But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessarily close our argument, as his writings will supply no material to work on. For as a smoke or a mist makes the air in which it resides heavy and thick, and incapacitates the eye for the discharge of its natural function, yet does not form itself into so dense a body that he who will may grasp and hold it in his palms, and offer resistance to its stroke, so if one should say the same of his pompous piece of writing, the comparison would not be untrue. Much nonsense is worked up in his tumid and viscous discourse, and to one not gifted with over-much discernment, like a mist to one viewing it from afar, it seems to have some substance and shape, but if you come up to it and scrutinize what is said, the theories slip from your hold like smoke, and vanish into nothing, nor have they any solidity or resistance to oppose to the stroke of your argument. It is difficult, therefore, to know what to do. For to those who like to complain either alternative will seem objectionable; whether, leaping over his empty wordiness, as over a ravine, we direct the course of our argument to the level and open country, against those points which seem to have any strength against the truth, or form our absurd battle along the whole line of his inanities. For in the latter case, to those who do not love hard work, our labour, extending over some thousands of lines to no useful purpose, will be wearisome and unprofitable. But if we attack those points only which seem to have some force against the truth, we shall give occasion to our adversaries to accuse us of passing over arguments of theirs which we are unable to refute. Since, then, two courses are open to us, either to take all their arguments seriatim, or to run through those only which are more important—the one course tedious to our hearers, the other liable to be suspected by our assailants—I think it best to take a middle course, and so, as far as possible, to avoid censure on either hand. What, then, is our method? After clearing his vain productions, as well as we can, of the rubbish they have accumulated, we will summarily run through the main points of his argument in such a way as neither to plunge needlessly into the profundities of his nonsense, nor to leave any of his statements unexamined. Now his whole treatise is an ambitious attempt to show that God speaks after the manner of men, and that the Creator of all things gives them suitable names, indicative of the things themselves. And, therefore, opposing himself to him who contended that such names are given by that rational nature which we have received from God, he accuses him of error, and of desertion from his fundamental proposition: and having brought this charge against him, he uses the following arguments in support of his position.

Ἀλλὰ δέδοικα μὴ πάντα ἡμῖν ἐπίσης τὰ ἐκ τῆς λογογραφίας τοῦ Εὐνομίου προκείμενα φλέγματά τινα ᾖ καὶ θαλάσσιοι πνεύμονες: ὥστε κατ' ἀνάγκην ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐναπολῆξαι, μηδεμίαν ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων ὕλην εἰς ἐργασίαν εὑρίσκοντα. ὡς γάρ τις καπνὸς ἢ ὀμίχλη βαθύνει μὲν καὶ ἀναθολοῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ἐν ᾧπερ ἂν τὴν σύστασιν λάβῃ, καὶ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργειαν κωλύει τὴν ὅρασιν, οὐ μὴν οὕτω καταπυκνοῦται πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ὡς καὶ δράξασθαι τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ περισχεῖν ταῖς παλάμαις καὶ ἀντιτυπῆσαι τῷ πλήττοντι, τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ περὶ τῆς σεμνῆς ταύτης λογογραφίας εἰπών τις οὐκ ἂν τῆς ἀληθοῦς εἰκασίας ἁμάρτοι. πολὺς ὁ ὕθλος ἐν ὀγκώδει καὶ φλεγμαίνοντι λόγῳ πεπονημένος καὶ τῷ μὴ λίαν διορατικῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ὥσπερ ἀχλὺς τῷ πόρρωθεν βλέποντι σύστασιν ἔχειν τινὰ καὶ φαντασίαν δοκεῖ: εἰ δέ τις κατ' αὐτὸν γένοιτο καὶ τῇ ἐξεταστικῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐφάπτοιτο, καπνοῦ δίκην διαρρεῖ « ὑπὸ » τῆς λαβῆς τὰ νοήματα καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν διασκίδναται καὶ οὐ δέχεται διά τινος στερρότητος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας τὸν πλήττοντα λόγον. τί οὖν χρὴ πράττειν, ἄπορον: εὐσυκοφάντητος γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον παρὰ τοῖς φιλαιτίοις ἡ αἵρεσις, εἴτε καθάπερ τινὰ φάραγγα διαπηδήσαντες τὴν κενοφωνίαν ἐπὶ τὰ πρανῆ καὶ ἐπίδρομα τὸν λόγον εὐθύνωμεν, τοῖς δοκοῦσί τινα κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἰσχὺν ἔχειν συσταθέντες διὰ τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως, εἴτε καὶ πάσῃ συμπαρατείνωμεν τῇ φλυαρίᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὰ μάταια μάχην: οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐπαχθὴς ἔσται τοῖς ἀφιλοπόνοις ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ἀνόνητος ἐν πολλαῖς ἐπῶν χιλιάσιν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ χρησίμῳ μηκυνομένη. εἰ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων ἔχειν τινὰ κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἰσχὺν μόνων ἀντιλαβοίμεθα, κατηγορίας ἀφορμὴν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις παρέξομεν ὡς παρεικότες τινὰ τῶν οὐ δεχομένων ἀντίρρησιν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν δύο προκειμένων ἡμῖν, τοῦ τε διὰ πάντων τὸν λόγον ἐλθεῖν καὶ τοῦ τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτέροις μόνοις ἐπιδραμεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἐπαχθὲς τοῖς ἀκούουσι, τὸ δὲ τοῖς διαβάλλουσιν ὕποπτον, καλῶς ἔχειν φημὶ μέσην τινὰ τραπόμενον ἐκφυγεῖν ἑκατέρωθεν ὡς οἷόν τε τὸ ὑπαίτιον. τίς οὖν ἡ μέθοδος; πάντων τῶν κατὰ τὸ μάταιον πεπονημένων αὐτῷ συντεμόντες ὡς οἷόν τε τὸν πολὺν συρφετὸν δι' ὀλίγων ἐπιδραμούμεθα κεφαλαιωδῶς τὰ νοήματα, ὡς μήτε τοῖς ἀνοήτοις ἐμβαθύνειν εἰκῆ μήτε τι τῶν εἰρημένων περιϊδεῖν ἀνεξέταστον.
Ἅπας τοίνυν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἄσχολός ἐστι τὴν σπουδήν, δεῖξαι φιλονεικῶν ἀνθρωπικῶς τὸ θεῖον διαλεγόμενον καὶ τὰς σημαντικὰς τῶν πραγμάτων φωνὰς αὐτὸν τοῖς οὖσι τὸν τῶν πραγμάτων δημιουργὸν ἐφαρμόζοντα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μαχόμενος πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα τῆς λογικῆς εἶναι φύσεως, ἣν θεόθεν εἰλήφαμεν, τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας διαμαρτάνειν φησὶ καὶ τῆς ἰδίας αὐτὸν μὴ κρατεῖν ὑποθέσεως καὶ ταύτην ἐπαγαγὼν τὴν μέμψιν αὐτῷ τοιούτοις κέχρηται λογισμοῖς πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν.