Such is our position; our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term126 i.e. ἀγέννητος, is such as can derive no help from any reasonings; he only spits forth at random about it these strangely unmeaning and bombastic expressions127 ἀλλοκότως αὐτοῦ τὰς τοιαύτας στομφώδεις καὶ ἀδιανοήτους φωνὰς…πρὸς τὸ συμβὰν ἀποπτύοντος, in the framework of his sentences and periods. But the upshot of all he says is this; that there is no difference in the meaning of the most varied names. But we must most certainly, as it seems to me, quote this passage of his word for word, lest we be thought to be calumniously charging him with something that does not belong to him. “True expressions,” he says, “derive their precision from the subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are applied to different realities, the same to the same: and so one or other of these two things must of necessity be held: either that the reality indicated is different (if the expressions are), or else that the indicating expressions are not different.” With these and many other such-like words, he proceeds to effect the object he has before him, excluding from the expression certain relations and affinities128 ἐκβαλὼν τοῦ λόγου σχέσεις τινὰς καὶ παραθέσεις. Gulonius’ Latin is wrong; “protulit in medium.”, such as species, proportion, part, time, manner: in order that by the withdrawal of all these “Ungeneracy” may become indicative of the substance of God. His process of proof is in the following manner (I will express his idea in my own words). The life, he says, is not a different thing from the substance; no addition may be thought of in connection with a simple being, by dividing our conception of him into a communicating and communicated side; but whatever the life may be, that very thing, he insists, is the substance. Here his philosophy is excellent; no thinking person would gainsay this. But how does he arrive at his contemplated conclusion, when he says, “when we mean the unbeginning, we mean the life, and truth compels us by this last to mean the substance”? The ungenerate, then, according to him is expressive of the very substance of God. We, on the other hand, while we agree that the life of God was not given by another, which is the meaning of “unbeginning,” think that the belief that the idea expressed by the words “not generated” is the substance of God is a madman’s only. Who indeed can be so beside himself as to declare the absence of any generation to be the definition of that substance (for as generation is involved in the generate, so is the absence of generation in the ungenerate)? Ungeneracy indicates that which is not in the Father; so how shall we allow the indication of that which is absent to be His substance? Helping himself to that which neither we nor any logical conclusion from the premises allows him, he lays it down that God’s Ungeneracy is expressive of God’s life. But to make quite plain his delusion upon this subject, let us look at it in the following way; I mean, let us examine whether, by employing the same method by which he, in the case of the Father, has brought the definition of the substance to ungeneracy, we may not equally bring the substance of the Son to ungeneracy.
Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρ' ἡμῶν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τοῦ πολεμοῦντος ἡμῖν κατ' αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν τῆς λέξεως σύμφρασιν τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ὡς μηδεμίαν τὴν ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλοκότως αὐτοῦ τὰς τοιαύτας στομφώδεις καὶ ἀδιανοήτους φωνὰς ἐν κώλων καὶ περιόδων σχήματι πρὸς τὸ συμβὰν ἀποπτύοντος. ὁ δὲ σκοπὸς τῶν λεγομένων οὗτός ἐστι, τὸ μηδεμίαν εἶναι τῶν ποικίλων ὀνομάτων κατὰ τὰς ἐμφάσεις διαφοράν. ἀνάγκη δὲ πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτὴν ἐπὶ λέξεως παραθέσθαι τὴν ῥῆσιν, ὡς ἂν μὴ συκοφαντικῶς ἐπιφέρειν αὐτῷ τι τῶν οὐ προσόντων δοκοίημεν. « τῶν γὰρ ἀληθῶν » φησι « λόγων ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ δηλουμένων πραγμάτων λαμβανόντων τὴν ἐπίκρισιν καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἑτέροις πράγμασι συναρμοζομένων ὥσπερ » αὖ « καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον, ἢ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ δηλούμενον πάντως ἕτερον ἢ μηδὲ τὸν δηλοῦντα λόγον ἕτερον ». ταῦτα καὶ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προτεθέντος αὐτῷ σκοποῦ κατασκευὴν διεξέρχεται, ἐκβαλὼν τοῦ λόγου σχέσεις τινὰς καὶ παραθέσεις καὶ εἶδος καὶ μέτρον καὶ μέρος καὶ χρόνον καὶ τόπον, ὡς διὰ τῆς τούτων ὑπεξαιρέσεως τῆς οὐσίας ἐνδεικτικὴν τὴν ἀγεννησίαν γενέσθαι. ἡ δὲ κατασκευὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, λέξω δὲ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ λέξει τὸ νόημα. « οὐκ ἄλλη τις », φησίν, « ἡ ζωὴ παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μή τις σύνθεσις περὶ τὴν ἁπλῆν νοοῖτο φύσιν, πρὸς τὸ μετέχον καὶ μετεχόμενον τῆς ἐννοίας μεριζομένης: ἀλλ' αὐτό », φησίν, « ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ζωή, οὐσία ἐστί », καλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοσοφῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ἀντείποι τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων μὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν.
Ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὸν σκοπὸν συνεπέρανεν; « εἰ τὸ ἄναρχον σημαίνοντες », φησί, « τὴν ζωὴν ἐσημήναμεν, ταύτην δὲ τὴν ζωὴν οὐσίαν λέγειν ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκάζει λόγος, αὐτῆς εἶναι τῆς θείας οὐσίας » φησὶ « σημαντικὸν τὸ ἀγέννητον ». ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ μὲν μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι παρ' ἑτέρου τὴν θείαν ζωήν, ὅπερ σημαίνει ἡ τοῦ ἀνάρχου διάνοια, καὶ αὐτοὶ συντιθέμεθα, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διὰ τῆς τοῦ μὴ γεγεννῆσθαι λέξεως σημαινόμενον οὐσίαν νομίζειν μόνων τῶν ἐκ μανίας παραφερομένων οἰόμεθα. τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἐξέστηκεν ὡς ὁρισμὸν οὐσίας τὴν μὴ γέννησιν ἀποφήνασθαι; ὡς γὰρ οἰκείως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ γεννητὸν ἡ γέννησις, οὕτω δηλαδὴ καὶ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ἐφαρμοσθήσεται ἡ μὴ γέννησις. ὃ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι περὶ τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀγεννησίας ἐνδεικνυμένης, πῶς ἡμεῖς εἰς οὐσίαν τὴν τοῦ μὴ προσόντος ἔνδειξιν συντιθέμεθα; ἀλλ' ἑαυτῷ δοὺς τὸ μήτε παρ' ἡμῶν μήτε ἐκ τῆς τῶν τεθέντων ἀκολουθίας αὐτῷ συγχωρούμενον, τὸ σημαντικὸν τῆς θείας ζωῆς τὴν ἀγεννησίαν εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ συνεπέρανεν. ὡς δ' ἂν μάλιστα καταφανὴς ὁ περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον αὐτοῦ γένοιτο λῆρος, οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον διασκοπήσωμεν. δι' ὧν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγεννησίαν τὸν τῆς οὐσίας περιήγαγε λόγον, ἐξετάσωμεν εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς τὴν ἀγεννησίαν ἀνάξομεν.