operation,” and “proportion,” and “relation,” and who it is that prescribes laws to God in respect to rules and modes of proportion and relation, than that, by busying ourselves in such matters, we should nauseate our hearers, and digress from more important matters of inquiry.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐνσχολάζων τοῖς ἀνοήτοις ἔοικά τι κατὰ τὸ λεληθὸς τοῖς ἐναντίοις χαρίζεσθαι. πρὸς γὰρ τὰ μάταια τῶν εἰρημένων ἀντιτιθεὶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκναίειν μοι δοκῶ τοὺς καθομιλοῦντας τῷ λόγῳ πρὸ τῆς « ὑπὲρ » τῶν καιριωτέρων μάχης. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μέν, ὅπως ἂν ἔχῃ, τοῖς ἐπιστατικωτέροις τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἐατέον, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὰ προκείμενα μετενεκτέον τὸν λόγον. σιγάσθω δὲ καὶ τὸ προσεχῶς τοῖς ἐξητασμένοις προσκείμενον ὅτι: « ταῦτα μέντοι τοῦτον διατέτακται τὸν τρόπον, οὐ τῆς ἐπινοίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαχούσης τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῶν ὀνομάτων »_τίς γὰρ τοῦτό φησι, τὸ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν θεωρούμενον ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ πράγματος εἶναί τινος; μόνων γὰρ τῶν οἰκείᾳ τινὶ προαιρέσει διοικουμένων τὸ κατ' ἐξουσίαν τι πράττειν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἐπίνοια τῆς ἡμετέρας διανοίας ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς τῶν φθεγγομένων ἤρτηται προαιρέσεως, οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑφεστῶσα, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τῶν διαλεγομένων ὁρμῇ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσα_« ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ », φησί, « τοῦ τὰ πάντα δημιουργήσαντος θεοῦ σχέσεως τε καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἀναλογίας μέτροις καὶ νόμοις προσφυῶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων τὰς προσηγορίας συναρμόζοντος ». ταῦτα δὲ ἢ καθόλου νοῦν οὐκ ἔχει ἢ ὑπεναντίως τοῖς προεκτεθεῖσιν ἔχει. εἰ γὰρ προσφυῶς ἁρμόζειν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις μαρτυρεῖ νῦν τῷ θεῷ τὰ ὀνόματα, πῶς ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέροις κατασκευάζει τὸν θεὸν τοῖς ἀτίμοις τὰ ὑψηλότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων χαρίζεσθαι, μὴ συμμεταδιδόντα τῆς ἐμφαινομένης τῇ σημασίᾳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀξίας, καὶ πάλιν τὰ μεγάλα κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καθυβρίζειν ταῖς ἀτίμοις φωναῖς, τῇ ταπεινότητι τῶν ῥημάτων οὐ συμμετατιθεμένης τῆς φύσεως; ἀλλ' ἀδικοῦμεν τάχα τὴν ἀδιανόητον αὐτοῦ ταύτην τῶν ῥημάτων συνθήκην ταῖς τοιαύταις κατηγορίαις ὑπάγοντες. ταῦτα γὰρ καθόλου πάσης ἐστὶ διανοίας ἀλλότρια, οὐ μόνον τῆς ὀρθῆς λέγω τῆς εἰς εὐσέβειαν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν μετέχοντά τινος λογισμοῦ τοῖς ἐξετάζειν ἀκριβῶς ἐπισταμένοις εὑρίσκεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν θαλασσίων πνευμόνων ὄγκον μέν τινα τὸ φαινόμενον ἔχειν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ ὄγκος φλέγμα ἐστὶ βδελυκτὸν μὲν ἰδεῖν, βδελυκτότερον δὲ εἰς χεῖρας λαβεῖν, διὰ τοῦτο πρεπωδεστάτην πρὸς τὰ μάταια τὴν σιωπὴν κρίνων παραδραμοῦμαι τὰ εἰρημένα σιγῇ. τίνι γὰρ διοικεῖται νόμῳ ἐνέργειά τε καὶ ἀναλογία καὶ σχέσις καὶ τίς ὁ νομοθετῶν τῷ θεῷ τοὺς τῆς ἀναλογίας καὶ σχέσεως νόμους καὶ τρόπους, κρεῖττον ἂν εἴη μένειν ἀνεξέταστον ἢ διὰ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα σπουδῆς ναυτίαν τε ποιεῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσι καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων τὸν λόγον.